The essence of ultimate decision remains impenetrable to the observer—often, indeed, to the decider himself. . . . There will always be the dark and tangled stretches in the decision-making process—mysterious even to those who may be most intimately involved.

John Fitzgerald Kennedy

I have come across men of letters who have written history without taking part in public affairs, and politicians who have concerned themselves with producing events without thinking about them. I have observed that the first are always inclined to find general causes, whereas the second, living in the midst of disconnected daily facts, are prone to imagine that everything is attributable to particular incidents, and that the wires they pull are the same as those that move the world. It is to be presumed that both are equally deceived.

Alexis de Tocqueville
Written under the auspices of
The Faculty Seminar on Bureaucracy, Politics, and Policy
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Harvard University

ESSENCE OF DECISION
Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis

Graham T. Allison
Harvard University

Little, Brown and Company
Boston
To my mother and father

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Preface

My aims in this book are two. On the one hand, I examine the central puzzles of the Cuban missile crisis. Several participants in this nuclear confrontation have already told the story, each from his own point of view. None of these accounts directly addresses the major questions of the crisis. I try to in this book.

On the other hand, I explore the influence of unrecognized assumptions upon our thinking about events like the missile crisis. Answers to questions like why the Soviet Union tried to sneak strategic offensive missiles into Cuba must be affected by basic assumptions we make, categories we use, our angle of vision. But what kind of assumptions do we tend to make? How do these assumptions channel our thinking? What alternative perspectives are available? This study identifies the basic frame of reference used by most people when thinking about foreign affairs. Furthermore, it outlines two alternative frameworks. Each frame of reference is, in effect, a "conceptual lens." By comparing and contrasting the three frameworks, we see what each magnifies, highlights, and reveals as well as what each blurs or neglects.

The structure of this book reflects my dual objectives. Three conceptual chapters sketch three rough-cut frames of reference. These chapters are separated by three case studies, each of which uses one of the frames of reference in searching for answers to the major questions of the Cuban missile crisis. By addressing central issues of the crisis first from one perspective, then from a second, and finally from a third, these chapters not only probe more deeply into the event, uncovering additional insights; they also demonstrate how alternative conceptual lenses lead one to see, emphasize, and worry about quite different aspects of events like the missile crisis.

On the one hand, substantive instance; on the other, concep-
tual argument. Today I must confess that I am no longer certain where one ends and the other begins, or, indeed, which is the head and which the tail of my own dog. But I am certain about the impulse that led me to pursue these two aims jointly.

This book attempts to address the entire community of foreign policy observers, which comprises both "artists" and "scientists." For the artists, the appeal of the conceptual chapters may be minimal. As "spinach and callisthenics," they will be palatable to the extent they stimulate new insight into old problems, clearer perception of additional facets, and better substantive studies. But for the scientists, the theoretical chapters constitute the contribution: pointing out the existence of implicit conceptual frameworks within which investigations proceed and spelling out some of the systematic implications of alternative models. In attempting to address both audiences simultaneously, I open myself to the objection that the cases lack the subtlety and craft of "art," whereas the theoretical chapters display little of the system and rigor of "science." How justifiable such criticism may be is left to the reader's judgment. But there should be no ambiguity about the reasons for my attempt.

If a common ground exists between the artists and the scientists, that ground is explanation. Neither art's appreciation of the uniqueness of occurrences nor science's grasp of occurrences as mere instances of more general propositions is limited to explanation. But central to both enterprises is an attempt to understand and explain why events occurred. The artist may appear (to the scientist) overly fascinated with nuance and randomness that would be better treated as extraneous fluff around common, recurring elements. The scientist may seem (to the artist) to ride roughshod over relevant, particular details in the quest for generality. But the achievement of neither group in the foreign policy community justifies arrogance toward, or neglect of, the other's work. Thus, my attempt to produce explanations and, in the same book, to formulate systematically the concepts and propositions in terms of which the explanations are produced, seems appropriate.

However wide the gulf between artists and scientists, in the end both must be mellowed by awareness of the insight expressed in the epigraph: "The essence of ultimate decision remains impenetrable to the observer — often, indeed, to the decider himself... There will always be the dark and tangled stretches in the decision-making process — mysterious even to those who may be most intimately involved."

A Reader's Guide. My argument in this book has been percolating for more than five years. Drafts of pieces of the argument have circulated since the summer of 1967. But when I finally decided to sit down and write the book, a colleague offered me some advice. Rather than stumbling around thinking about a general unknown reader, or trying to write for everyman, he suggested instead that I choose four or five real people and let them stand for the circle of readers to whom I was writing. I found the advice quite helpful. And it may be instructive to identify these individuals — in general terms — and to state, briefly, my hopes in writing for each.

The first two "representative readers" are a colleague and a student. The colleague is a professional analyst of foreign policy and international relations; the student, a bright college sophomore. For the colleague the chapters on the missile crisis should provide new material, a fresh look at the central issues, and an illustration of the general argument. More ambitiously, the conceptual chapters try to (1) provide a comprehensive overview of the product of analysis in various areas of foreign policy and international relations; (2) present a set of categories which can be used in judging that product; (3) undermine prevailing assumptions both about the nontheoretical nature of foreign policy analysis and about the rampant disjointedness of efforts in various substantive areas of foreign policy; (4) challenge the basic categories and assumptions within which most analysts think about problems of foreign policy; and (5) sketch two sharp, provocative alternative conceptual frameworks. The basic outline of the general argument can stand on its own feet. (Indeed, a number of other scholars are using the alternative models in their own studies.) But, strictly speaking, the argument is unfinished. It stands as an invitation to my colleague, and to the reader: please join the discussion.

For the student, the chapters on the missile crisis are meant to make persuasive an unhappy, troubling, but unavoidable fact about this world. No event demonstrates more clearly than the missile crisis that with respect to nuclear war there is an awesome crack between unlikelihood and impossibility. The theoretical chapters, especially the summaries of various areas of the literature, should acquaint him with what serious analysts do and with what their analyses have produced. But the chief attraction will, I hope, be the speed at which the interested student is brought to the frontiers of analysis of foreign policy, and indeed of all public policy.
Third and fourth are a layman who is a regular reader of foreign policy articles in The New York Times, and a serious journalist. As I pondered their interests and tastes, I found less difference between these two individuals and the first two readers than I had first imagined. Thus I hope that both the layman and the journalist will find the entire study relevant, for some of the same reasons. But they, or some people like them, may be bored by the summaries of the literature and the more formal considerations in each of the conceptual chapters. If so, they can omit the conceptual chapters, except for the statements of each paradigm.

Fifth, is the wife of one of my colleagues, an intelligent person not especially interested in foreign affairs, and thus a good stand-in for "general readers." After reading an earlier draft of the manuscript, this colleague recommended it to her wife with the advice, "Read the introduction and then just read the alternate chapters on the missile crisis." These chapters can be read simply as an unfolding of the evidence about this crucial event from three alternative vantage points. The general reader should be forewarned, however, that this path will not leave him with a confident account of "what really happened." Indeed, if I had been successful, it should lead him to become interested in the issues to which the conceptual chapters are addressed.

A Note on Sources. As John F. Kennedy warned with explicit reference to the Cuban missile crisis, "Any historian who walks through this mine field of charges and countercharges should proceed with some care." My discussion of the missile crisis makes use of all information in the published record. As the footnotes attest, the amount of information available in public primary sources is extraordinary. I have also been privileged to have interviews and conversations with most of the high-level participants in the crisis. Moreover, I have the benefit of extended and repeated conversations with many individuals who have spent time reminiscing with the central participants. And, finally, I have interviewed a large number of people who were involved in the lower-level operations of the U.S. government during the crisis. These individuals provided a valuable guide through the maze of public material. For their patience and consideration, as well as their information, I am most grateful. Some of my sources insisted on anonymity. Others were promised an opportunity to review any manuscript that quoted them directly. My aspiration here is not to write a definitive history but rather to demonstrate the possibility and utility of alternative approaches to events of this sort (given the information available in public sources). Therefore, the three stories of the missile crisis in this book are documented entirely from the public record.

Acknowledgments. The origins of this book go back at least to the spring of 1966 when several Harvard faculty members began meeting to discuss the impact of "bureaucracy" on "policy" — the gap between the intentions of the actors and the results of governmental action. The "May Group," as we came to be known after our chairman, Ernest R. May, included Morton H. Halperin, Fred C. Iklé, William W. Kaufmann, Andrew W. Marshall, Richard E. Neustadt, Don K. Price, Harry S. Rowen, and myself as rapporteur. That group hooked me on the problem, supplied me with more ideas than I could assimilate, and criticized every successive attempt to formulate what became the general argument of this book. Indeed, the book represents to a large extent the most recent but still unfinished "Evolving Paper" of that group — though, obviously, none of them can be saddled with responsibility for any of the faults in this statement of the argument. Today the group meets as the Research Seminar on Bureaucracy, Politics, and Policy of the Institute of Politics in the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard. Over these five years, membership in the group has included Francis M. Bator, Joseph L. Bower, William C. Capron, Michel Crozier, Philip B. Heymann, Albert O. Hirschman, Stanley Hoffmann, Henry D. Jacoby, Doris H. Kearns, Lance Liebman, David S. Mundel, Edwin O. Reischauer, Thomas C. Schelling, James Q. Wilson, Samuel L. Williamson, and Adam Yarmolinsky. To this group, and to each of the members individually, I am most grateful.

Since this book has been so long in the making, drafts of the manuscript, or pieces thereof, have circulated in various forms. In addition to members of the May Group, a large number of other readers have offered pertinent criticisms and suggestions. For services beyond any call of duty or responsibility, I want to thank Alexander L. George, William R. Harris, Roger Hillsman, Theodore R. Marmor, Warner C. Schilling, Leon V. Sigal, Harrison Wellford, Martin S. Wishnatsky, Albert Wohlstetter, Roberta Wohlstetter, and Charles Wolf, Jr.

Several institutions have supported my research and writing. The Institute of Politics served as catalyst for the original May
Group and as patron in a variety of ways ever since. The Rand Corporation gave me spare time during two summers in a critical, stimulating environment. An early draft was revised while I was a Research Associate at the Center for International Affairs at Harvard. An International Affairs Fellowship from the Council on Foreign Relations allowed me to complete the manuscript and to begin pushing further some of its implications.

Final preparation of the manuscript was greatly aided by Janet Shur's excellent research assistance, Joan Wyatt's service not only as typist but also as copy editor, and Susan Elliott's chasing of references.

Four individuals deserve special note for the intellectual and personal debt I have incurred. The influence of Thomas C. Schelling will be obvious in my chapter on Model I. The impact of ideas that Andrew W. Marshall has been propagating for a decade is marked, especially in my chapter on Model II. My heaviest debt, which is clearest in my chapter on Model III, is to Richard E. Neustadt. To each of these men I am deeply grateful. Elisabeth K. M. Allison, my wife, pushed me at the beginning, served as an indefatigable research assistant during the long haul, and nudged me across the finish line by sweetly, but not infrequently, inquiring, "When are you going to be through?"

Contents

Introduction 1
The General Argument 2
Some Reservations 7

1 Model I: The Rational Actor 10
   The Classical Model Illustrated 14
      Military Force Posture. American Foreign Policy. Theory
      with a Capital "T."

   A Rigorous Model of Action 28
   A Rational Actor Paradigm 32
   Variants of the Classical Model 36

2 Cuba II: A First Cut 39
   Why Did the Soviet Union Decide to Place Offensive
   Missiles in Cuba? 40
      Hypothesis One: Bargaining Barter. Hypothesis Two:
      Hypothesis Four: Cold War Politics. Hypothesis Five:
      Missile Power.

   Why Did the United States Respond to the Missile
   Deployment with a Blockade? 56
   Why Did the Soviet Union Withdraw the Missiles? 62

3 Model II: Organizational Process 67
   Organizational Theory and Economics 69
   Organizational Process Paradigm 78
   The Organizational Process Paradigm Applied 97
      Nuclear Strategy.
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Introduction

The Cuban missile crisis was a seminal event. History offers no parallel to those thirteen days of October 1962, when the United States and the Soviet Union paused at the nuclear precipice. Never before had there been such a high probability that so many lives would end suddenly. Had war come, it could have meant the death of 100 million Americans, more than 100 million Russians, as well as millions of Europeans. Beside it, the natural calamities and inhumanities of earlier history would have faded into insignificance. Given the odds on disaster—which President Kennedy estimated as “between one out of three and even”—our escape seems awesome. This event symbolizes a central, if only partially “thinkable,” fact about our existence.

Although several excellent accounts are now available, the missile crisis remains, as Harold Macmillan has observed, a “strange and still scarcely explicable affair.” Even the central questions have eluded satisfactory answers:

Why did the Soviet Union place strategic offensive missiles in Cuba? For what purpose did the Russians undertake such a drastic, risky departure from their traditional policy? Given the repeated American warnings that such an act would not be tolerated, how could Khrushchev have made such a major miscalculation?

Why did the United States respond with a naval quarantine of Soviet shipments to Cuba? Was it necessary for the United States to force a public nuclear confrontation? What alternatives were really available? What danger did the Soviet missiles
in Cuba pose for the United States? Did this threat justify the President's choice of a course of action that he believed entailed a 33 to 50 percent chance of disaster? Did that threat require more immediate action to disable the Soviet missiles in Cuba before they became operational?

Why were the missiles withdrawn? What would have happened if, instead of withdrawing the missiles, Khrushchev had announced that the operational Soviet missiles would fire if fired upon? Did the "blockade" work, or was there an "ultimatum" or perhaps some "deal"? Why did the Soviets remove the missiles rather than retaliate at other equally sensitive points — Berlin, for example?

What are the "lessons" of the missile crisis? What does this event teach us about nuclear confrontations? What does it imply about crisis management and government coordination? Is this a model of how to deal with the Soviet Union?

Satisfactory answers to these questions await information that has not yet come to light and more penetrating analysis of available evidence. This study provides new information about the missile crisis and a more powerful analysis of some aspects of it. But the missile crisis also serves as a grist in a more general investigation. This study proceeds from the premise that satisfactory answers to questions about the missile crisis wait for more than information and analysis. Real improvement in our answers to questions of this sort depends on greater awareness of what we (both laymen and professional analysts) bring to the analysis. When answering questions like "Why did the Soviet Union place missiles in Cuba?" what we see and judge to be important and accept as adequate depends not only on the evidence but also on the "conceptual lenses" through which we look at the evidence. Another purpose of this study is therefore to explore some of the fundamental yet often unnoticed choices among the categories and assumptions that channel our thinking about problems like the Cuban missile crisis.

**The General Argument**

When we are puzzled by a happening in foreign affairs, the source of our puzzlement is typically a particular *outcome*: the Soviet emplacement of missiles in Cuba, the movement of U.S. troops across the narrow neck of the Korean peninsula, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.* These occurrences raise obvious questions: Why did the Soviet Union place missiles in Cuba? Why did U.S. troops fail to stop at the narrow neck in their march up Korea? Why did Japan attack the American fleet at Pearl Harbor? In pursuing the answers to these questions, the serious analyst seeks to discover why one specific state of the world came about — rather than some other.

In searching for an explanation, one typically puts himself in the place of the nation, or national government, confronting a problem of foreign affairs, and tries to figure out why he might have chosen the action in question. Thus, analysts have explained the Soviet missiles in Cuba as a probe of American intentions. U.S. troops marched across the narrow neck in Korea because American objectives had escalated as a consequence of easy victories in the South. The attack on Pearl Harbor is explained as Japan's solution to the strategic problem posed by U.S. pressure in the Far East.

In offering (or accepting) these explanations, we are assuming governmental behavior can be most satisfactorily understood by analogy with the purposive acts of individuals. In many cases this is a fruitful assumption. Treating national governments as if they were centrally coordinated, purposive individuals provides a useful shorthand for understanding problems of policy. But this simplification — like all simplifications — obscures as well as reveals. In particular, it obscures the persistently neglected fact of bureaucracy: the "maker" of government policy is not one calculating decisionmaker but is rather a conglomerate of large organizations and political actors. What this fact implies for analysis of events like the Cuban missile crisis is no simple matter: its implications concern the basic categories and assumptions with which we approach events.

More rigorously, the *argument* developed in the body of this study can be summarized in three propositions:

1. Professional analysts of foreign affairs (as well as ordinary laymen) think about problems of foreign and military policy

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*The term *outcome* is introduced here as a technical concept meaning a selectively delimited state of the real world importantly affected by the action of a government. The assertion is that in thinking about problems of foreign affairs, what most participants and analysts are really interested in are outcomes and the specific actions governments take that affect outcomes.*
in terms of largely implicit conceptual models that have significant consequences for the content of their thought.*

In thinking about problems of foreign affairs, professional analysts as well as ordinary laymen proceed in a straightforward, informal, nontheoretical fashion. Careful examination of explanations of events like the Soviet installation of missiles in Cuba, however, reveals a more complex theoretical substructure. Explanations by particular analysts show regular and predictable characteristics, which reflect unrecognized assumptions about the character of puzzles, the categories in which problems should be considered, the types of evidence that are relevant, and the determinants of occurrences. The first proposition is that bundles of such related assumptions constitute basic frames of reference or conceptual models in terms of which analysts and ordinary laymen ask and answer the questions: What happened? Why did it happen? What will happen?* Assumptions like these are central to the activities of explanation and prediction. In attempting to explain a particular event, the analyst cannot simply describe the full state of the world leading up to that event. The logic of explanation requires that he single out the relevant, important determinants of the occurrence. Moreover, as the logic of prediction underscores, he must summarize the various factors as they bear on the occurrence. Conceptual models not only fix the mesh of the nets that the analyst drags through the material in order to explain a particular action; they also direct him to cast his nets in select ponds, at certain depths, in order to catch the fish he is after.

2. Most analysts explain (and predict) the behavior of national governments in terms of one basic conceptual model, here entitled Rational Actor or "Classical" Model (Model I).*

In spite of significant differences in interest and focus, most analysts and ordinary laymen attempt to understand happenings in foreign affairs as the more or less purposive acts of unified national governments. Laymen personify rational actors and speak of their aims and choices. Theorists of international relations focus on problems between nations in accounting for the choices of unitary rational actors. Strategic analysts concentrate on the logic of action in the absence of an actor. For each of these groups, the point of an explanation is to show how the nation or government could have chosen to act as it did, given the strategic problems it faced. For example, in confronting the problem posed by the Soviet installation of strategic missiles in Cuba, the Model I analyst frames the puzzle: Why did the Soviet Union decide to install missiles in Cuba? He then fixes the unit of analysis: governmental choice. Next, he focuses attention on certain concepts: goals and objectives of the nation or government. And finally, he invokes certain patterns of inference: if the nation performed an action of this sort, it must have had a goal of this type. The analyst has "explained"—this event when he can show how placing missiles in Cuba was a reasonable action, given Soviet strategic objectives. Predictions about what a nation will do or would have done are generated by calculating the rational thing to do in a certain situation, given specified objectives.

3. Two alternative conceptual models, here labeled an Organizational Process Model (Model II) and a Governmental (Bureaucratic) Politics Model (Model III),* provide a base for improved explanations and predictions.1

Although the Rational Actor Model has proved useful for many purposes, there is powerful evidence that it must be supplemented, if not supplanted, by frames of reference that focus on the governmental machine—the organizations and political actors involved in the policy process. Model I's implication that important events have important causes, i.e., that monoliths perform large actions for large reasons, must be balanced by the appreciation that (1) monoliths are black boxes covering various gears and levers in a highly differentiated decisionmak*

*In arguing that explanations proceed in terms of implicit conceptual models, this essay makes no claim that foreign policy analysts have developed any satisfactory, empirically tested theory. In this study the term model without qualifiers should be read "conceptual scheme or framework."

*Earlier drafts of this argument have generated heated discussion about proper names for the models. To choose names from ordinary language is to promote familiarity and to court confusion. Perhaps it is best to think of these models simply as Model I, Model II, and Model III.
ing structure and (2) large acts result from innumerable and often conflicting smaller actions by individuals at various levels of bureaucratic organizations in the service of a variety of only partially compatible conceptions of national goals, organizational goals, and political objectives. Model I’s grasp of national purposes and of the pressures created by problems in international relations must confront the intra-national mechanisms from which governmental actions emerge.

Recent developments in organization theory provide the foundation for the second model, which emphasizes the processes and procedures of the large organizations that constitute a government. According to this Organizational Process Model, what Model I analysts characterize as “acts” and “choices” are thought of instead as outputs of large organizations functioning according to regular patterns of behavior. Faced with the problem of Soviet missiles in Cuba, a Model II analyst frames the puzzle: From what organizational context and pressures did this decision emerge? He then fixes the unit of analysis: organizational output. Next, he focuses attention on certain concepts: the strength, standard operating procedures, and repertoires of organizations. And finally, he invokes certain patterns of inference: if organizations produced an output of this kind today, that behavior resulted from existing organizational features, procedures, and repertoires. A Model II analyst has “explained” the event when he has identified the relevant Soviet organizations and displayed the patterns of organizational behavior from which the action emerged. Predictions identify trends that reflect established organizations and their fixed procedures and programs.

The third model focuses on the politics of a government. Events in foreign affairs are understood, according to this model, neither as choices nor as outputs. Rather, what happens is characterized as a resultant of various bargaining games among players in the national government. In confronting the problem posed by Soviet missiles in Cuba, a Model III analyst frames the puzzle: Which results of what kinds of bargaining among which players yielded the critical decisions and actions? He then fixes the unit of analysis: political resultant. Next, he focuses attention on certain concepts: the perceptions, motivations, positions, power, and maneuvers of the players. And finally, he invokes certain patterns of inference: if a government performed an action, that action was the resultant of bargaining among players in games.

A Model III analyst has “explained” this event when he has discovered who did what to whom that yielded the action in question. Predictions are generated by identifying the game in which an issue will arise, the relevant players, and their relative power and skill.

A central metaphor illuminates the differences among these models. Foreign policy has often been compared to moves and sequences of moves in the game of chess. Imagine a chess game in which the observer could see only a screen upon which moves in the game were projected, with no information about how the pieces came to be moved. Initially, most observers would assume — as Model I does — that an individual chess player was moving the pieces with reference to plans and tactics toward the goal of winning the game. But a pattern of moves can be imagined that would lead some observers, after watching several games, to consider a Model II assumption: the chess player might not be a single individual but rather a loose alliance of semi-independent organizations, each of which moved its set of pieces according to standard operating procedures. For example, movement of separate sets of pieces might proceed in turn, each according to a routine, the king’s rook, bishop, and their pawns repeatedly attacking the opponent according to a fixed plan. It is conceivable, furthermore, that the pattern of play might suggest to an observer a Model III assumption: a number of distinct players, with distinct objectives but shared power over the pieces, could be determining the moves as the resultant of collegial bargaining. For example, the black rook’s move might contribute to the loss of a black knight with no comparable gains for the black team, but with the black rook becoming the principal guardian of the palace on that side of the board.

Some Reservations

This bald summary conveys none of my reservations about the persuasiveness of the argument in its present form. To make these points fully convincing would require greater length than seems reasonable here, and more success than I have had in coming to grips with several hard problems. First, the argument that most analysts tend to rely on a single conceptual model sounds crudely reductionist. In spite of my recognition and description of several variants of Model I, my insistence on their
logical similarity may, nonetheless, seem procrustean. Second, because explanation and prediction of international events are not developed theoretical enterprises, few analysts proceed exclusively and single-mindedly within a pure conceptual model. Instead, they think predominantly in terms of one model, occasionally shifting from one variant of it to another and sometimes appropriating material that lies entirely outside the boundaries of the model. These first two problems give rise to a third. When examining uses of the Rational Actor Model, and especially when considering to what extent one has been relying upon some variant of this model, one can always find that it does not really capture all of his analytical activity. Fourth, the richness of variations on the classical theme makes a clearly specified account of the model seem little more than a caricature or a strawman. Fifth, the alternative models are not fully developed. Finally, since the body of literature applying these alternative models to problems of foreign affairs is quite small, my applications of them are simply initial, tentative efforts.

In spite of my limited success in dealing with these difficult problems, many readers have found the general argument a suggestive contribution not only to discussion of the missile crisis but also to general thought about governmental behavior, especially in foreign and military affairs. Consequently, I have been persuaded to set these ideas down as the beginning, not the end, of an extended argument. In part, my compliance stems from the fact that defense of the stated propositions requires more than theoretical argument. The proof of the pudding is in the demonstration that the frameworks produce different explanations. The burden of the argument in this study is shared — some will insist carried — by three case studies that display the products of the conceptual models as each is applied in turn to the same problem: the central puzzles of the Cuban missile crisis. While differences among the conceptual models are examined systematically in the concluding chapter, these alternative explanations of the same happening are more revealing about the character of those differences — by showing the models at work.

A single case can do no more than suggest the kinds of differences among explanations produced by the three models. But the Cuban missile crisis is especially appropriate for the purposes of this study. In the context of ultimate danger to the nation, a small group of men, unhitched from the bureaucracy, weighed the options and decided. Such central, high-level, crisis decisions would seem to be the type of outcome for which Model I analysis is most suited. Model II and Model III are forced to compete on Model I's home ground. The dimensions and factors uncovered by Model II and Model III in this case will therefore be particularly suggestive.
Model I: The Rational Actor

When confronted by a puzzling international event, how does one proceed? Let the reader consider, for example, how he would respond to the assignment "Explain the Soviet installation of missiles in Cuba." The typical analyst or layman begins by considering various aims that the Soviets might have had in mind — for example, to probe American intentions, to defend Cuba, or to improve their bargaining position. By examining the problems the Soviets faced and the character of the action they chose, the analyst eliminates some of these aims as implausible. When he is able to construct a calculation that shows how, in a particular situation, with certain objectives, he could have chosen to place missiles in Cuba, the analyst has explained the action. (Indeed, the statement "I can't understand [or explain] why the Soviets did such and such" points to an inability to balance an action with a plausible calculation.) The attempt to explain international events by recounting the aims and calculations of nations or governments is the trademark of the Rational Actor Model.

As it is exemplified in academic literature, policy papers, the press, and informal conversations, most contemporary thought about foreign policy proceeds within this conceptual model. Consider several brief examples. The most widely cited explanation of the Soviet emplacement of missiles in Cuba has been produced by two Rand sovietologists, Arnold Horelick and Myron Rush. They conclude that "the introduction of strategic missiles into Cuba was motivated chiefly by the Soviet leaders' desire to overcome ... the existing large margin of United States strategic superiority." How do they reach this conclusion? In

Sherlock Holmes style, they magnify several salient characteristics of the action and use these features as criteria against which to test alternative hypotheses about Soviet objectives. For example, the size of the Soviet deployment and the simultaneous emplacement of more expensive, more visible intermediate-range missiles as well as medium-range missiles, they argue, exclude an explanation of the action in terms of Cuban defense — since that objective could have been secured with a much smaller number of medium-range missiles alone. Their explanation presents an argument for one objective that permits interpretation of the details of Soviet behavior as a value-maximizing choice.

What is the point of the puzzle raised by The New York Times reporters over Soviet deployment of an antiballistic missile system? The question, as the Times states it, concerns the Soviet Union's objective in allocating such large sums of money for this weapon system while at the same time seeming to pursue a policy of increasing detente. In former President Johnson's words, "The paradox is that this [Soviet deployment of an antiballistic missile system] should be happening at a time when there is abundant evidence that our mutual antagonism is beginning to ease." This development is troubling because the juxtaposition of Soviet antiballistic missile deployment and evidence of Soviet actions toward detente poses an apparent contradiction. Toward what objective could the Soviet government have rationally chosen to pursue these two courses of action simultaneously? This question arises only when the analyst attempts to structure events as purposive choices of consistent actors.

How do analysts explain the coming of the First World War? According to Hans Morgenthau, "The first World War had its origins exclusively in the fear of a disturbance of the European balance of power." In the pre-World War I period, the Triple Entente was a delicate counterweight to the Triple Alliance. If either bloc could have gained a decisive advantage in the Balkans, it would have achieved a decisive advantage in the balance of power. "It was this fear," Morgenthau says, "that motivated Austria in July 1914 to settle its accounts with Serbia once and for all, and that induced Germany to support Austria unconditionally. It was the same fear that brought Russia to the support of Serbia, and France to the support of Russia." How is Morgenthau able to resolve this problem so confidently? By imposing on the data a "rational outline." The value of this method,
according to Morgenthau, is that "it provides for rational discipline in action and creates that astounding continuity in foreign policy which makes American, British, or Russian foreign policy appear as an intelligible, rational continuum... regardless of the different motives, preferences, and intellectual and moral qualities of successive statesmen."9

Stanley Hoffmann’s essay "Restraints and Choices in American Foreign Policy" concentrates, characteristically, on "deep forces" — the international system, ideology, and national character — which constitute restraints, limits, and blinders.8 When he explains particular occurrences, however, though emphasizing relevant constraints, he focuses on choices of nations. American behavior in Southeast Asia is explained as a reasonable choice of "downgrading this particular alliance [SEATO] in favor of direct United States involvement," given the constraint that "one is bound by one’s commitments; one is committed even by one’s mistakes."10 More frequently, Hoffmann uncovers confusion or contradiction in a nation’s choice. For example, U.S. policy toward underdeveloped countries is explained as "schizophrenic."11

The method Hoffmann employs in explaining national behavior as rational decision (or departure from this norm), he calls "imaginative reconstruction."12

Deterrence is the cardinal issue of contemporary strategic literature. Thomas Schelling’s Strategy of Conflict formulates a number of propositions focused upon the dynamics of deterrence in the nuclear age. One of the major propositions concerns the stability of the balance of terror: in a situation of mutual deterrence, the probability of nuclear war is reduced not by the "balance" (the sheer equality of the situation) but rather by the stability of the balance, i.e., the fact that neither opponent in striking first can destroy the other's ability to strike back.13

How does Schelling support this proposition? His confidence in it derives not from an inductive canvass of a large number of previous cases, but instead from two calculations. In a situation of "balance" but vulnerability, there are values for which a rational opponent could choose to strike first, e.g., to destroy enemy retaliatory capabilities. In a "stable balance," however, each can respond to a first strike by inflicting unacceptable damage. This capability guarantees deterrence since no rational agent could choose a course of action effectively equivalent to national suicide. Whereas most contemporary strategic thinking is driven implicitly by the motor upon which this calculation depends,

Schelling explicitly recognizes that strategic theory does assume a model. The foundation is, he asserts, "the assumption of rational behavior — not just of intelligent behavior, but of behavior motivated by a conscious calculation of advantages, a calculation that in turn is based on an explicit and internally consistent value system."14

What is striking about these examples from the literature of foreign policy and international relations are the similarities among analysts of various styles when they are called upon to produce explanations. Each assumes that what must be explained is an action, i.e., behavior that reflects purpose or intention. Each assumes that the actor is a rational government. Each assumes that the action is chosen as a calculated solution to a strategic problem. For each, explanation consists of showing what goal the government was pursuing when it acted and how the action was a reasonable choice, given the nation’s objective. This cluster of assumptions characterizes the Rational Actor Model. In most respects, contrasts in the thinking of Morgenthau, Hoffmann, and Schelling could not be more pointed. Recognition of the extent to which each employs Model I, however, highlights basic similarities among Morgenthau’s method of "rational reenactment," Hoffmann’s "imaginative reconstruction," and Schelling’s "vicarious problem solving," and family resemblances among Morgenthau’s "rational statesman," Hoffmann’s "roulette player," and Schelling’s "game theorist."15

In spite of considerable differences in emphasis and focus, most contemporary analysts (as well as laymen) proceed predominantly — albeit most often implicitly — in terms of this framework when trying to explain international events. Indeed, the assumption that occurrences in foreign affairs are the acts of nations has been so fundamental to thinking about such problems that the underlying model has rarely been recognized: to explain an occurrence in foreign policy simply means to show how the government could have rationally chosen that action.16

In this sense, the frame of reference can be called the "classical" model.

To prove that most analysts think largely in terms of the classical model is not my purpose. Rather, this chapter attempts to convey to the reader a grasp of the model and a challenge: let the reader examine the literature with which he is most familiar and make his own judgment. The first section of this chapter consists of a rapid tour of major works in a number of areas
judged because Fay studied in Germany and I in England, but surely there is more involved than that. Is there something wrong with our methods of historical study and training when two scholars draw such conflicting conclusions from the same evidence?\footnote{The Classical Model Illustrated}

Though Schmitt raises a number of complex questions about historical methods, the central dispute arises only within a special set of assumptions about the attribution of cause. Their argument about the cause of the war turns on judgments about the decisions, actions, and attitudes of nations. Identification of these decisions, acts, and attitudes requires that the various activities and thoughts of individuals within each of the relevant governments be neatly summarized. This instance of what Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., has called "the passion for tidiness [which] is the historian's occupational disease" is suggestive of the basic frame of reference employed by most diplomatic historians.\footnote{The Classical Model Illustrated}

\section{Strategy}

In explaining occurrences in foreign affairs, diplomatic historians reflect the intuitions and expectations of educated laymen, albeit in a more elaborate and consistent form.\footnote{The Classical Model Illustrated} Contemporary strategists refine these instincts. Thus the literature of contemporary strategy is especially instructive for our purpose. The \textit{Strategy of Conflict} stands unchallenged as the finest formulation of the principles of contemporary strategic thinking. According to its author, Thomas Schelling, strategy analyzes and explains the maze of national actions and reactions as more or less advantageous moves in a game of interdependent conflict. Nations act in situations of tempered antagonism and precarious partnership, each nation's best choice depending on what it expects the other to do. Strategic behavior influences an actor's choice by working on his expectations of how his behavior is related to his adversary's.\footnote{The Classical Model Illustrated}

Schelling's discussion of deterrence was noted at the outset of this chapter. Here we must limit our attention to two further problems of contemporary strategy: limited war and signaling. About these issues, Schelling sets forth the following propositions. First: all kinds of limited war become more probable as the impossibility of all-out surprise attack becomes evident.\footnote{The Classical Model Illustrated} Second: limited war requires limits — i.e., mutual recognition

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**The Classical Model Illustrated**

Diplomatic History

Consider the problem of the cause of the First World War. This chestnut has attracted the attention of the finest diplomatic historians for half a century, though debate on the fiftieth anniversary of that war's conclusion was hardly less vigorous than on the first. The two classic contributions to this scholarly debate review the same documents but come to diametrically opposed conclusions about the issue. On the one hand, Bernadotte Schmitt concludes that German determination caused the war: "The conciliatory reply of Serbia to the Austrian ultimatum was brushed aside because the ruling clique was determined on war."\footnote{The Classical Model Illustrated} On the other hand, Sidney Fay finds: "It was the hasty Russian general mobilization... while Germany was still trying to bring Austria to accept mediation proposals, which finally rendered European war inevitable."\footnote{The Classical Model Illustrated} The difficulty raised by these contrary conclusions is nowhere expressed more clearly than by Schmitt, in his autobiographical essay, "Fifty Years of Exploring History":

Fay's \textit{Origins of the World War}, published in 1928, took a lenient view of Germany's responsibility, whereas my book, \textit{The Coming of the War} 1914 (1930), laid the chief burden on Germany. This has always troubled me. We had both taken advanced degrees at eminent universities... We used the same documents and read the same biographies and memoirs in preparing our respective books — and came up with quite different interpretations. It is sometimes asserted that we are both pre-

central to the study of foreign policy and international relations. The second section attempts to clarify the concept of rational action — the essence of this conceptual model — by considering briefly the more rigorous theoretical models of action used in economic, game, and decisionmaking theory. This section is necessarily more technical. Some readers will prefer simply to think of this model as an attempt to understand the behavior of governments by analogy with the behavior of individuals making calculated, rational choices, and will thus prefer to skim this section. The third section formalizes this conceptual model as a paradigm and outlines several variants of the basic paradigm.
of restraints. These tacit agreements, arrived at through partial or haphazard negotiations, require terms that are qualitatively distinguishable from the alternatives and cannot simply be a matter of degree. For example, in the Korean War the 30th parallel was a powerful focus for a stalemate, and the main alternative, the "narrow waist," was a strong candidate not just because it provided a shorter defense line but because it would have been clear to both sides that an advance to the waist did not necessarily signal a determination to advance farther and that a retreat to the waist did not telegraph any intention to retreat farther.\(^2\) Third: the explicit statements and the tactical moves of nations constitute strategic signals. Adversaries watch and interpret each other's behavior, each aware that his own actions are being interpreted and each acting with a consciousness of the expectations he creates.

✓ What evidence is adduced to support these propositions? The ascertainment that limited wars are more likely to occur when the balance of strategic capabilities is stable is supported by a chain of reasoning. In an unstable strategic context, a rational opponent might initiate a nuclear war rather than accept the loss of a limited war. An adversary who might be tempted to initiate a limited war must therefore proceed cautiously. In a stable strategic context, however, nuclear war means mutual annihilation; and, therefore, adventurous nations can instigate limited wars with less fear of all-out retaliation. Confidence in the second proposition — limited wars will be limited only at points that enjoy a certain saliency — springs not from scrutiny of history's limited wars but rather from thinking about the inability of rational antagonists in certain gaming situations to come to an agreement at any other point. The third proposition — a conception of international politics as "essentially bargaining situations" in which alert, intelligent, coordinated nations speak and move in order to influence other nations by changing their expected payoffs — constitutes a highly refined instance of the Rational Actor Model.\(^2\)

✓ Herman Kahn's most recent strategic study, *On Escalation*, takes as its explicit point of departure Schelling's notion of a "competition in risk-taking."\(^2\) Kahn concentrates on the coercive aspects of national behavior in international politics, which involve "instrumental motivation — narrow considerations of profit and loss."\(^2\) He tries to formulate "relatively general principles, more or less true for all the interaction of escalation and negotiation in which a fear of further escalation and a desire not to set undesirable precedents or to weaken desirable restraints are present."\(^2\) With this focus, Kahn stretches a ladder of six thresholds and forty-four rungs that provides a backdrop for explaining various occurrences and playing out numerous scenarios. Both the explanations and the predictive scenarios unfold sequences of events. But what governs the movement from one frame of the scenario to the next? Plausible constructions of what unitary, value-maximizing actors would do pull the reader from frame to frame.

The character of Kahn's thought process is perhaps most clear in his discussion of how the United States would actually fight a central war, i.e., a war involving major nuclear attacks on the homelands of both superpowers. Fears that a "fog of war" would accompany nuclear attacks on the antagonists' homelands have led some analysts to believe that mutual miscalculation and bureaucratic momentum would create chaos. But Kahn maintains that "there has been a systematic overestimation of the importance of the so-called 'fog of war' — the inevitable uncertainties, misinformation, disorganization, or even breakdown of organized units — that must be expected to influence central war operations."\(^2\) His expectations about central war stem from his confidence in dead reckoning. This term, borrowed from navigation, refers to the ability of a pilot or captain, by knowing his ship's starting point and environment and by reading its internal instruments, to determine where he is purely by mathematical calculation.\(^2\)

The commander or decision-maker may know a good deal about how the war started and the basic conditions existing at the outbreak; or information may become available specifying these reasonably well, even though this information was not known before the war's outbreak. From this point forward, even though he is completely cut off from all information external to his own organization and forces, and perhaps even from much of that, he may still have enough of an idea of events and their timetable, at least in outline, and a sufficient judgment of what the other side is trying to accomplish (through knowledge of its logistics, forces, doctrines, and other constraints) to "play" both sides hypothetically by dead reckoning.\(^2\)

In a central nuclear war, the United States would play out both its own and the antagonist's hand by calculating what rational actors would do at each point. Moreover, the application of this
concept of dead reckoning is not limited to hypothetical central
wars. Indeed, Kahn, who has observed military decisionmaking
much more closely than most civilian analysts, maintains that
"What I am talking about really is one basic mode — perhaps
the basic mode — of decisionmaking in any military head-
quarters." At a minimum, it is the motor that moves Herman
Kahn's thinking.

The "scenario" and the "war game" stand as emblems of
contemporary strategic thinking. They also epitomize the clas-
sical model. The eminent American military strategist, Albert
Wohlstetter, characterizes the method and scope of Rand's use
of one gaming technique:

RAND analysts, in conducting map exercises to determine the
performance of alternative defenses, typically try some defense
tactics and then attempt to figure the best means the enemy has
available for countering this tactic; then they try another tactic,
examine the possible countermoves again, and so on. In this
way each strike calculated is actually the result of a rather
extensive canvass not only of our tactics but also of enemy
reactions. Matching best enemy countermoves to our own choices
was also an important part of RAND's work on air base choice.
This sort of matching is one kind of "minimax" analysis. Pre-
cisely the same kind of matching of move and countermove is
relevant in designing and evaluating bilateral arms control ar-
rangements which should not be taken as a matter of simple
faith.²⁶

What is distinctive about this approach? In Wohlstetter's
words, it "attempts to introduce the enemy by letting him, in his
best interest, do his worst to our forces and then seeing which of
our forces accomplishes the job most effectively in the face of
this best enemy attempt."²⁴ The question of what the enemy will
do is answered by considering the question of what a rational,
unitary genie would do.

Contemporary strategists' refined version of the standard
frame of reference has considerable appeal to policy makers who
must make decisions on the basis of partly read, partially di-
gested, uncertain information. The Rational Actor Model permits
a brief summary of the relevant aspects of a problem, in terms
that are familiar from ordinary language. Consider, for example,
how government officials estimate the likely effects of Ameri-
can military deployments on the behavior of other nations. In
the early 1960s, the Defense Department concluded that the

United States should press for a significant build-up of NATO
conventional forces. The chain of reasoning was stated clearly
by the then (1961) Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Nitze:

If you were sitting in the Kremlin, which situation [first, a NATO
armed with nuclear weapons alone, or second, a NATO armed
both with nuclear and a significant conventional capability]
would be considered most likely to bring you face to face with
nuclear war if you persisted in a train of actions violating what
the West takes to be its vital interests? To me, the answer is
clear. If I were in the Kremlin I would be much more con-
cerned in the second situation; I would consider it much more
likely that the West would find it politically possible to initiate
action in defense of the Berlin access routes from the second
posture than from the first.²⁵

For every analyst, enemy reactions constitute a critical but elu-
sive factor. One advantage of the Rational Actor Model is that
it provides an inexpensive approximation by letting the analyst
think about what he would do if he were the enemy. As Schelling
has stated in another context, "You can sit in your armchair and
try to predict how people will behave by asking how you would
behave if you had your wits about you. You get, free of charge,
a lot of vicarious, empirical behavior."²⁶

No recent policy maker has had greater impact on strategic
thinking within the U.S. government than former Secretary of
Defense Robert McNamara. One of his most important policy
addresses, the speech at Ann Arbor in 1962, was designed "to
expose his audience to the way in which the United States plan-
ned its nuclear operations, explain the problems raised by the
existence of other national nuclear capabilities, and underscore
the vital but limited role in deterrence played by strategic
nuclear forces."²⁷ That speech is therefore an important source
of clues to the thinking of policy makers.

After rehearsing a series of fallacies, McNamara turned to
the problems of surprise attacks and escalation: "Let us look at
the situation today [1962]. First, given the current balance of
nuclear power, which we confidently expect to maintain in the
years ahead, a surprise nuclear attack is simply not a rational
act for any enemy. Nor would it be rational for an enemy to take
the initiative in the use of nuclear weapons as an outgrowth of
a limited engagement in Europe or elsewhere. I think we are
entitled to conclude that either of these actions has been made
highly unlikely."²⁸
Of what does McNamara's confidence in the asserted unlikelihood of surprise attack or expansion to nuclear war consist? The argument proceeds in three steps. From a fact about the physical world—the United States has strategic superiority over the Soviet Union—the former Secretary moves to a theoretical assertion within the model: given a standard rational calculus, a major element in which is enemy awareness of American nuclear superiority, there is little an enemy could hope to achieve by surprise attack or escalation. On the basis of this assertion, he draws an inference about the probability of an occurrence in this world, namely enemy warheads exploding on U.S. or European territory as a result of a surprise attack or escalation.

Sovietology

*Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy*, by Arnold Horelick and Myron Rush, analyzes Soviet foreign policy from 1957 to 1965. The authors unravel the most tangled Russian actions as calculated decisions by the Soviet leaders. The seemingly unyielding facts of Soviet strategic purchases throughout this period are turned round and round until they fit comfortably into a larger, purposeful picture. This analysis resolves the mysteries of Soviet foreign policy and strategic posture in terms of four types of pieces: (1) the foreign policy objectives of the contending powers, (2) the means available to them for pursuing their objectives, (3) the principles that guide their employment of these means and their distinctive styles of political warfare, and (4) the constraints under which they operate in conducting the struggle.

The famed "missile gap" is unveiled as a myth fostered by Khrushchev to fuel the Soviet political offensive against West Berlin of 1958–1962. Exposure of the myth of Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) superiority forced the Soviet leadership to seek to regain the initiative by moving missiles to Cuba. The relative quiescence of Soviet foreign policy since the missile crisis follows from their strategic inferiority.

For Horelick and Rush, an understanding of these years of Soviet foreign policy requires insight into the Soviet failure to capitalize on their technological advantage in 1958 by constructing a large intercontinental missile fleet. Their explanation focuses on Soviet calculations:

A decision to procure a large number of first-generation, or even second-generation, ICBMs' entailed a certain risk that the force might have serious technical deficiencies and, further, might be considerably degraded within a few years by the opponent's countermeasures. New systems already under development probably promised to be superior. In view of the great demands on Soviet resources, the leaders doubtless hesitated to expend the large amount of funds needed, especially to procure a force that was subject to early obsolescence.41

But this calculation does not constitute a sufficient explanation. As the authors willingly acknowledge, "whatever the limitations on Soviet resources and capacities, however, the USSR has spent huge sums on air defense and on acquiring an 'overkill' capability against Western Europe."42 Though some analysts attempt to explain this disparity between the extraordinarily large purchase of shorter-range ballistic missiles and the incredibly small purchase of ICBMs in terms of the greater technological uncertainty surrounding the ICBMs, Horelick and Rush are not tempted by that escape. As they recognize: "Technical uncertainties as to how the Soviet ICBM would perform were in some degree matched by similar uncertainties about the shorter-range ballistic missiles, which were nevertheless deployed in large numbers."43 How, then, is this seemingly intractable configuration of facts about Soviet behavior understood?

Horelick and Rush infer that the Soviet leaders must have been virtually certain that a U.S. attack upon the Soviet Union would not occur:

Had there been serious doubt on this score, ordinary prudence would have required the procurement of a sizeable force without much delay. Such a force would have been needed to reinforce deterrence of a United States attack and, in the event deterrence failed, to provide a more adequate capability to fight a war. Instead, because of his assurance that there would be no American attack, Khrushchev chose to procure a small force at a slow pace.44

The inference is from a physical fact—the Soviet failure to acquire a substantial first-generation or second-generation ICBM force—to what they "must have believed." Must, since if they had believed otherwise, their chosen course of action would simply not have been rational.45
Sinology

Communist China's entry into the Korean War in November 1950 caught most of Washington entirely off guard. Indeed, this event so surprised Douglas MacArthur, the American military commander in Korea, that U.S. troops were forced to make "the longest retreat in American military history." The problem of Chinese intervention in the Korean War has thus been a central issue for scholars of Chinese Communist behavior. Allen Whiting's China Crosses the Yalu is the most noted examination of this problem. By scrutinizing the Chinese Communist press for clues on strategy and tactics during 1950, he is able to construct an explanation of Chinese behavior. Why did China enter the war?

In sum, it was not the particular problems of safeguarding electric power supplies in North Korea or the industrial base in Manchuria that aroused Peking to military action. Instead, the final step seems to have been prompted in part by general concern over the range of opportunities within China that might be exploited by a determined, powerful enemy on China's doorstep. At the least, a military response might deter the enemy from further adventures. At most, it might succeed in inflicting sufficient damage to force the enemy to compromise his objectives and to accede to some of Peking's demands. Contrary to some belief, the Chinese Communist leadership did not enter the Korean War either full of self-assertive confidence or for primarily expansionist goals.48

Whiting spells out the objectives and plans that led to Chinese entrance into the war. But as Whiting—one of the most careful sinologists—is quick to acknowledge, he has no access to the internal thoughts of Peking. His analysis depends on more than careful examination of the available facts: "Basic to such evaluation is an assumption of rational decision-making in Peking. This postulates decisions as resulting from a logical assessment of desired goals and available means and as being implemented in a manner calculated to make the gains outweigh the costs."49 This assumption—which is central to the classical model—provides a path through what would otherwise seem an incomprehensible swamp.

Having adopted this frame of reference, the analyst can use Chinese actions as evidence about Chinese goals and objectives. Whiting instructs the reader concerning the use of his method of analysis: "Actual decisions may be inferred from negative as well as positive evidence."48 For example, many analysts have argued that the main reason China entered the Korean War was to protect Manchurian industry, which was dependent on supplies from North Korea. At the time, this belief prompted Western spokesmen to make repeated statements about "China's legitimate interest" near the border. But Whiting discounts this explanation on the grounds that "Peking ignored this issue completely in its domestic as well as its foreign communications. The absence of propaganda about protection of the hydroelectric installations, despite the need to maximize popular response to mobilization of 'volunteers,' suggests that this consideration played little if any role in motivating Chinese Communist intervention."49

Communist China and Arms Control, by Morton H. Halpern and Dwight Perkins, examines a second important problem in Sinology.50 In analyzing Chinese policy on arms control, they seek to explain the acts and decisions as means calculated to achieve two classes of goals: (1) Chinese national interests and (2) Marxist-Leninist goals.51 Chinese national interests account for the Sino-American conflict, efforts to remove the influence and power of the United States from Southeast Asia, and the invasion of Tibet. On the other hand, "China's behavior in the Sino-Soviet dispute and in some of the issues surrounding it is most easily explained by a genuine and substantial interest by the Chinese leadership in the fortunes of the world Communist revolution, a revolution that may not always be the surest way of promoting the security and development of the Chinese state."52 What underlies the attempt to explain Chinese decisions and acts in terms of such abstract goals is a basic assumption of the model: "The Chinese Communist leadership pursues its objectives in a systematic and logical way, given its perception of the world."53

Military Force Posture

What determines a nation's military force posture? That is, at any point in time, why does the Soviet Union or the United States have one particular configuration of military hardware and weapons systems rather than some other? Most analysts...
attempt to understand a nation’s force posture as the chosen means of implementing strategic objectives and military doctrine. In fact, military analysts, both within the American intelligence community and without, typically expend considerable effort in balancing statements about a nation’s strategic objectives with evidence about that nation’s actual hardware and systems. Thus they construct a coherent picture in which force posture follows as a more or less logical deduction from objectives and doctrines. For example, in the late 1950s H. S. Dinerstein examined published Soviet doctrines announcing a strategy of destroying the enemy military forces before those forces could destroy Soviet citizens and inferred that the Soviets must have been maintaining “a (strategic) striking force able to hit with considerable precision.”

The less the information about the internal affairs of a nation or government, the greater the tendency to rely on the classical model. But this framework is not uncommon in American analysts’ explanations of U.S. force posture. Participants in the U.S. weapons procurement process can usually relate an infinitely untidy history of any particular action with which they are familiar, but the mass of disjointed detail creates an impression of randomness. There seems to be no satisfactory way of packaging these details. Consequently, both academic observers and participants (when they stand back from a particular incident) tend to offer explanations and predictions by reference to the value-maximizing choices of the nation or national government. For example, a major study of the determinants of U.S. force posture, The Weapons Acquisition Process by Peck and Scherer (published in 1962 after many man-years of research and more than twenty case studies by a Harvard Business School project), proceeds in these terms. While Peck and Scherer are more concerned with an economic analysis of outcomes than they are with the process by which the outcomes are produced, they nevertheless conclude that “weapons systems program decisions” are to be explained as “attempts to maximize some function such as the surplus of expected military value (from the military value functions) over development cost (from the development possibility curves).” Using these functions, they predict which weapons the United States will develop. “If a nation’s aggregate weapons development budget is limited, only those programs with the highest surpluses of expected military value over development cost will be pursued.”

This framework leads them to isolate “technical and scientific ideas” as the principal determinants of innovations in the force posture, like the Atlas ICBM and the F4H interceptor.

American Foreign Policy

For perceptive, influential interpretation and criticism of American foreign policy, Henry Kissinger’s works are unparalleled. His style of analysis, however, is representative of a broad stream of scholarship concerned with the foreign and military policy of the United States and other countries. Kissinger focuses primarily on national character, psychology, and preconceptions in explaining failures of American foreign policy. For example, his widely publicized book, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, explains the general American postwar failure “to prevent a hostile power from expanding its orbit and developing a capability to inflict a mortal blow on the United States” as a consequence of our ill-conceived strategic doctrine. “We added the atomic bomb to our arsenal without integrating its implications into our thinking.” We failed to get “clear about what strategic transformations we are prepared to resist.” Our notion of aggression as an unambiguous act and our concept of war as inevitably an all-out struggle have made it difficult to come to grips with our perils.” More specifically, Kissinger explains our failure at the end of the Korean War to “push back the Chinese armies even to the narrow neck of the Korean peninsula, [thereby] administering a setback to Communist power in its first trial at arms with the free world” as a result of “our strategic doctrine [that] made it very difficult... to think of the possibility of intermediary transformations [between imposed unconditional surrender and a return to the status quo].” Similarly The Necessity for Choice identifies the “lack of a strategic doctrine and a coherent military policy” as the cause of the “deterioration of our position in the world... we have experienced since World War II.”

The “we” and “our” that Kissinger refers to are the U.S. government and the American foreign policy community. It is these actors whose psychology and preconceptions Kissinger uncovers and whose doctrines and actions he criticizes as unsatisfactory approximations to his high standard of a rational strategic doctrine. Indeed, no strand is more stark in Kissinger’s work than his persistent prescription: we must develop a strate-
gie doctrine that will "define what objectives are worth contending for and determine the degree of force appropriate for achieving them." We must "define for ourselves the nature of a peace consistent with our values and adequate for our security."  

Theory with a Capital "T"

It is easier to name the major theorists of international relations than to define their field. In spite of considerable differences among such scholars as Hans Morgenthau, Arnold Wolfers, Raymond Aron, and the "frontiersmen" of international relations theory, when they are producing explanations, all reflect to some degree the basic classical model.

The dean of postwar international relations theorists is Hans Morgenthau. The introduction to his major work Politics Among Nations emphasizes the necessity of employing a framework when studying foreign policy. He states clearly the frame of reference upon which he relies: "To give meaning to the factual raw material of foreign policy, we must approach political reality with a kind of rational outline, a map that suggests to us the possible meanings of foreign policy." To explain national action in specific situations, the analyst must rethink the nation's problem and reenact the leaders' choice. Morgenthau provides explicit instructions.

We put ourselves in the position of a statesman who must meet a certain problem of foreign policy under certain circumstances, and we ask ourselves what the rational alternatives are from which a statesman may choose who must meet this problem under these circumstances (presuming always that he acts in a rational manner), and which of these rational alternatives this particular statesman, acting under these circumstances, is likely to choose.

In a brilliant essay entitled "The Actors in International Politics," Arnold Wolfers observes: "Until quite recently, the 'states-as-the-sole-actors' approach to international politics was so firmly entrenched that it may be called the traditional approach." He examines two more recent strands in the literature, the "minds of men" theory and the "decision-making" approach and argues that these new frames of reference amount to a rather meager departure from the traditional approach.

While accepting contributions from these strands, Wolfers defends the traditional "state-as-actor" model as the "standard on which to base our expectations of state behavior and deviations." It establishes "the 'normal' actions and reactions of states in various international situations."

International Politics and Foreign Policy, edited by James Rosenau, contains the most extensive collection of selections from contemporary international relations theorists. Fifty-five selections from the works of what Rosenau calls "frontiersmen" are distinguished primarily by their concern with theory and method as opposed to history or policy. In an introductory note Rosenau sensitively delineates common characteristics of the majority of these works: "Most observers...[posit] a state-as-decision-maker model of the actors who comprise the international system. That is, action in the international system is ordinarily attributed to states, but these states are recognized to be a complex of governmental officials who act on behalf of and in response to their national societies." Rosenau recognizes that "to speak of Germany wanting this, or France avoiding that, is to run the risk of oversimplifying, of ascribing human characteristics to nonhuman, abstract entities." He, nevertheless, defends this approach as a necessary abbreviation.

Raymond Aron's monumental Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations encompasses so wide a range of subjects and reveals such diverse interests that one hesitates to use it as an illustration. Nevertheless, it can be noted that much of his theory is dependent on the assumption of a rational, unified, national actor. "The theory of international relations starts from the plurality of autonomous centers of decision [national governments], hence from the risk of war and from this risk it deduces the necessity of the calculation of means." Criticizing the attempts of theorists such as Morgenthau to explain national action by reference to a single goal, Aron argues that governments pursue a spectrum of goals, tempered by "the risk of war [that] obliges it [the government] to calculate forces or means." His theory explores (1) the sociological influences on the stakes of the conflicts among states, and the goals which the participants choose; (2) the international systems or diplomatic constellations in which states pursue these goals, and (3) the historical characteristics of the present international system. But the actor whose goals are sociologically determined and who must act in a particular international system is a rational, cal-
A Rigorous Model of Action

The preceding tour begins to suggest the breadth of the influence of Model I in the literature of foreign affairs. To see how deeply this framework is engrained in our thinking, it is useful to consider the language used in writing or speaking about international events. We speak of occurrences not as unstructured happenings but rather as "the Soviet decision to abstain from attack," "the Chinese policy concerning defense of the mainland," and "Japanese action in surrendering." To summarize the relevant aspects of a state of the world as a nation’s "decision" or "policy" is — at least implicitly — to slip into the rational actor framework. These terms derive their meaning from a conceptual web, the major strands of which constitute the classical model.85 Decision presupposes a decider and a choice among alternatives with reference to some goal. Policy means the realization in a number of particular instances of some agent's objectives. These concepts identify phenomena as actions performed by purposeful agents. This identification involves a simple extension of the pervasive everyday assumption that what human beings do is at least "intendedly rational," an assumption fundamental to most understanding of human behavior.86

This everyday assumption of human purposiveness has a counterpart that plays a central role in the social sciences. One strand of social science concentrates on the reactive aspects of human behavior, specifying regularities of behavior in certain typical situations. But the central tradition in the social sciences examines the purposive, calculated, and planned aspects of human behavior.83 Thus economics, political science, and to a large extent sociology and psychology study human behavior as purposive, goal-directed activity.

But what does it mean to conceive of behavior as "action"?/ When one thinks of activity as "intendedly rational" or studies behavior as goal-directed, what do these notions entail? A rigorous model of this concept of action has been formulated in economics, decision, and game theory. The model's rigor stems from its assumption that action constitutes more than simple purposive choice of a unitary agent. What rationality adds to the concept of purpose is consistency: consistency among goals and objectives relative to a particular action; consistency in the application of principles in order to select the optimal alternative. Von Neumann and Morgenstern's last work on rationality has not been superseded: "It may safely be stated that there exists, at present, no satisfactory treatment of the question of rational behavior."84 Nevertheless, these theories have developed an important ideal type.

Classical "economic man" and the rational man of modern statistical decision theory and game theory make optimal choices in narrowly constrained, neatly defined situations. In these situations rationality refers to an essentially Hobbesian notion of consistent, value-maximizing reckoning or adaptation within specified constraints.85 In economics, to choose rationally is to select the most efficient alternative, that is, the alternative that maximizes output for a given input or minimizes input for a given output. Rational consumers purchase the amount of goods, A, B, and C, etc., that maximizes their utility (by choosing a basket of goods on the highest possible indifference curve.) Rational firms produce at a point that maximizes profits (by setting marginal costs equal to marginal revenue). In modern statistical decision theory and game theory, the rational decision problem is reduced to a simple matter of selecting among a set of given alternatives, each of which has a given set of consequences: the agent selects the alternative whose consequences are preferred in terms of the agent's utility function which ranks each set of consequences in order of preference.

The basic concepts of these models of rational action are:

1. Goals and Objectives. The goals and objectives of the agent are translated into a "payoff" or "utility" or "preference" function, which represents the "value" or "utility" of alternative sets of consequences. At the outset of the decision problem the agent has a payoff function which ranks all possible sets of consequences in terms of his values and objectives. Each bundle of consequences will contain a number of side effects. Nevertheless, at a minimum, the agent must be able to rank in order of preference each possible set of consequences that might result from a particular action. (Many theories imply stronger integral or ratio scales.)86

2. Alternatives. The rational agent must choose among a set of alternatives displayed before him in a particular situation. In decision theory these alternatives are represented as a
decision tree. The alternative courses of action may include more than a simple act, but the specification of a course of action must be sufficiently precise to differentiate it from other alternatives.

3. CONSEQUENCES. To each alternative is attached a set of consequences or outcomes of choice that will ensue if that particular alternative is chosen. Variations are generated at this point by making different assumptions about the accuracy of the decisionmaker's knowledge of the consequences that follow from the choice of each alternative.

4. CHOICE. Rational choice consists simply of selecting that alternative whose consequences rank highest in the decision-maker's payoff function.

These categories formalize the concept of rational action that underpins economics, decision, and game theory, as well as the less structured notion that underlies our everyday assumption of human purposiveness both in individual behavior and in national foreign policy. Rationality refers to consistent, value-maximizing choice within specified constraints. Applications of this model of purposive action are considerable and instructive. The model permits decision and game theorists to structure problems of choice. In the most advanced social science, this model constitutes the fundamental assumption of consumer theory and the theory of the firm. Indeed, though Anthony Downs overstates the point, he is largely accurate in asserting that "economic theorists have nearly always looked at decisions as though they were made by rational minds. . . . Economic theory has been erected upon the supposition that conscious rationality prevails." The implications he draws from this assertion are directly on target: "The traditional [economic] methods of prediction and analysis are applicable. . . . If a theorist knows the ends of some decision-maker, he can predict what actions will be taken to achieve them as follows: (1) he calculates the most reasonable way for the decision-maker to reach his goals, and (2) he assumes this way will actually be chosen because the decision-maker is rational." In addition, the assumption of rationality provides impressive explanatory power. As John Harsanyi, one of the most insightful theorists of rationality, has stated: "The concept of rational behavior is often a very powerful explanatory principle because it can account for a large number of empirical facts about people's behavior in terms of a few simple assumptions about the goals (or ends) people are trying to achieve." How does the social scientist apply this concept? Again to quote Harsanyi:

From the point of view of a social scientist trying to explain and predict human behavior, the concept of rationality is important mainly because, if a person acts rationally, his behavior can be fully explained in terms of the goals he is trying to achieve. When we say that Napoleon's strategy in a particular battle was rational, this means that his strategy choice can be explained essentially by pointing out that this was the best strategy for him to choose in terms of his military objectives at the time.

Nevertheless, the power of the theory of rational action derives from its rigor — rigor purchased at the price of assumptions too heroic for many empirically oriented social scientists. The rigorous model of rational action maintains that rational choice consists of value-maximizing adaptation within the context of a given payoff function, fixed alternatives, and consequences that are known (in one of the three senses corresponding to certainty, risk, and uncertainty). But what guarantees that value-maximizing behavior within these parameters will in fact maximize the agent's values? Obviously it would not, if the set of alternatives failed to include an option whose consequence ranked higher than any of the stated alternatives.

In order to maintain claims concerning "optimal choice," theorists are forced to retreat to one of two defenses (though they often fail to recognize this necessity and thus blur their chosen defense). On the one hand, the theorist can make the assumption of comprehensive rationality, according to which "the payoff function" means an accurate mapping of all consequences in terms of all the agent's values; "the alternatives" means "all alternatives"; and "the consequences" means "all consequences" that will result from the choice of any alternative. For example, the problem of rational choice in a game of chess is the problem of selecting the move that leads to the most preferred outcome, i.e., the one move that will bring the player the most advantageous consequences according to his payoff function.

On the other hand, the more common — and more satisfactory — defense is to make an assumption of limited rationality and to restrict claims concerning "optimal choice" accordingly.
By assuming an economic definition of the situation, economists impose a benchmark that stipulates the content of the "values," "alternatives," and "consequences" in the rigorous model. This leads many economists to overlook a wide range of values and consequences that are important to students of political, psychological, and sociological behavior. But within these stipulated bounds, they can identify value-maximizing activity.93

**A Rational Actor Paradigm**

By using the concepts of the more rigorous models of action, we can sharpen the general characterization of Model I that emerged from our examination of the literature. Formulation of Model I as an "analytic paradigm"—in the technical sense of that term developed by Robert K. Merton for sociological analyses—highlights the distinctive thrust of this style of analysis. According to Merton, a paradigm is a systematic statement of the basic assumptions, concepts, and propositions employed by a school of analysis. The components of the paradigms formulated in this study include the basic unit of analysis, the organizing concepts, the dominant inference pattern, and, simply for illustrative purposes, several of the propositions suggested by the paradigm. Considerably weaker than any satisfactory theoretical model, these paradigms nevertheless represent a short step in that direction from looser, implicit conceptual models. To articulate a largely implicit framework as an explicit paradigm is, of necessity, to caricature. But caricature can be instructive.

I. **Basic Unit of Analysis: Governmental Action as Choice.** Happenings in foreign affairs are conceived as actions chosen by the nation or national government.95 Governments select the action that will maximize strategic goals and objectives. The "solutions" to strategic problems are the fundamental categories in terms of which the analyst perceives what is to be explained.

II. **Organizing Concepts**

A. **National Actor.** The nation or government, conceived as a rational, unitary decisionmaker, is the agent. This actor has one set of specified goals (the equivalent of a consistent utility function), one set of perceived options, and a single estimate of the consequences that follow from each alternative.

B. **The Problem.** Action is chosen in response to the strategic problem the nation faces. Threats and opportunities arising in the international strategic "marketplace" move the nation to act.

C. **Static Selection.** The sum of activity of representatives of the government relevant to a problem constitutes what the nation has chosen as its "solution." Thus the action is conceived as a steady-state choice among alternative outcomes (rather than, for example, a large number of partial choices in a dynamic stream).

D. **Action as Rational Choice.** The components include:

1. **Goals and Objectives.** National security and national interests are the principal categories in which strategic goals are conceived. Nations seek security and a range of other objectives. (Analysts rarely translate strategic goals and objectives into an explicit utility function; nevertheless, analysts do focus on major goals and objectives and trade off side effects in an intuitive fashion.)

2. **Options.** Various courses of action relevant to a strategic problem provide the spectrum of options.

3. **Consequences.** Enactment of each alternative course of action will produce a series of consequences. The relevant consequences constitute benefits and costs in terms of strategic goals and objectives.

4. **Choice.** Rational choice is value-maximizing. The rational agent selects the alternative whose consequences rank highest in terms of his goals and objectives.

III. **Dominant Inference Pattern.** If a nation performed a particular action, that nation must have had ends toward which the action constituted a maximizing means. The Rational Actor Model's explanatory power stems from this inference pattern. The puzzle is solved by finding the purposeful pattern within which the occurrence can be located as a value-maximizing means.

IV. **General Propositions.** The disgrace of foreign policy studies is the infrequency with which propositions of any generality
are formulated and tested. In arguing for explicitness about the categories in which analysis proceeds, this study emphasizes the importance of being serious about the logic of explanation. Consequently, the propositions upon which explanations depend need to be formulated clearly. To illustrate the kind of propositions on which analysts who employ this model rely, several are formulated.

The basic assumption of value-maximizing behavior produces propositions central to most explanations. The general principle can be formulated as follows: the likelihood of any particular action results from a combination of the nation's (1) relevant values and objectives, (2) perceived alternative courses of action, (3) estimates of various sets of consequences (which will follow from each alternative), and (4) net valuation of each set of consequences. This yields two propositions.

A. An increase in the costs of an alternative (a reduction in the value of the set of consequences that will follow from an action, or a reduction in the probability of attaining fixed consequences) reduces the likelihood of that action's being chosen.

B. A decrease in the costs of an alternative (an increase in the value of the set of consequences that will follow from an action, or an increase in the probability of attaining fixed consequences) increases the likelihood of that action's being chosen.

V. Specific Propositions

A. Deterrence. The likelihood of successful deterrence is a function of the factors specified in the general proposition. Combined with various assertions, this general proposition yields the propositions of the theory of deterrence.

1. A stable nuclear balance reduces the likelihood of nuclear attack. This proposition is derived from the general proposition, plus the asserted fact that a second-strike capability affects the potential attacker's calculations by increasing the likelihood and the costs of one particular set of consequences that might follow from attack — namely, retaliation.

2. A stable nuclear balance increases the probability of limited war. This proposition is derived from the general proposition, plus the asserted fact that, though increasing the costs of a nuclear exchange, a stable nuclear balance nevertheless produces a more significant reduction in the probability that such consequences would be chosen in response to a limited war. Thus this set of consequences weighs less heavily in the calculus.

B. Soviet Force Posture. Soviet force posture (i.e., weapons and their deployment) constitutes a value-maximizing means of implementing Soviet strategic objectives and military doctrine. A proposition of this sort underlies Secretary of Defense Laird's leap from the fact of two hundred SS-9s (large intercontinental missiles) to the assertion that "the Soviets are going for a first-strike capability, and there's no question about it."

VI. Evidence. The fundamental method employed in rational actor analysis is what Schelling has called "vicarious problem solving." Faced with a puzzling occurrence, the analyst puts himself in the place of the nation or government. Examination of the strategic characteristics of the problem permits the analyst to use principles of rational action to sift through both commissions and omissions. Evidence about details of behavior, statements of government officials, and government papers are then marshaled in such a way that a coherent picture of the value-maximizing choice (from the point of view of the nation) emerges.

It must be noted, however, that an imaginative analyst can construct an account of value-maximizing choice for any action or set of actions performed by a government. Putting the point more formally, if somewhat facetiously, we can state a "Rationality Theorem": there exists no pattern of activity for which an imaginative analyst cannot write a large number of objective functions such that the pattern of activity maximizes each function. The problem for the good Model I analyst is therefore not simply to find an objective or cluster of objectives around which a story of value-maximizing choice can be constructed, but to insist on rules of evidence for making assertions about governmental objectives, options, and consequences that permit him to distinguish among the various accounts.
Variants of the Classical Model

This paradigm exhibits the basic logic of a cluster of approaches that we have labeled the classical or Rational Actor Model. Analysts who think in these categories package the activities of various officials of a national government as actions chosen by a unified actor, strongly analogous to an individual human being. An action is explained by reference to the aims of the unitary, national actor. The explanation permits the reader to understand why the event occurred by redoing the calculation and thereby discovering how, in the given context with certain objectives, the actor came to choose the action in question.

But as our examination of various uses of this approach suggests, its basic logic is found in a number of interestingly different variants. The point of each is in one sense the same: to place the action within the purposive framework of a unified actor. But differences among these approaches are also important. Indeed, in emphasizing the similarities in basic logic rather than various differences, this account may be misleading. A further study, now in progress, focuses on the differences among the various approaches now lumped together under one general rubric. But here it may be helpful to identify, if only tentatively, several variants of this approach, each of which might be exhibited similarly as a paradigm.

The preceding paradigm reflects the most refined version of the model found in the literature of modern strategy. Analysts like Schelling and Wohlsetter state propositions about the reactions of nation A to nation B, such as the proposition about the stability of the balance of terror. Problems and pressures in the international strategic marketplace yield probabilities of occurrence. The international actor, which could be any nation, is simply a value-maximizing mechanism for getting from the strategic problem to the logical solution.

A second type of analysis focuses not upon nations in general, but rather upon a nation or national government with a particular character. Characteristics of this actor limit the goals, options, and consequences of the basic paradigm. Thus (1) propensities or personality traits or psychological tendencies of the nation or government, (2) values shared by the nation or government, or (3) special principles of action change the "goals" or narrow the "alternatives" and "consequences" considered. In contrast to the first variant's concentration on the nation's strategic goals and objectives, this variant emphasizes a government's more specialized objectives, including its own perpetuation. For example, whereas an analyst using the first variant might attempt to explain the United Arab Republic's recent actions by reference to strategic objectives and fears, an analyst employing this second variant would refer to the particular objectives and fears of the present government. Similarly, explanations of the Soviet deployment of ABMs by reference to the Soviets' "defense-mindedness" reflect this variant.

A related, but nevertheless different, type of analysis focuses explicitly on an individual leader or leadership clique as the actor whose preference function is maximized and whose personal (or group) characteristics are allowed to modify the basic concepts of the paradigm. This individual's weighting of goals and objectives, tendencies to perceive (and to exclude) particular ranges of alternatives, and principles employed in estimating the consequences that follow from each alternative serve as the basic framework within which the choice must be located. For example, the actor in Whiting's analysis is not "any nation" or "any China." Rather, as Whiting states, "Alternative courses of action open to the Chinese [are] derived from the frame of reference within which the new regime evaluated events, alternative political goals, and the available means of promoting policy." Each Prussian strategy manual constructs an "operational code of the Bolsheviks." These principles of action rather than general principles of rational action are then used to explain purposive activity of the Soviet government.

A more complex variant of the basic model recognizes the existence of several actors within a government— for example, hawks and doves or military and civilians —but still attempts to explain (or predict) an occurrence by reconstructing the calculations of the victorious actor. Thus, for example, some revisionist histories of the Cold War recognize the forces of light and the forces of darkness within the U.S. government but explain American actions as a result of goals and perceptions of the victorious forces of darkness. This variant obviously includes some conspiracy theorists.

Some analysts employ the basic model (in one of its forms) essentially as a norm. Actual events are then explained (and criticized) as approximations to choices expected by the classical model. Kissinger, Kennan, and to some extent Hoffmann rely
Cuba II: A First Cut

The "missiles of October" offer a fascinating set of puzzles for any analyst. For thirteen days in October 1962, the United States and the Soviet Union stood "eyeball to eyeball," each with the power of mutual annihilation in hand. The United States was firm but forbearing. The Soviet Union looked hard, blinked twice, and then withdrew without humiliation. Here is one of the finest examples of diplomatic prudence, and perhaps the finest hour of John F. Kennedy's Presidency.

In retrospect, this crisis seems to have been a major watershed in the Cold War. Having peered over the edge of the nuclear precipice, both nations edged backward toward detente. An understanding of this crisis is thus essential for every serious student of foreign affairs.

To understand how — at a time when war could have meant the destruction of both societies — these superpowers moved to the brink of nuclear war, and, having got there, how they managed to retreat, it is necessary to answer three central questions. Why did the Soviet Union attempt to place offensive missiles in Cuba? Why did the United States choose to respond to the Soviet missile emplacement with a blockade of Cuba? Why did the Soviet Union decide to withdraw the missiles? Fortunately, the openness of the crisis makes it possible to reconstruct the calculations of both nations with a certain amount of confidence.
Though the U.S. build-up in Florida may have been required to convince the Soviet Union of U.S. ability to move up the ladder of escalation, the Soviets were not left to guess what the next step would be or when it would come. Rather, an explicit threat, with a specific time limit, was conveyed by Robert Kennedy to Dobrynin and through him to Chairman Khrushchev.

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Model II: Organizational Process

For some purposes, governmental behavior can be usefully summarized as action chosen by a unitary, rational decisionmaker: centrally controlled, completely informed, and value maximizing. But this simplification must not be allowed to conceal the fact that a government consists of a conglomerate of semi-feudal, loosely allied organizations, each with a substantial life of its own. Government leaders do sit formally and, to some extent, in fact, on top of this conglomerate. But governments perceive problems through organizational sensors. Governments define alternatives and estimate consequences as their component organizations process information; governments act as these organizations enact routines. Governmental behavior can therefore be understood, according to a second conceptual model, less as deliberate choices and more as outputs of large organizations functioning according to standard patterns of behavior.

To be responsive to a wide spectrum of problems, governments consist of large organizations, among which primary responsibility for particular tasks is divided. Each organization attends to a special set of problems and acts in quasi-independence on these problems. But few important issues fall exclusively within the domain of a single organization. Thus governmental behavior relevant to any important problem reflects the independent output of several organizations, partially coordinated by government leaders. Government leaders can substantially disturb, but not substantially control, the behavior of these organizations.

To perform complex routines, the behavior of large num-
bers of individuals must be coordinated. Coordination requires standard operating procedures: rules according to which things are done. Reliable performance of action that depends upon the behavior of hundreds of persons requires established "programs." Indeed, if the eleven members of a football team are to perform adequately on any particular down, each man must not "do what he thinks needs to be done" or "do what the quarterback tells him to do." Rather, each player must perform the maneuvers specified by a previously established play, which the quarterback has simply called in this situation.

At any given time, a government consists of existing organizations, each with a fixed set of standard operating procedures and programs. The behavior of these organizations—and consequently of the government—relevant to an issue in any particular instance is, therefore, determined primarily by routines established in these organizations prior to that instance. Explanation of a government action starts from this baseline, noting incremental deviations. But organizations do change. Learning occurs gradually, over time. Dramatic organizational change occurs in response to major disasters. Both learning and change are influenced by existing organizational capabilities and procedures.

Borrowed from studies of organizations, these loosely formulated propositions amount simply to tendencies. Each must be hedged by modifiers like "other things being equal" and "under certain conditions." In particular instances, tendencies hold—more or less. In specific situations, the relevant question is: more or less? But this is as it should be. For "organizations" are no more homogeneous a class than "solids." When scientists tried to generalize about "solids," they achieved similar results. Solids tend to expand when heated, but some do and some don't. More adequate categorization of the various elements now lumped under the rubric "organizations" is thus required. Moreover, the behavior of particular organizations seems considerably more complex than the behavior of solids. Additional information about a given organization is required for further specification of the tendency statements. In spite of these two caveats, the characterization of government action as organizational output differs sharply from Model I. Attempts to understand problems of foreign affairs in terms of this frame of reference should produce quite different explanations.

Studies of organizations have had little influence upon the existing literature of international affairs. Few specialists in international politics have studied organization theory. It is only recently that organization theorists have come to study organizations as decisionmakers; behavioral studies of foreign policy organizations from the decisionmaking perspective have not yet been produced. It seems unlikely, however, that these gaps will remain unfilled. Considerable progress has been made in the study of the business firm as a decisionmaking organization. Scholars have begun applying similar insights to situations in which the decisionmaker is a government organization rather than a firm. And interest in an organizational perspective is spreading rapidly among institutions and individuals concerned with actual government operations.

Organizational Theory and Economics

One venerable tradition in the social sciences permits the expression of personal discoveries in an individually tailored vocabulary. Unfortunately, this encourages much repackaging of existing theories and not a little confusion. Avoiding that pitfall, the present chapter makes maximum use of terms and concepts developed by organization theorists and economists. This approach acknowledges the model's intellectual debt while making explicit the relation between the Organizational Process Paradigm for international politics and models of other types of organizations.

It can be reasonably claimed that organization theory is a young science. James March dates the origin of contemporary, cumulative studies of organizations: "The field as a more or less identifiable cluster of research interests within a number of social sciences dates for most purposes from a group of books written between 1937 and 1947 — Barnard, Roethlisberger and Dickson, and Simon." Thus Chester Barnard's The Function of the Executive and Herbert Simon's Administrative Behavior mark the beginning and the end of the decade of definition of organization theory as a semi-discipline. The second decade witnessed an enormous increase in effort devoted to the systematic study of organizations. Many of the "discoveries" of that decade (and of earlier periods) are summarized in a logically ordered, propositional form by March and Simon in their path-breaking book, Organizations, published in 1958. March and Simon formulated
three central problems with the "state of the art" as it stood at the end of the second decade: (1) "The literature leaves one with the impression that after all not a great deal has been said about organizations"; (2) "but it has been said over and over in a variety of languages. Consequently, we require a serious effort toward the construction of a common language"; (3) "There is in the literature a great disparity between hypotheses and evidence."

The third decade of organization theory's short life — which observed another exponential leap in resources devoted to the examination of organizational behavior — was capped by the publication of the monumental Handbook of Organizations in 1965. As its introduction modestly states, the Handbook attempts to "summarize and report the present state of knowledge about organizations." Contributions to the volume came from four political scientists, five economists, five psychologists, six students of business and industrial organizations, and ten sociologists; yet the editor found it unnecessary either to provide a glossary or to identify the contributors by discipline. Thus some progress has been made in coming to grips with the problem of a common vocabulary. The Handbook's 1,247 double-columned pages suggest that considerably more has now been said about organizations. The sophistication of some of the articles indicates that even the third problem may not prove entirely intractable: the study of organizations has acquired considerable momentum as the result of inputs from so many disciplines. As James March, the editor of the Handbook, states in the introduction:

The vitality represented by the contributors to the Handbook, and by contemporary organizations, suggests that if [the study of organizations] is going somewhere. There is commitment by first-class scholars. There is a set of interesting theoretical ideas. There is an involvement in empirical research. There is a large, mostly untouched, and usually cooperative group of organizations for study. There is widespread recognition of the significance of organizational behavior both as a factor in the analysis of complex social systems and as an important special case of human activities.

The Handbook's chapter headings indicate the range of subjects studied by organizational theorists: management theory; economic theories of organization; organizational growth and development; communications in organizations; organizational decision making; interpersonal relations in organizations; organizational control structures; the comparative analysis of organizations. Obviously an attempt to summarize this literature is beyond the scope of the present study. Indeed, the Handbook itself is the summary to which the interested reader is referred. It should be useful, nevertheless, to indicate the strand of organization theory upon which Model II is most dependent.

The branch of organization theory that takes as its focus the decisionmaking process in organizations affords the richest source of insights for the paradigm developed in this chapter. For two decades, the seminal figure in this area has been Herbert Simon. Simon's work is motivated by the attempt to understand the basic features of organizational structure and function as they derive from the characteristics of human problem-solving and rational choice.

Most theories of individual and organizational choice employ a concept of "comprehensive rationality," according to which individuals and organizations choose the best alternative, taking account of consequences, their probabilities, and utilities. But, as we have observed in Chapter I, such choices require: (1) the generation of all possible alternatives, (2) assessment of the probabilities of all consequences of each, and (3) evaluation of each set of consequences for all relevant goals. These requirements are, in Simon's words, "powers of prescience and capacities for computation resembling those we usually attribute to God." By focusing on the limits of human capacity in comparison with the complexities of the problems that individuals in organizations must face, Simon develops the concept of "bounded rationality." The physical and psychological limits of man's capacity as alternative generator, information processor, and problem solver constrain the decisionmaking processes of individuals and organizations. Because of these bounds, intendedly rational action requires simplified models that extract the main features of a problem without capturing all of its complexity.

Simon's work finds five characteristic deviations from comprehensive rationality that are displayed by the simplifications of human problem solvers:

1. FACTORED PROBLEMS. Problems are so complex that only a limited number of aspects of each problem can be attended to at a time. Thus individuals factor (split up) problems into quasi-independent parts and deal with the parts one by one.
Organizations factor complex problems into a number of roughly independent parts which are parcelled out to various organizational units. Ideally problems are factored by a means-end analysis, which assigns separable pieces of a problem to organizational units as subgoals. The structure of an organization thus reflects the problems that its subunits face. (Roles consist of specified subsets of premises that guide actions in a particular subunit.)

2. SATISFICING. Maximization or optimization is replaced by satisficing. In choosing, human beings do not consider all alternatives and pick the action with the best consequences. Instead, they find a course of action that is “good enough” — that satisfies. Organizations are happy to find a needle in the haystack rather than searching for the sharpest needle in the haystack.

3. SEARCH. Comprehensive rationality requires consideration of all alternatives, thus making the problem of search trivial. Where satisficing is the rule — stopping with the first alternative that is good enough — the order in which alternatives are turned up is critical. Organizations generate alternatives by relatively stable, sequential search processes. As a result, the menu is severely limited.

4. UNCERTAINTY AVOIDANCE. Comprehensively rational agents deal with alternate consequences of action by estimating probabilities of possible outcomes. People in organizations are quite reluctant to base actions on estimates of an uncertain future. Thus choice procedures that emphasize short-run feedback are developed. Organizations, like house thermostats, rely on relatively prompt corrective action to eliminate deviations between actual and desired temperatures, rather than accurate prediction of next month’s temperature.

5. REPERTOIRES. Repertoires of action programs are developed by organizations and individuals. These constitute the range of effective choice in recurring situations.

In economics, recent developments in the theory of the business firm recapitulate the growth of organization theory. The traditional theory of the firm treats the business firm as a unitary agent — an instance of that infamous abstraction homo economicus. The theory assumes that: (1) firms seek to maximize profits; (2) firms operate with perfect knowledge. With no further assumptions about the psychological characteristics of economic man, the theory then explains the firm’s behavior in terms of forces outside the firm. The entrepreneur, faced with a determinate supply schedule for factors of production, a given price for his product, and a technologically determined production function, is a predictable animal: profit is maximized when marginal cost is equal to the price that equals marginal revenue; the marginal rate of substitution between products and between factors of production equals their price ratio; equilibrium is achieved at the point of optimal use of inputs and outputs.

The propositions yielded by this theory have been formulated precisely:

1. A number of equations $n$ may be derived and solved for the optimal quantities of the firm’s $n$ commodities (both inputs and outputs).
2. At equilibrium, the marginal rate of substitution between two products, or between two factors, is equal to the ratio of their prices.
3. The marginal physical productivity of a factor with respect to a product (the rate of change of the amount of the factor used with respect to the product’s output) is equal to their price ratio.
4. The quantity of a good produced is selected so that its marginal cost (with respect to this product) is equal to its (given) price.
5. A price increase for a product raises its supply; a price increase for a factor reduces its demand.
6. “Cross” price effects are symmetric. That is, the rate of change of a first commodity with respect to the price of a second commodity is equal to the rate of change of the second with respect to the price of the first.
7. A price increase of a good tends to affect the other commodities by decreasing the outputs of products and increasing the inputs of factors.

A prominent feature of this theory is the assumption of a perfectly competitive environment. But imperfect factor markets and imperfect product markets have been treated as extensions of this case. Theories of imperfect competition essentially hold the basic theory of the firm constant while changing market assumptions. This attempted extension of the theory of the firm has produced a number of targets for critics. First, the assump-
tion of profit maximization has been challenged. Second, the
assumption of certainty or knowledge of the probability distri-
bution of future events has been questioned. Third, divergence be-
tween theoretical firms and real world firms has been noted.

Critics of the assumption that firms maximize profits chal-
lenge two discrete aspects of this assumption. One cluster of
critics accepts the notion of "maximization" but attacks the
assumption that "profits" are what is maximized. Rothschild
substitutes survival for profits; Baumol maintains that sales subject
to a profit constraint is the objective.29 Others claim that firms
maximize not a single goal but rather a series of goals: profits,
sales, survival, maintenance of a share of the market, liquidity,
managerial comfort.31 Papandreou attempts to sum up a num-
ber of goals in a "general preference function" which itself is what
the firm maximizes.32 A second cluster of critics challenges the
notion of "maximization." Simon's critique of this concept, and
his suggestion of satisficing as a substitute, has been noted. Gor-
don, Margolis, and others argue that maximization should be
replaced by a concept of goals as constraints that must be
satisfied.33

Critics of the assumption of "perfect information" also come
in two stripes. As we have noted, Simon and the Carnegie School
focus on the bounded character of human capabilities. Firms are
physically unable to possess full information, generate all alter-
 natives, and calculate all consequences in terms of all values.
Thus they arrange a negotiated environment and adopt rules of
thumb for choice and search. March and Simon develop the
principle of sequential search and spell out its implications for
the theory of choice.34 The second group focuses on the cost of
information and calculation in a world of uncertainty. Addi-
tional information is always available — at a cost. Further
calculation can always be done — if someone is paid to do it.
Thus the simplifications, which determine choices, utilize con-
siderably less information and calculation than the human beings
involved are capable of assimilating.

The debate about the gap between the firm of economic
theory and what observers of actual businesses call firms has
produced not a little methodological confusion. Invoking em-
pirical observation, critics point out that the firm of economic
theory is in fact an organization. Its acts are not those of a unit-
tary, rational, perfectly informed entrepreneur but of an organ-
ization. Goals grow out of the interaction among various

participants in the organization.25 Prices are set by the full cost
(or markup) method.28 Inventory turnover is used as a surrogate
for demand estimates; cost calculations are done in standard
rather than marginal terms;29 all actions are governed by stan-
dard business procedures and shortcuts.30 These would seem to
be straightforward factual propositions about which there need
be no debate. But the traditional theory of the firm persists, and
not without defenders. In defense of the classic consensus, Milton
Friedman accepts each of the propositions about the way firms
actually operate but challenges their implications.31 What these
points show is that the theory of the firm meets the test of
"descriptive inaccuracy," which, according to Friedman, is a
mark of all powerful theory. The criterion by which the theory
must be tested is its predictive power. Friedman argues that, on
these grounds, the theory is acceptable — though he cites little
evidence for his claim about its predictive powers.32

The utility of Friedman's point turns on the purpose for
which the theory of the firm is constructed. Cyert and March are
undoubtedly correct in their suggestion that "much of the con-
troversy is based on a misunderstanding of the questions the
conventional theory of the firm was designed to answer."33 If the
theory of the firm is restricted exclusively to aggregate level
explanations of resource allocation by a price system, its pre-
dictions about these outcomes are a key criterion of its success.
But the classical theory of the firm is also employed to answer
questions about the internal allocations of resources and the
process of price and output decisions as well. For this task the
theory's performance as a predictor is not impressive. The pru-
dent path for the development of a theory of micro-behavior
would seem to require micro-assumptions more similar to ob-
served characteristics of an actual firm.34

The first milestone along this road was set by an insuffi-
ciently heralded book, A Behavioral Theory of the Firm, by Ri-
chard Cyert and James March, published in 1963.34 Proceeding
from a careful catalogue of challenges to the classical theory of
the firm and a survey of the literature of organization theory,
Cyert and March make a new departure. In contrast to tradi-
tional theories that explain the firm's behavior in terms of mar-
ket factors, Cyert and March focus — as organization theory
would suggest — on the effect of organizational structure and
conventional practice upon the development of goals, the for-
mulation of expectations, and the execution of choice.35
This product of the Carnegie School represents an extension of Simon’s concern with problem-solving under conditions of bounded rationality. Cyert and March attempt to understand organizational decision as choice made in terms of goals, on the basis of expectations. Thus the framework of the analysis is fixed by three categories: (1) organizational goals, (2) organizational expectations, and (3) organizational choice. Following Barnard, Cyert and March view the organization as a coalition of participants (some of whom are not necessarily on its payroll, e.g., suppliers and customers) with disparate demands, changing focuses of attention, and limited ability to attend to all problems simultaneously. Bargaining among potential coalition members produces a series of de facto agreements that impose constraints on the organization. The list of these more or less independent constraints, imperfectly rationalized in terms of more general purposes, constitute an organization’s goals. Organizational expectations arise from inferences drawn from available information. Organizational choice emerges as the selection of the first alternative that expectations identify as acceptable in terms of goals.

At the core of this theory are four concepts that relate variables affecting the three major categories (goals, expectations, and choice).

1. QUASI-RESOLUTION OF CONFLICT. There is no internal consensus within a firm at the level of operational goals. Nevertheless, organizations thrive with considerable latent goal conflict. The prevailing coalition imposes on the organization a series of independent, aspiration-level constraints. In their price and output model of the business firm, Cyert and March postulate a profit goal, a sales goal, a market share goal, an inventory goal, and a production goal. Individual subunits of the organization handle pieces of the firm’s separated problem in relative independence. The sales department is responsible for sales goals and strategy, the production department for production. Inconsistency that occurs as a result of this “local rationality” is absorbed by “organizational slack.” Conflicts among goals are resolved by sequential attention to goals. Conflicting pressures to “smooth production” and to “satisfy customers” are typically resolved by doing first one and then the other.

2. UNCERTAINTY AVOIDANCE. Uncertainty is a critical factor of the environment in which organizations live. Organizations seek to avoid uncertainty. The first rule is: solve pressing problems rather than developing long-run strategies. The requirement that events in the distant future be anticipated is avoided by using decision rules that emphasize short-run feedback. The second rule is: negotiate with the environment. The requirement that future reactions of other parts of the environment be anticipated is avoided by imposing plans, standard operating procedures, industry traditions, and uncertainty-absorbing contracts.

3. PROBLEMISTIC SEARCH. Since Cyert and March argue that organizations use acceptable level goals and select the first alternative they meet that satisfies these goals, the theory of organizational search is critical. Organizational search is problemistic search. Search is stimulated by a specific problem and motivated to find a solution to that problem. Search follows simple-minded rules that direct the searcher first to the neighborhood of problem symptoms, then to the neighborhood of the current alternative. Search is biased by the special training and experience of the various parts of the organization, the interaction of hopes and expectations, and the communication distortions reflecting unresolved conflict.

Organizational learning. Organizational behavior (characterized by the three concepts) is relatively stable. Organizations are, however, dynamic institutions. They change adaptively as the result of experience. Over time, organizational learning produces changes in goals, attention rules, and search procedures.

This process-oriented model of the firm has been applied to actual business behavior with some measure of success. The four relational concepts lend themselves to the language of computer programming. Though Cyert and March produce a rather successful simulation model of a quite unexciting example (one department of a large retail department store), Geoffrey Clarkson’s application of a similar model to simulate an individual trust officer in selecting a portfolio is more interesting. Yair Aharoni employs a modified version of the theory with considerable success to the foreign investment decision process of businesses (though he finds the process too complicated for any simple computer simulation).

Interesting points of tangency with the behavioral theory of the firm can be found in a number of studies of governmental
organizations. Patrick Dreber applies the basic model to simulate the behavior of government units in municipal budgeting. Wildavsky's work on national budgeting exhibits a similar model. Eckstein's *British National Health Service*, Sayer and Kaufman's *Governing New York City*, and Thompson's *The Regulatory Process in OPA Rationing* reflect an analogous orientation. Unfortunately, no one has yet studied the behavior of the organizations concerned with foreign policy in terms of March and Simon's model.

**Organizational Process Paradigm**

This capsule account of organizational theory and economics provides a context within which to outline an organization process paradigm relevant to foreign policy and international politics. While not employed in the present literature, this paradigm should suggest perspectives that will be valuable in the future. Without the necessary, but missing, behavioral studies of the organizational components of governments, the present formulation must be more an expression of the prospects than of the payoffs in this area of inquiry. Nevertheless, what is now known about the behavior of organizations is enough to suggest some limits on the use of Model I in explaining and predicting governmental behavior.

I. Basic Unit of Analysis: Governmental Action as Organizational Output. The happenings of international politics are, in three critical senses, outputs of organizational processes. First, actual occurrences are organizational outputs. For example, Chinese entry into the Korean War—that is, the fact that Chinese soldiers were firing at U.N. soldiers south of the Yalu in 1950—is an organizational action: the action of soldiers in platoons, which form companies, which in turn comprise armies, responding as privates to lieutenants who are responsible to captains and so on to the commander, moving into Korea, advancing against enemy troops, and firing according to fixed routines of the Chinese army. The decisions of government leaders trigger organizational routines. Government leaders can trim the edges of this output and can exercise some choice in combining outputs. But most of the behavior is determined by previously established procedures.

Second, existing organizational routines for employing present physical capabilities constitute the range of effective choice open to government leaders confronted with any problem. Only the existence of men who were equipped and trained as armies and capable of being transported to North Korea made entry into the Korean War a live option for the Chinese leaders. The fact that the fixed programs (equipment, men, and routines that exist at the particular time) exhaust the range of buttons that leaders can push is not always perceived by these leaders. But in every case it is critical for an understanding of what is actually done.

Third, organizational outputs structure the situation within the narrow constraints of which leaders must make their "decisions" about an issue. Outputs raise the problem, provide the information, and take the initial steps that color the face of the issue that is turned to the leaders. As Theodore Sorensen has observed: "Presidents rarely, if ever, make decisions—particularly in foreign affairs—in the sense of writing their conclusions on a clean slate. . . . The basic decisions, which confine their choices, have all too often been previously made." To one who understands the structure of the situation and the face of the issue—both determined by the organizational outputs—the formal choice of the leaders is frequently anti-climactic.

Analysis of formal governmental choice centers on the information provided and the options defined by organizations, the existing organizational capabilities that exhaust the effective choices open to the leaders, and the outputs of relevant organizations that fix the location of pieces on the chessboard and shade the appearance of the issue. Analysis of actual government behavior focuses on executionary outputs of individual organizations as well as on organizational capabilities and organizational positioning of the pieces on the chessboard.

II. Organizing Concepts

A. Organizational Actors. The actor is not a monolithic "nation" or "government" but rather a constellation of
loosely allied organizations on top of which government leaders sit. This constellation acts only when component organizations perform routines. In the U.S. government, the departments or agencies — for example, the Navy, the Department of State, the CIA — are typically the principal agents.*

**B. Factored Problems and Fractionated Power.** Surveillance of the multiple facets of foreign affairs requires that problems be cut up and parcelled out to various organizations. Within the U.S. government, the Department of State has primary responsibility for diplomacy, the Department of Defense for military security, the Treasury for economic affairs, and the CIA for intelligence.

To avoid paralysis, primary power must accompany primary responsibility. The Defense Department purchases weapons required for national security; the CIA gathers relevant intelligence. Where organizations are permitted to do anything, a large part of what they do will be determined within the organization. Thus each organization perceives problems, processes information, and performs a range of actions in quasi-independence (within broad guidelines of national policy).

The overriding fact about large organizations is that their size prevents any single central authority from making all important decisions or directing all important activities. Factored problems and fractionated power are two edges of the same sword. Factoring permits more specialized attention to particular facets of problems than would be possible if government leaders tried to cope with the problems by themselves. But that additional attention must be paid for in the coin of discretion for what an organization attends to, and how organizational responses are programmed.

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*Organizations are not monolithic. The proper level of disaggregation depends upon the objectives of the analysis. This paradigm is formulated with reference to the major organizations that constitute the U.S. government. Reformulation for the principal organizational components of each of the departments and agencies — for example, disaggregating the Navy into the “brown shoe Navy” (aircraft carriers), “black shoe Navy” (traditional surface ships), the submariners, and the nuclear propulsion club (Polaris) would be relatively straightforward.

**C. Parochial Priorities and Perceptions.** Primary responsibility for a narrow set of problems encourages organizational parochialism, which is enhanced by factors such as: (1) selective information available to the organization, (2) recruitment of personnel into the organization, (3) tenure of individuals in the organization, (4) small group pressures within the organization, and (5) distribution of rewards by the organization. Clients (e.g., interest groups), government allies (e.g., congressional committees), and extra-national counterparts (e.g., the British Ministry of Defense for the Defense Department’s Office of International Security Affairs or the British Foreign Office for the State Department’s Office of European Affairs) galvanize this parochialism. Thus organizations develop relatively stable propensities concerning operational priorities, perceptions, and issues. For example, the military services are manned by careerists on a structured ladder. Promotion to higher rungs is dependent on years of demonstrated, distinguished devotion to a service’s mission. Work routines, patterns of association, and information channels combine with external pressures from organized groups and friends in Congress to make quite predictable a service’s continual search for new hardware consistent with currently assigned roles and missions — for instance, the Air Force’s pursuit of a new manned bomber.

**D. Action as Organizational Output.** The prominent feature of organizational activity is its programmed character: the extent to which behavior in any particular case is an enactment of preestablished routines.* In producing outputs, the activity of each organization is characterized by:

*This characterization of organizational activity (contrasts defining acceptable performance, standard operating procedures, search rules, etc.) depends on more detailed features of an organization and its members. Rules for promotion and reward, budgeting procedures, information accounting-control procedures, and procedures for recruitment and socialization to the norms of the organization, as well as members’ operating styles and attitudes and their extent of professionalization, affect the form and the stability of the characteristics outlined below. No doubt, the environment and the surrounding culture also affect these characteristics, though how and to what extent is less clear. For a suggestive examination of the last question, see Michel Crozier, *The Bureaucratic Phenomenon*, Chicago, 1964.
1. **Goals: Constraints Defining Acceptable Performance.**

The operational goals of an organization are seldom revealed by formal mandates. Rather, each organization's operational goals emerge as a set of constraints defining acceptable performance. Central among these constraints is organizational health, defined usually in terms of bodies assigned and dollars appropriated. The set of constraints emerges from a mix of the expectations and demands of other organizations in the government, statutory authority, demands from citizens and special interest groups, and bargaining within the organization. These constraints represent a quasi-resolution of conflict — the constraints are relatively stable, so there is some degree of resolution; but the constraints are not compatible, hence it is only a quasi-resolution. Typically, the constraints are formulated as imperatives to avoid roughly specified discomforts and disasters. For example, the behavior of each of the U.S. military services (Army, Navy, and Air Force) seems to be characterized by effective imperatives to avoid: (1) a decrease in dollars budgeted, (2) a decrease in manpower, (3) a decrease in the number of key specialists (e.g., for the Air Force, pilots), (4) reduction in the percentage of the military budget allocated to that service, (5) encroachment of other services on that service's roles and missions, and (6) inferiority to an enemy weapon of any class. The fourth constraint is at the heart of what many civilians in the Office of the Secretary of Defense found puzzling in the outburst of the Air Force over the Kennedy administration's first budget — which increased total Air Force dollars by approximately 4 percent. That budget also reduced the Air Force's percentage of the defense pie.

2. **Sequential Attention to Goals.** The existence of conflict among operational constraints is resolved by the device of sequential attention. As a problem arises, the subunits of the organization most concerned with that problem deal with it in terms of the constraints they take to be most important. When the next problem arises, another cluster of subunits deals with it, focusing on a different set of constraints.

3. **Standard Operating Procedures.** Organizations perform their "higher" functions, such as attending to problem areas, monitoring information, and preparing relevant responses for likely contingencies, by doing "lower" tasks — for example, preparing budgets, producing reports, and developing hardware. Reliable performance of these tasks requires standard operating procedures (SOPs). Rules of thumb permit concerted action by large numbers of individuals, each responding to basic cues. The rules are usually simple enough to facilitate easy learning and unambiguous application. Since procedures are "standard" they do not change quickly or easily. Without such standard procedures, it would not be possible to perform certain concerted tasks. But because of them, organizational behavior in particular instances appears unduly formalized, sluggish, and often inappropriate. Some SOPs are simply conventions that make possible regular or coordinated activity. But most SOPs are grounded in the incentive structure of the organization or even in the norms of the organization or the basic attitudes and operating style of its members. The stronger the grounding, the more resistant SOPs are to change.

4. **Programs and Repertoires.** Organizations must be capable of performing actions in which the behavior of hundreds of individuals is precisely coordinated. Assured performance requires sets of rehearsed SOPs for producing specific actions, e.g., fighting enemy units or answering an embassy's cable. Each cluster comprises a "program" (in the language of drama and computers) that the organization has available for dealing with a situation. The list of programs relevant to a type of activity, e.g., fighting, constitutes an organizational repertoire. The number of programs in a repertoire is always quite limited. When properly triggered, organizations execute programs; programs cannot be substantially changed in a particular situation. The more complex the action and the greater the number of individuals involved, the more important are programs and repertoires as determinants of organizational behavior.
5. **Uncertainty Avoidance.** Organizations do not attempt to estimate the probability distribution of future occurrences. Rather, organizations avoid uncertainty. By arranging a *negotiated environment*, organizations regularize the reactions of other actors with whom they have to deal. The primary environment (relations with other organizations comprising the government) is stabilized by such arrangements as agreed budgetary splits, accepted areas of responsibility, and established practices. The secondary environment (relations with the international world) is stabilized between allies by the establishment of contracts (alliances) and "club relations" (U.S. State Department and British Foreign Office or U.S. Treasury and British Treasury). Between enemies, contracts and conventional practices perform a similar function—for example, the rules of the "precarious status quo" that President Kennedy referred to in the missile crisis.

Where the international environment cannot be negotiated, organizations deal with remaining uncertainties by establishing a set of standard scenarios that constitute the contingencies for which they prepare. For example, the standard scenario for Tactical Air Command of the U.S. Air Force involves combat with enemy aircraft. Planes are designed and pilots trained for this contingency. Though this capability has proved of less relevance in more probable contingencies, e.g., close-in ground support in limited wars like Viet Nam, the scenario has been slow to change.

6. **Problem-directed Search.** Where situations cannot be construed as standard, organizations engage in search. The style of search and its stopping point are largely determined by existing routines. Organizational search for alternative courses of action is problem-oriented: it focuses on the atypical discomfort that must be avoided. It is simple-minded: the neighborhood of the symptom is searched first, then the neighborhood of the current alternative. Patterns of search reveal biases that reflect factors such as specialized training, experience of various parts of the organization, and patterns of communication within the organization.

7. **Organizational Learning and Change.** The parameters of organizational behavior mostly persist. In response to nonstandard problems, organizations search for routines evolve, assimilating new situations. Such learning and change follow in large part from existing procedures, but marked changes in organizations do sometimes occur. Conditions in which dramatic changes are more probable include:

a. **Budgetary Feast.** Typically, organizations devour budgetary feasts by proceeding down the existing shopping list. Nevertheless, government leaders who control the budget and are committed to change can use extra funds to effect changes.

b. **Prolonged Budgetary Famine.** Though a single year's famine typically results in few fundamental changes in organizational structure and procedures, it often causes a loss of effectiveness in performing certain programs. Prolonged famine, however, forces major retrenchment.

c. **Dramatic Performance Failures.** Dramatic change occurs usually in response to major disasters. Confronted with an undeniable failure of procedures and repertoires, authorities outside the organization demand change, existing personnel are less resistant to change, and key members of the organization are replaced by individuals committed to change.

E. **Central Coordination and Control.** Governmental action requires decentralization of responsibility and power. But problems do not fit neatly into separable domains. Each organization's performance of its job has major consequences for other departments. Important problems lap over the jurisdictions of several organizations. Thus the necessity for decentralization runs headlong into the requirement for coordination. (Those who advocate one horn or other of this dilemma—responsive action entails decentralized power versus coordinated action requires central control—account for a considerable part of the demand for government reorganization.)

The necessity for coordination and the centrality of
foreign policy to the welfare of the nation guarantee the involvement of government leaders in the processes of the organizations that share power. Each organization's propensities and routines can be affected by the intervention of government leaders. Central direction and persistent control of organizational activity, however, is not possible. The relations among organizations and between organizations and government leaders depend critically on a number of structural variables, including the (1) nature of the job, (2) performance measures and information available to government leaders, (3) system of rewards and punishments for organizational members, and (4) procedures by which human and material resources get committed. For example, to the extent that rewards and punishments for the members of an organization are distributed by higher authorities, these authorities can exercise some control by specifying criteria for evaluating organizational output. These criteria become constraints within which organizational activity proceeds. Constraints, however, are crude instruments of control. Specification of relevant operational criteria for the activities of most government organizations is incredibly difficult. Moreover, in the U.S. government, the leader's control over critical rewards and punishments is severely limited.

Intervention by government leaders does sometimes change the activity of an organization in an intended direction, but instances are fewer than might be expected. As Franklin Roosevelt, the master manipulator of government organizations, remarked:

The Treasury is so large and far-flung and ingrained in its practices that I find it is almost impossible to get the action and results I want. . . . But the Treasury is not to be compared with the State Department. You should go through the experience of trying to get any changes in the thinking, policy, and action of the career diplomats and then you'd know what a real problem was. But the Treasury and the State Department put together are nothing as compared with the Na-a-vy. . . . To change anything in the Na-a-vy is like punching a feather bed. You punch it with your right and you punch it with your left until you are finally exhausted, and then you find the damn bed just as it was before you started punching.46

John Kennedy's experience seems to have been similar:

"The State Department," he asserted, "is a bowl of jelly." And lest the McNamara revolution in the Defense Department seem too striking a counter-example, the Navy's rejection of McNamara's major intervention in naval weapons procurement, the F-111B, should be studied as an antidote.

F. Decisions of Government Leaders. Organizational persistence does not preclude shifts in governmental behavior. Government leaders sit atop the conglomerate of organizations. In spite of the limits of the leadership's ability to control changes in a particular organization's goals or SOPs, many important issues of governmental action require that these leaders decide what organizations will play out which programs where. Thus some kinds of important shifts in the behavior of governments can take place with little change in a particular organization's parochialism and SOPs. The degree of these shifts is limited by the range of existing organizational programs.

The leadership's options for shifting governmental behavior at any point include: (1) triggering program A rather than program B within a repertoire, (2) triggering existing organizational routines in a new context, (3) triggering several different organizations' programs simultaneously. Additional leeway can be won by feeding an issue to one component of an organization rather than another, for example, raising a strategic issue in budgetary guise or vice versa. Over the longer run, leaders can create new organizations. Occasionally, they may even effect deliberate change in organizations by manipulating the factors that support existing organizational tendencies. Even in making these various choices, leaders rely for the most part on information provided by, estimates generated by, and alternatives specified by organizational programs.

III. Dominant Inference Pattern. If a nation performs an action of a certain type today, its organizational components must yesterday have been performing (or have had established routines for performing) an action only marginally different from today's action. At any specific point in time, a government consists of an established conglomerate of organizations, each with existing goals, programs, and rep-
ertoires. The characteristics of a government's action in any instance follows from those established routines, and from the choice made by government leaders — on the basis of information and estimates provided by existing routines — among established programs. The best explanation of an organization's behavior at time \( t \) is \( t - 1 \); the best prediction of what will happen at time \( t + 1 \) is \( t \). Model II's explanatory power is achieved by uncovering the organizational routines and repertoires that produced the outputs that comprise the puzzling occurrence.

This inference pattern is illustrated clearly (though in terms of a quite different orientation) by Roberta Wohlstetter's excellent study, *Pearl Harbor*. The question addressed by this book is why America slept. That is, how could the United States have failed to anticipate the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, given the extraordinary amount and quality of intelligence available? The Rational Actor Model would seem to supply the answer: confusion or conspiracy, incompetence or design. By December 7, Admiral Kimmel, the Pacific Fleet Commander, had received the following information: a warning from the Navy on November 27, about possible attack, report of a change in Japanese codes (evaluated as very unusual); reports of Japanese ships in Camranh Bay, orders to be alert for Japanese action in the Pacific, messages deciphered from Japan's most secure code ordering Japanese embassies to destroy secret papers, FBI notice that the local Japanese consul was burning papers, government authorization to destroy all American codes and secret papers in outlying islands, and personal warnings from Admiral Stark in Washington. Assuming honesty and competence, a Model I analyst would be led to predict: (1) the fleet would be out of the harbor, (2) the island would be air patrolled, (3) the emergency warning center would be staffed, and (4) the Army would have been notified under the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan. But each of these predictions would have proved incorrect. Instead the Navy's activity on December 7 was identical with its behavior on December 6, which differed imperceptibly from its behavior on December 5, and so on. Each of these details represents standard outputs of an organization functioning according to very established routines.

IV. General Propositions

A. Organizational Implementation. Activity according to standard operating procedures and programs does not constitute far-sighted, flexible adaptation to "the issue" (as it is conceived by the analyst). Detail and nuance of actions by organizations are determined chiefly by organizational routines, not government leaders' directions. Model I's attempt to use these details to distinguish among alternative hypotheses about leaders' subtle plans is misguided.

1. SOPs. SOPs constitute routines for dealing with standard situations. Routines allow large numbers of ordinary individuals to deal with numerous instances, day after day, without much thought. But this regularized capacity for adequate performance is purchased at the price of standardization. If the SOPs are appropriate, average performance — i.e., performance averaged over the range of cases — is better than it would be if each instance were approached individually (given fixed talent, timing, and resource constraints). But specific instances, particularly critical instances that typically do not have "standard" characteristics, are often handled sluggishly or inappropriately.

2. Programs. A program, i.e., a complex cluster of SOPs, is rarely tailored to the specific situation in which it is executed. Rather, the program is (at best) the most appropriate of the programs in the existing repertoire.

3. Repertoires. Since repertoires are developed by parochial organizations for standard scenarios that the organization has defined, programs available for dealing with a particular situation are often ill suited to it.

On December 7, 1941, what was Army Intelligence in Hawaii prepared to do? A single scenario — the prevention of sabotage — dominated the planning, and the responses available were quite limited. As Wohlstetter records: "Washington advised General Short on November 27 to expect hostile activities' at any moment, by which it meant 'attack on American positions from without,' but General Short under-
stood this phrase to mean 'sabotage.’ Predictably, Army Intelligence implemented its counter-sabotage routines, rather than taking any precautions against air attack.

B. Organizational Options. The menu of alternatives defined by organizations in sufficient detail to be live options is severely limited in both number and character. The short list of alternatives reflects not only the cost of alternative generation but, more important, each organization’s interest in controlling, rather than presenting, choices — for example, by serving up one real alternative framed by two extremes. The character of the alternatives, i.e., the location of the set of alternatives in the universe of possible alternatives relevant to the leader’s objectives, differs significantly from the character of alternatives that would be presented by, say, a team of five disinterested experts. The difference is a function of the configuration of established organizations and their existing goals and procedures.

1. Alternatives built into existing organizational goals — e.g., both incremental improvements in each military service’s primary weapon system and major new developments in that line — will be adequate (i.e., compare favorably with the expert’s list, though with less sensitivity to costs). In contrast, alternatives contrary to existing organizational goals — e.g., proposals for reducing the number of officers in a service — will be poor (i.e., compare poorly with the expert’s list).

2. Alternatives requiring coordination of several organizations — e.g., multi-service weapon systems, like McNamara’s TFX — are likely to be poor.

3. Alternatives in areas between organizations — e.g., weapon systems not represented by a major service component — are likely to be poor. For example, the requirement for central coordination of intelligence seems obvious. But failure of the alert system on three occasions prior to Pearl Harbor was not sufficient to generate a proposal for central coordination of intelligence and communication. Nor in organizational terms could it have been. Naval Intelligence “obviously and correctly regarded its own sources as superior” and had no incentives for merging with an inferior. Army Intelligence, G-2, had little interest in combined intelligence operations. Its relations with Naval Intelligence were “not very close because we had practically nothing in common. There was no combat at that time.”

C. Limited Flexibility and Incremental Change. Major lines of organizational action are straight — i.e., behavior at one time, \( t \), is marginally different from behavior at \( t - 1 \). Simple-minded predictions work best: behavior at \( t + 1 \) will be marginally different from behavior at the present time.

1. Organizational budgets change incrementally — both with respect to totals and with respect to intra-organizational splits. Organizations could divide the money available each year by carving up the pie anew (in the light of objectives or changes in the environment), but, in fact, organizations take last year’s budget as a base and adjust incrementally. Predictions that require large budgetary shifts in a single year between organizations or between units within an organization should be hedged.

2. Organizational priorities, perceptions, and issues are relatively stable.

3. Organizational procedures and repertoires change incrementally.

4. New activities typically consist of marginal adaptations of existing programs and activities.

5. A program, once undertaken, is not dropped at the point where objective costs outweigh benefits. Organizational momentum carries it easily beyond the loss point.

Army Intelligence was primarily in the business of detecting subversive activity. But as early as May 40, General Marshall requested that an evaluation branch be established within G-2 (Army Intelligence) for the “maintenance of current estimates of predicted activity in... the Far East.” This request fueled an increase in the number of officers on the G-2 staff from twenty-two to nearly eighty men by December 7, 1941. But as the Chief of Military Intelligence later testified, at the end of 1941,
"military intelligence was specifically concerned... with anti-subversive precautions and operations."

D. Long-range Planning. The existence of long-range planning units in the foreign policy departments of the U.S. government — e.g., the Policy Planning Staff in the Department of State — would seem to support Model I's implication that governments deal with the uncertain future by devising long-run plans. Model II's proposition, however, concerns the effective contribution of such units to the policy output. Long-range planning tends to become institutionalized (in order to provide a proper gesture in that direction) and then disregarded. "As far back as 1936 war games and drills in the Hawaiian Islands had been planned on the basis of a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor... defined as a surprise air raid by Japan." G-2 had a plan known as "Orange," to provide for defense against such an attack. The general and admiral in command of air units in Hawaii had approved the requirements for that defense. But the actual organizational routines proceeded without reference to that planning exercise. "There had never been any attempt to cover the full 360 degrees around the islands by long-distance reconnaissance"; moreover, despite two alerts in July and October 1941, "before December 7 Short [the Army Commander] held no drill or alert in which the boxes of ammunition were opened." E.

E. Goals and Tradeoffs. Since organizational goals are formulated as constraints — i.e., imperatives to avoid falling beneath specified performance levels, behavior departs from Model I's expectations.

1. Tradeoffs — i.e., hard choices among goals — are neglected.

2. Incompatible constraints are attended to sequentially, the organization satisfying one while simply neglecting another. The aerial arm of the U.S. Navy stationed in Hawaii had two imperatives: (1) to train pilots for an attack on the Japanese mandated islands and (2) to carry out distant reconnaissance of enemy activities. Given the available aircraft, it was not possible to satisfy both imperatives, so the Navy concentrated on the first. In order to conserve resources for the primary mission (attack on the Japanese mandates), aircraft were returned to base on weekends, including Friday, for maintenance. Had a limited number of aircraft been attending to the second imperative on Sunday, December 7, the base would have had an hour's warning. But attention to that imperative had been neglected for concentration on preparations for an offensive attack.

F. Imperialism. Most organizations define the central goal of "health" in terms of growth in budget, manpower, and territory. Thus issues that arise in areas where boundaries are ambiguous and changing, or issues that constitute new territories, are dominated by colonizing activity.

When a breakthrough cracked the Japanese codes, the question in the Navy was less "What do these messages mean?" than "Who would perform the task of serious evaluation of enemy intentions?" This issue pitted the Office of Naval Intelligence against the War Plans Division. Though it lacked Japanese linguists and specialists, the War Plans Division ("traditionally the more powerful agency") fought and won the right to "interpret and evaluate all information concerning possible hostile nations from whatever source received."

G. Options and Organization. Organizations or subunits of an organization are often created in order to pay special attention to a neglected aspect of a problem. Leaders see this as a way of increasing options by providing information and alternatives that would otherwise be unavailable. But the existence of options affects the probabilities of choice, for the organizations created to provide an option also generate information and estimates that are tailored to make the exercise of that option more likely.

H. Administrative Feasibility. Adequate explanation, analysis, and prediction must include administrative feasibility as a major dimension. A considerable gap separates what leaders choose (or might rationally have chosen) and what organizations implement.

1. Organizations are blunt instruments.

2. Projects that demand that existing organizational units depart from their established programs to per-
3. Projects that require coordination of the programs of several organizations are rarely accomplished as designed.

4. Where an assigned piece of a problem is contrary to existing organizational goals, resistance will be encountered.

5. Government leaders can expect that each organization will “do its part” in terms of what the organization knows how to do.

6. Government leaders can expect incomplete and distorted information from each organization about its part of the problem.

Washington’s insensitivity to administrative feasibilites is clearly demonstrated by Pearl Harbor. Having ordered full cooperation and communication between the Army and Navy, the leaders in Washington assumed that in the period of increased danger the Army and Navy operations at Pearl Harbor would function as a finely tuned sensor. Indeed, according to subsequent testimony, Washington seems to have assumed fully informed, intelligent coordination between these two “eyes” of the government. But in fact: (1) there was no exchange of information between Army and Navy units at Pearl Harbor; (2) on the basis of quite separate sources and types of information, each had a quite different estimate of likely contingencies for the end of the year 1941; and (3) though each had three different stages of alert, these plans meant quite different things — according to the Navy plan “1” signified a full alert, whereas for the Army “1” conveyed sabotage (lowest level of alert) and “3” a full alert. Indeed, “even in Washington the services were usually in disagreement about (1) what information to send to the theaters, (2) how to word that information, (3) what situation dictated an alert order, and (4) precisely what kind of alert was indicated.”

I. Directed Change. Existing organizational orientations and routines are not impervious to directed change. Careful targeting of major factors that support routines — such as personnel, rewards, information, and budgets — can effect major changes over time. But the terms and conditions of most political leadership jobs — short tenure and responsiveness to hot issues — make effective, directed change uncommon.

V. Specific Propositions

A. Deterrence. The probability of nuclear attack is less sensitive to balance and imbalance, or stability and instability (as these concepts are employed by Model I strategists) than it is to a number of organizational factors. Except for the special case in which the Soviet Union acquires a credible capability to destroy the United States with a disarming blow, American superiority or inferiority affects the probability of a nuclear attack less than do a number of organizational facts.

B. Soviet Force Posture. Soviet force posture (i.e., the fact that certain weapons, rather than others, are produced and deployed) is determined by organizational factors such as the goals and procedures of existing military services and of research and design labs. Government leaders’ choices determine budgetary totals and influence some major procurement decisions, but the bulk of the force posture emerges from the routine functionings of organizational units. The weakness of the Soviet Air Force within the Soviet military establishment seems to have been a crucial element in the Soviet failure to acquire a large bomber force in the 1950s (thereby faulting American intelligence predictions of a “bomber gap”). The fact that missiles were controlled until 1960 in the Soviet Union by the Soviet Ground Forces, whose goals and procedures reflected no interest in an intercontinental mission, was not irrelevant to the slow Soviet build-up of ICBMs (thereby faulting U.S. intelligence predictions of a “missiles gap”). The influence of organizational factors, like the Soviet Ground Forces’ control of missiles and that service’s fixation on European scenarios, helps to explain the Soviet deployment of so many MRBMs that European targets could be destroyed three times over.

Recent weapon development — e.g., the testing of a Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS)
and multiple warheads for the SS-9 — very likely reflects the activity and interests of a cluster of Soviet research and development organizations, rather than a decision by Soviet leaders to acquire a first-strike weapon system. Careful attention to the organizational components of the Soviet military establishment (Strategic Rocket Forces, Navy, Air Force, Ground Forces, and National Air Defense), the missions and weapon systems to which each component is wedded (an independent weapon system assists survival as an independent service), and existing budgetary splits (which probably are relatively stable in the Soviet Union as they tend to be everywhere) offer potential improvements in medium-range and longer-range predictions.

VI. Evidence. This paradigm's stark statement of organizational tendencies constitutes a marked shift of perspective. Examination of government action in terms of these roughly formulated concepts and propositions can be fruitful. For example, with a minimum of information about the organizations that constitute a government and their routines and SOPs, an analyst can significantly improve some expectations generated by the Rational Actor Model. But in order for the paradigm to get a strong grip on a specific case, the bare bones of this generalized statement must be fleshed out by information about the characteristics of the organizations involved.

Additional research should strengthen this paradigm. First, behavioral studies of various governmental organizations should permit greater differentiation within the broad class now lumped together simply as organizations. Second, study of the behavior of various classes of organizations should permit identification of the factors that support behavioral tendencies. This will also lead to a more precise formulation of the concepts and propositions of the paradigm. Third, studying instances of dramatic organizational change will make it possible to pinpoint conditions under which change is probable, and the levers a manager could manipulate to engineer improvements. Such studies should also shed light on the difficult question of why a given set of SOPs happens to exist in a particular organization.

The Organizational Process Paradigm Applied

To illustrate how Model II might be applied to problems typically treated by the classical model, let us reconsider the question of why the Soviet Union is simultaneously pursuing detente and deploying an antiballistic missile system. A Model II analyst demands no ingenious rationale for these two divergent patterns of activity; his organizational orientation leads him to expect that the left and right hands of a government often operate independently. Nor do the details of the ABM system or particular characteristics of detente provide clues to the true Soviet intentions, for these features are more a function of organizational procedures than of a coordinated choice. To find the key to this puzzle, the Model II analyst would examine the organizational interests, demands, and independent actions that yield these divergent patterns.

What organization is purchasing the Soviet ABM capability? Understanding the actions of that organization requires answers to three more specific questions: (1) What slice of the defense budget does that organization have, and how stable has its slice been? (2) What perceptions and priorities are engrafted in that organization? (3) What programs and standard operating procedures are built into that organization?

Public evidence suggests that the Soviet ABM system is being purchased by the Air Defense Command (PVO). This organization's slice of the Soviet defense budget has probably been large and relatively stable. This is the organization that reportedly spent extensively on anti-aircraft artillery from 1945 to the early 1960s. Perhaps by the late 1960s there seemed few additional locations within the Soviet Union for the deployment of conventional anti-aircraft capability. Thus the PVO may have both the budget and the need for a project like ABM.

The priorities and perspectives of the PVO are decidedly defense oriented. Any organization that could justify such extensive expenditures on anti-aircraft artillery would obviously be interested in defense against missiles. The fact that its anti-aircraft system was relatively ineffective did little to deter deployment. Similarly, the ineffectiveness of the present ABM system may not be particularly daunting. Nor is there reason to believe that this organization will consider or be impressed by arguments about possible U.S. reactions to Soviet defensive ac-
organizations. Finally, if the PVO “keeps on doing what it’s doing,” an extensive ABM system will be acquired. The organization’s established procedures and programs—e.g., reported development of ABMs since the mid-1950s and continuous deployment of at least one major defensive system since 1945—would lead to deployment by continuation. To decide against deployment would require a major shift in established trends. Thus, organizational pressures seem sufficiently strong to account for ABM deployment to date. Given the secrecy that pervades the Soviet system—which restricts the flow of information, communication, and criticism that would encourage a more comprehensive view of various Soviet programs—and the characteristic lack of understanding and interest on the part of Soviet political leaders in the details of force posture, it is not at all surprising that this purchase should have proceeded (with tacit “approval” of the leaders) while the leadership group and, especially, the scientific community were pursuing detente.

Model II thus brings into question the traditional (Model I) conception of an “arms race” between the United States and the Soviet Union. Different organizations within a government—each with its own definition of its problem and its own effective constraints—seek certain weapon systems. Military organizations tend to keep doing what they are doing—e.g., to replace cavalry with cavalry—until a catastrophe in war occurs. Though governments are not entirely unresponsive to enemy purchases and other activities, changes in the overall budget and changes among missions and organizations are marginal. Soviet responses to American procurement typically involve not the choice of the rational countermove but rather a delayed option for something on the menu of one of the present organizations. As A. W. Marshall has argued, the history of Soviet purchases from 1946 to 1962 reveals an interaction between American and Soviet force postures that is muffled, lagged, and very complex.

**Nuclear Strategy**

In the standard intuitive typology, no class of decisions is more suited to analysis according to the Rational Actor Model than nuclear strategy. As noted in Chapter 1, the most developed area of this literature is the theory of deterrence, which has a single central concern: prevention of the explosion of enemy weapons on U.S. territory. The literature has focused almost exclusively on issues of “stability” and “balance,” yielding propositions like Wohlstetter’s and Schelling’s that the probability of nuclear war is reduced not by the balance but rather by the stability of the balance. What these propositions assert are syllogisms that turn on the pivot of what a rational leader could choose (or perhaps what argument could prevail among rational leaders). But extensive and exclusive discussion of such issues is relevant only because “balance” and “stability” are believed to be the critical determinants of the occurrence that this literature discusses—namely the explosion of nuclear weapons on U.S. territory.

The organizational process paradigm suggests that the scenarios that dominate the existing strategic literature are considerably less interesting than a range of additional scenarios that arise irrespective of conditions of balance and imbalance, stability and instability. First, if the undesired event occurs, it will be as a consequence of organizational activity: the firing of rockets by a member of a missile group. This raises a central question: What is the enemy’s control system? If the physical mechanisms and the SOPs permit multiple centers at which a choice can be made to launch nuclear weapons against the United States, the probability of the undesired event rises considerably higher than it would over most conceivable ranges of imbalance and instability. Examination of this issue might suggest that an enemy be given information about mechanical devices for maximizing central control over nuclear launches.

**Second,** what patterns of regularized behavior has the enemy developed for bringing his strategic capabilities to alert status? If these routines are loose, an accident may occur. If the procedures are so unregularized that the forces have never been brought to alert status, this is a critical piece of information about the dimension of risk and the difficulty of de-escalation. Prior to the outbreak of World War I, if the Russian tsar had understood the consequences—in terms of organizational processes—of his order for full mobilization, he would have known that he had chosen war.

**Third,** organizational processes fix the range of effective choices open to enemy leaders. What plans and procedures will the leaders face when the showdown comes? Reportedly, the plans available to the U.S. President when Kennedy entered the White House provided that, in the case of a nuclear showdown,
the President would pick up a special telephone and listen to a
discussion between the relevant military and intelligence ex-
erts that would conclude with a recommendation, "O.K., Mr.
President, got!" The menu of choice made available to the Rus-

sian tsar in 1914 included only full mobilization and no mobil-
ization. Partial mobilization was not an option offered by the or-
organization. Similarly, the German railroad timetables required
that troops be loaded at specific times if they were to be at partic-
ular locations at specific other times. The German General
Staff's war plans did not require war. But once war was begun,
established routines for fighting the war did require that it be
fought on both the Eastern and the Western fronts.

Fourth, outputs of routine organizational procedures set
the chessboard at which government leaders look when they con-
front the problem of choice. How are the enemy troops trained,
and how are nuclear weapons deployed? In the quite conceivable
case of the outbreak of hostilities in Berlin, organizational factors
will be at least as important in the scenario as any "rational"
considerations of stability. The deployment, training, tactical
nuclear equipment, and SOPs of the Soviet troops in East Ger-
many will determine the face of the issue for the Soviet leaders,
as well as the way in which the leaders' choice is implemented.

Fifth, how likely are organizational processes to produce
accidental firings? During the early 1950s the U.S. Air Force re-
portedly functioned according to a "fail-safe" system — in no
case could the United States fail to destroy the Soviet Union.
The notion of a "Doomsday Machine" was dreamed up to illus-
brate how much cheaper it would be to guarantee destruction of
the Soviet Union in every case in which there was an attack on
the United States — if that were the only goal. Reduction of
American losses and protection against responding irrevocably
to false alarms are also values for which the system must be
designed. These values require some reduction in the deterrence
of the rational enemy (with which standard deterrence theory
is concerned) in order to encourage the organization controlling
the strategic capability to develop safety systems.

Many aspects of these issues have arisen in the context of
arms control. The most sophisticated deterrence theorists, espe-
cially Schelling and the Wohlstetters, have contributed signifi-
cantly to thought about these issues. But the discussion of deter-
rence by students, the military, and many policy makers persists
in terms of the framework in which stability and balance are the
focus, without the integration of these further considerations.

Cuba II: A Second Cut

"The President believed he was President and that, his wishes
having been made clear, they would be followed and the
[Turkish] missiles removed." So Robert Kennedy recalled Presi-
dent Kennedy's dismay in late October 1962 when he dis-
covered that American missiles had not been removed from
Turkey — in spite of the fact that he had twice ordered their
withdrawal. If the United States attacked the Soviet missiles in
Cuba, the Russians could reciprocate by attacking the American
missiles in Turkey, and the President would face the decision
of whether to reply with nuclear weapons against the Russian
homeland. No one saw this issue more clearly than the Presi-
dent. On Saturday, October 27, when the ExCom was consid-
ering an attack on the Soviet missiles in Cuba, the President put
his finger on the problem of the Turkish missiles. "It isn't the
first step that concerns me, but both sides escalating to the
fourth and fifth step — and we don't go to the sixth because
there is no one around to do so." If events had followed this path — the United States
attacks Soviet missiles in Cuba; the Soviets attack American
missiles in Turkey; the United States reciprocates against the missile
bases in the Soviet Union involved in the attack on Turkey;
holocaust — historians would find the cause of the conflagration
in the clash of national interests and large purposes. The per-
severence of the Turkish missiles might be noted as anecdote but
would figure only as an aside in the explanation of the nuclear
war. Facts like this one, which follow for the most part from the
routine behavior of the large organizations that constitute gov-
Model III: Governmental Politics

Model II's grasp of government action as organizational output, partially coordinated by a unified group of leaders, balances the classical model's efforts to understand government behavior as choices of a unitary decisionmaker. But the fascination of Model II analysis should not be allowed to blur a further level of investigation. The "leaders" who sit on top of organizations are not a monolithic group. Rather, each individual in this group is, in his own right, a player in a central, competitive game. The name of the game is politics: bargaining along regularized circuits among players positioned hierarchically within the government. Government behavior can thus be understood according to a third conceptual model, not as organizational outputs but as results of these bargaining games. In contrast with Model I, the Governmental (or Bureaucratic) Politics Model sees no unitary actor but rather many actors as players — players who focus not on a single strategic issue but on many diverse intra-national problems as well; players who act in terms of no consistent set of strategic objectives but rather according to various conceptions of national, organizational, and personal goals; players who make government decisions not by a single, rational choice but by the pulling and hauling that is politics.

The apparatus of each national government constitutes a complex arena for the intra-national game. Political leaders at the top of the apparatus are joined by the men who occupy positions on top of major organizations to form a circle of central players. Those who join the circle come with some independent standing. Because the spectrum of foreign policy problems faced by a government is so broad, decisions have to be decentralized — giving each player considerable baronial discretion.

The nature of foreign policy problems permits fundamental disagreement among reasonable men about how to solve them. Analyses yield conflicting recommendations. Separate responsibilities laid on the shoulders of distinct individuals encourage differences in what each sees and judges to be important. But the nation's actions really matter. A wrong choice could mean irreparable damage. Thus responsible men are obliged to fight for what they are convinced is right.

Men share power. Men differ about what must be done. The differences matter. This milieu necessitates that government decisions and actions result from a political process. In this process, sometimes one group committed to a course of action triumphs over other groups fighting for other alternatives. Equally often, however, different groups pulling in different directions produce a result, or better a resultant — a mixture of conflicting preferences and unequal power of various individuals — distinct from what any person or group intended. In both cases, what moves the chess pieces is not simply the reasons that support a course of action, or the routines of organizations that enact an alternative, but the power and skill of proponents and opponents of the action in question.

This characterization captures the thrust of the bureaucratic politics orientation. If problems of foreign policy arose as discrete issues, and decisions were determined one game at a time, this account would suffice. But most "issues" — e.g., Viet Nam, or the proliferation of nuclear weapons — emerge piecemeal over time, one lump in one context, a second in another. Hundreds of issues compete for players' attention every day. Each player is forced to fix upon his issues for that day, deal with them on their own terms, and rush on to the next. Thus the character of emerging issues and the pace at which the game is played converges to yield government "decisions" and "actions" as collages. Choices by one player (e.g., to authorize action by his department, to make a speech, or to refrain from acquiring certain information), results of minor games (e.g., the wording of a cable or the decision on departmental action worked out among lower-level players), results of central games (e.g., decisions, actions, and speeches bargained out among central players), and "foul-ups" (e.g., choices that are not made because they are not recognized or are raised too late, misunderstand-
ings, etc.) — these pieces, when stuck to the same canvas, constitute government behavior relevant to an issue. To explain why a particular formal governmental decision was made, or why one pattern of governmental behavior emerged, it is necessary to identify the games and players, to display the coalitions, bargains, and compromises, and to convey some feel for the confusion.

This conception of national security policy as political resultant contradicts both public imagery and academic orthodoxy. Issues vital to national security are considered too important to be settled by political games. They must be "above" politics: to accuse someone of "playing politics with national security" is a most serious charge. Thus, memoirs typically handle the details of such bargaining with a velvet glove. For example, both Sorensen and Schlesinger present the efforts of the ExCom in the Cuban missile crisis as essentially rational deliberation among a unified group of equals. What public expectation demands, the academic penchant for intellectual elegance reinforces. Internal politics is messy; moreover, according to prevailing doctrine, politicking lacks intellectual substance. It constitutes gossip for journalists rather than a subject for serious investigation. Occasional memoirs, anecdotes in historical accounts, and several detailed case studies to the contrary, most of the foreign policy literature avoids bureaucratic politics.

The gap between academic literature and the experience of participants in government is nowhere wider than at this point. For those who participate in government the terms of daily employment cannot be ignored: government leaders have competitive, not homogeneous interests; priorities and perceptions are shaped by positions; problems are much more varied than straightforward strategic issues; management of piecemeal streams of decisions is more important than steady-state choices; making sure that the government does what is decided is more difficult than selecting the preferred solution.* As the

*The tendency of participants in American government to understand these facts when thinking about an issue within the U.S. government, but to downplay them and rely instead on Model I concepts and logic when thinking about other national governments, is well illustrated by an anecdote told by Henry S. Rowen. Shortly after taking a job in the U.S. government, Rowen attended a meeting of twelve representatives from different agencies on the

first Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal, once observed: "I have always been amused by those who say they are quite willing to go into government but they are not willing to go into politics. My answer … is that you can no more divorce government from politics than you can separate sex from creation."1

A small but increasing number of analysts have begun to examine the effect of these conditions on government actions. The first section of this chapter examines the work of several of these analysts, thus providing a foundation for a Governmental Politics Model. Unfortunately, the interests of these analysts have not led them to invest much labor in squeezing their insights into propositions. Consequently, the paradigm stated in the section beginning on page 162 can be no more than a tentative formalization. The application of the paradigm to several policy problems examined in preceding theoretical chapters is illustrated in the final section of this chapter.

The Governmental Politics Model Illustrated

Analyses of a Model III variety have attracted increasing attention since 1960. That year marked the publication of Presidential Power by Richard E. Neustadt and the legitimation of the political analysis of the Presidency that it embodied.2 While attempts to analyze governmental action as the result of politics had been made earlier, Neustadt's work stands as the most forceful and subtle. President-elect Kennedy's enthusiastic recommendation of the book to inquiring columnists and his appointment of Neustadt as a principal transition adviser put the study on the required reading list among activists jockeying for a position in the new administration, journalists, and analysts interested in understanding the American Presidency. (Kennedy claimed afterward to be the best publicity agent a political scientist ever had.)

problem of desalination in the Middle East. After more than an hour of discussion of U.S. policy, no one was in doubt about the fact that each of the representatives favored a policy that conflicted sharply with the policies of the others. Moreover, several of the agencies were carrying out directly contradictory courses of action. But when the group turned to the next item on the agenda, everyone proceeded to talk about "the Israeli policy on desalination" as if a consistent course of action had been chosen by a single rational individual in the light of broad national goals.
The style of Neustadt's analysis reflects his experience in government, especially on Truman's White House staff. The conceptual model implicit in his thinking is thus most easily identified by characteristic phrases:

The constitutional convention of 1787 is supposed to have created a government of "separated powers." It did nothing of the sort. Rather, it created a government of separated institutions sharing powers.6

Because participants in the government have independent bases, power [i.e., effective influence on outcomes] is shared. Constitutional prescription, political tradition, governmental practice, and democratic theory all converge to accentuate differences among needs and interests of individuals in the government, and to divide influence among them. Each participant sits in a seat that confers separate responsibilities for each; each is committed to fulfilling his responsibilities as he sees them. Thus those who share with the President the job of government cannot be entirely responsive to his command. What the President wants will rarely seem a trifl e to the men from whom he wants it. Besides, they are bound to judge his preferences in the light of their own responsibilities, not his.

Presidential power is the power to persuade.4

Underneath our images of Presidents-in-boots, astride decisions, are the half-observed realities of Presidents-in-sneakers, stirring in hand, trying to induce particular department heads, or Congressmen or Senators, to climb aboard.5

In status and formal powers the President is chief. Every other participant's business somehow involves him. But his authority guarantees only an extensive clerkship. If the President is to rule, he must squeeze from these formal powers a full array of bargaining advantages. Bolstered by his "professional reputation" and "public prestige," the President can use these advantages to translate the needs and fears of other participants into an appreciation that what he wants of them is what they should do in their own best interest. His bargaining advantages are rarely sufficient to assure enactment of his will, but they are his only means of ensuring an impact on governmental action.

They [the participants] bargain not at random but according to the processes, conforming to the prerequisites, responsive to the pressures of their own political system.6

The game of Presidential persuasion is not played at random. Rather, certain processes structure the play. Processes are regularized channels for bringing issues to the point of choice. Presidential attention becomes fixed, and bargaining earnest, only as issues are rendered actionable by moving along lines of process toward deadlines.

Not action as an outcome but his [the President's] impact on the outcome is the measure of the man.7

The things a President must think about if he would build his influence are not unlike those bearing on the viability of public policy. . . . A President who sees his power stakes sees something very much like the ingredients that make for viability in policy.8

The focus of Neustadt's attention is not action as the result of a bargaining game but rather Presidential choice. To understand policy, one must peer over the President's shoulder. What can be done is best understood by looking over the shoulder of the President-in-boots. What is done can best be understood by examining the skill of the President-in-sneakers as he probes the demands, the risks, and the threats to his own personal influence; as he persuades, cajoles, and spurs other members of the government to act accordingly.

Each [government] is a more or less complex arena for internal bargaining among the bureaucratic elements and political personalities who collectively comprise its working apparatus. Its action is the product of their interaction. . . . Relationships between allies are something like relationships between two great American departments.9

Applied to relations between nations, this model directs attention to intra-national games, the overlap of which constitutes international relations.

The palace perspective that gives Presidential Power its sharp focus attempts to elucidate policy as the result of Presidential politics. Neustadt's later works move in the direction of an analysis of policy as the result of political bargaining in which other actors as well as the President are important players.10 Nevertheless, he does not shed his commitment to a king's-eye view that leads him to picture policy as the crystallization of Presidential choice, action as the consequence of Presidential authorization, and activity by other players as a means of widening — or failing to widen — Presidential options.
Unfortunately, what is reputed to be the finest existing study of a crisis in international relations, Neustadt's "Skybolt Report," is not available in a public version. His analytic style is clear, however, in his case study of President Truman's failure to stop American troops at the "narrow waist" in their advance up the Korean peninsula. The United States entered the war with the explicit, limited intention of repelling the North Korean attack. The American-drafted U.N. Resolution of June 27, 1950, recommended only "such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and restore international peace and security in the area." By June 1951, the United States had repulsed the nearly disastrous Chinese attack and was pursuing the retreating army northward. But in this second march up the Korean peninsula, American troops halted at the 38th parallel — dismissing the territory between that line and the waist as "real estate." Why then — in the face of the probability of Chinese entry into the war — did American troops advanced across the 38th parallel, across the waist, and toward the Chinese border in November 1950? Neustadt's answer to the question focuses on the President's failure to perceive the risks to his own personal power, risks that endangered his prestige with the public outside Washington.

Truman's behavior permits no doubt about his priorities. His Memoirs paraphrase the National Security Council minutes of June 29, 1950:

I stated categorically that... I wanted to take every step necessary to push the North Koreans back behind the 38th Parallel. But I wanted to be sure that we did not become so deeply committed in Korea that we could not stop to take care of other situations as might develop... I wanted it clearly understood that our operations were designed to restore peace there and to restore the border.

There were many things he wanted more than unification of Korea. As Neustadt records:

He wanted to affirm that the UN was not a League of Nations, that aggression would be met with counter-force, that "police actions" were well worth the cost, that the "lesson of the 1930's" had been learned. He wanted to avoid "the wrong war, in the wrong place, at the wrong time," as General Bradley put it — and any "War," if possible. He wanted NATO strengthened fast, both militarily and psychologically. He wanted the United States rearmed without inflation, and prepared, thereafter, to sustain a level of expenditure for military forces and for foreign aid far higher than had seemed achievable before Korea. He also wanted to get on with the Fair Deal, keeping Democrats in office, strengthen his congressional support from North and West, and calm the waters stirred by men like Senator McCarthy.

These priorities make all the more tragic his failure to halt American troops along a line at which the Chinese attack might have been avoided or repelled.

Neustadt traces the elements of the tragedy. In August 1950, when plans for the Inchon landing were approved, Truman might have publicly nailed down the aims stated in June — namely, restoration of South Korean borders. Crossing into North Korea in September 1950 might have been justified on grounds other than unification. In October 1950 the target of a "better line of defense" at the waist might have been proclaimed. But the crux of the puzzle arises in the days between November 9 and the Chinese attack on November 28.

By late October, as U.S. troops marched up North Korea toward the Chinese border, the Chinese presence in Korea was confirmed. In the first week of November, MacArthur insisted upon bombing Yalu bridges because troops "pouring" South threatened "ultimate destruction of U.N. forces." Before November 10 the following facts were accepted: military action with existing forces could not achieve the military target — namely, destruction of enemy forces; no more troops could be spared for MacArthur; negotiation with the Chinese would be necessary. "As Truman's Memoirs show, the policy dilemma was implicitly accepted by all parties to a National Security Council discussion on November 9." The occupation of North Korea could not follow from military action alone. Either it would have to be given up entirely or it would follow from negotiation with the Chinese Communists. Yet the November 9 meeting ended with a decision that MacArthur's directives should be "kept under review" pending State Department efforts at clarification of Peking intentions and the possibilities of negotiation. In accepting this decision, Truman was simply postponing a change of MacArthur's orders, "yet this postpone-
ment of decision proved to be one of the most decisive actions Truman ever took. For this delay made MacArthur — the general whose personal views so differed from those of his commander-in-chief that Truman had considered firing him in August, who had the prestige of a general gathering victories, the pressures of a military man rushing to achieve his objectives before the politicians took over, who was pursuing his objectives with the discretion of earlier orders — “the judge and arbiter of White House risks.”

Why did no one try to alter MacArthur’s orders in the two weeks that followed? Pentagon analysts were convinced by mid-November that Chinese soldiers were massing South of the Yalu. Bradley, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Marshall, the Secretary of Defense; and Acheson, the Secretary of State — each expressed intense concern about MacArthur’s failure to concentrate his forces. The British kept urging a pullback to the waist. The Chiefs of Staff implored caution on MacArthur’s part. He demurred; they did not override him. Why did no one go to the President and recommend that the postpone-ment of a change of orders now be rescinded? Neustadt’s answer is simple enough: “Everyone thought someone else should go.” The details of his answer are best captured in his own words.

Before November 25 the men who had concluded two weeks earlier that Truman should not change MacArthur’s orders were agreed, it seems, in wishing that he would. The diplomatic emphasis of earlier discussion ceased to obscure military risks; when those grew sharp enough, it reinforced them. The logic of November 9 led to an opposite conclusion some days later, in the light of what these men had come to fear. On November 9 the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Bradley, had waived military risks in deference to foreign policy... but policy had not envisaged tactical disaster; policy suggested its avoidance at all costs. When worry grew, the military chiefs deferred to State; let Acheson, as guardian of “policy,” ask Truman to reverse MacArthur. But Acheson, already under fire from the Capitol, was treading warily between the Pentagon and that inveterate idealist about generals, Harry Truman. In immediate terms the risk was “military”; if it justified reversing the commander in the field, then the Joint Chiefs must make the judgment and tell Truman. So Acheson is said to have insisted, understandably enough, and there the matter rested. On a “military” issue the Chiefs of Staff were loath to balk the victor of Inchon, whose tactics might be better than they seemed 8000 miles away. As for the Secretary of Defense, he had preceded Acheson in State and had been Army Chief of Staff when Bradley was a subordinate commander. Since his return to government Marshall had leaned over backwards not to meddle with the work of his successors in their jobs. He had also leaned over backwards not to revive the old Army feud between him and MacArthur. What Acheson and Bradley were not ready to initiate, Marshall evidently felt he could not take upon himself.

What is the moral of the story? Agreement on what must be done about “the issue” does not suffice to guarantee action. Differences in roles, responsibilities, perceptions, and priorities among players focusing on slightly different faces of a complex issue permitted each player to expect that someone else would do what was required. Natural reticence, i.e., hesitant silence and only partially intended soft-spokenness, among players and between each player and the President combined with a moderate portion of misperception and confusion to allow inaction in a case where the substantive recommendation was not in dispute. Characteristically, Neustadt’s understatement leaves the lesson to the reader: if here, then elsewhere how much more?

A second, more explicitly theoretical source of the bureaucratic politics analyses of the 1960s flows from the works of Gabriel A. Almond and Charles E. Lindblom. Almond’s American People and Foreign Policy, published in 1950, formulates a set of concepts and terms for analyzing American foreign policy as the result of pluralist politics.

An outer circle of participants is composed of the “general public,” a group normally ignorant of and indifferent to foreign policy matters, unless aroused about some highly visible issue. The “attentive public” sits one ring closer to the center, is informed and interested in foreign policy problems, and provides the audience for discussion among the elites. Center stage is surrounded by the “policy and opinion elites” who give structure to the public discussion and open avenues of access to the various groupings. Finally, the “official policy leadership” are the actors. The elite structure is characterized by a large number of autonomous and competing groups: autonomous, since power is widely dispersed among participants and drawn from a variety of independent sources; competing, since participants differ about both ends and means; and groups, since only by coordination can individuals assemble sufficient power to achieve their proposals. Almond’s terminology
thus represents the application of a pluralist model to foreign policy decisions.\footnote{25}

The mechanism of decentralized coordination has provided the focus of Charles Lindblom's work. From his "Bargaining: The Hidden Hand in Government," through his most famous article, "The Science of Muddling Through," to his books The Intelligence of Democracy and The Policy-Making Process, Lindblom has explored the character of bargaining and expounded the virtues of incremental muddling as opposed to comprehensive choice as the mode of policy making.\footnote{25} Attacking a variant of what we have termed Model I, Lindblom develops an alternative. His alternative, which he labels "successive limited comparisons," is spelled out in terms of a series of contrasts with the characteristics of the rational model: \footnote{26}

1. The selection of values and goals is not distinct from empirical analysis of alternative actions for achieving the goals; rather the two processes are intermingled.
2. Since ends and means are not distinct, means-ends analysis is often inappropriate or limited.
3. The test of a "good" policy is typically that various analysts find themselves directly agreeing on a policy (without agreeing that it is the most appropriate means to an end).
4. Analysis is drastically limited. Important policy outcomes are neglected. Important alternative policies are neglected. Important affected values are neglected.
5. By proceeding incrementally and comparing the results of each new policy with the old, actors reduce or eliminate reliance on theory.

The more recent literature of bureaucratic politics includes both attempts at explicit characterization of this framework and case studies from this perspective. The convergence of government experience (Neustadt) and theoretical formulation (Almond and Lindblom) is clearest in Warner Schilling's study, "The Politics of National Defense: Fiscal 1950." \footnote{27} Schilling opts for a bureaucratic politics framework explicitly at the outset when outlining his concept of budgeting as a political process. The process is characterized by (1) problems that have no right answer: "There is no determinant answer to the question of how much to spend for defense"; (2) participants whose policy differences stem from both intellectual and institutional differences; (3) processes that distribute power and advantages differentially among participants; (4) a "strain towards agreement" that encourages compromise and consensus; and (5) outcomes that result from conflict, coalition, and bargaining.\footnote{25} Schilling claims that, as a result of this process, American foreign policy often exhibits a variety of symptoms that constitute a policy syndrome: (1) "no policy at all"; (2) "compromised policy"; (3) "paper policy"; (4) "blind policy"; (5) "slow policy"; (6) "leaderless policy"; and (7) "gyroscopic policy."\footnote{29}

Using this framework, Schilling analyzes the fiscal 1950 budget, first describing the political process through which that budget was determined and then examining the relationship between that process and the content of the budget. The budgetary process involved round-robin bargaining with Secretary of Defense Forrestal as the pivot. Truman and James Webb (Director of the Bureau of the Budget) fixed a $14.4 billion ceiling for defense spending. What the Pentagon judged as necessary for the national defense could not be bought for this amount. Forrestal's initial ploy was to approach the Joint Chiefs of Staff with a proposition: they would meet the $14.4 billion ceiling with an unbalanced force posture, i.e., one that satisfied strategic bombing requirements but left the Navy and Army bare. Truman and Webb would then see the holes in the military forces, particularly the limited war capabilities, and raise the ceiling. The Army and Navy chiefs were unwilling to risk their hides on such a gamble. So Forrestal approached Secretary of State Marshall. But Marshall's first concern was Europe, and prudence required that he "save the leverage he possessed on the President's budget for protection and advancement of his own claims on Federal revenue." \footnote{30} Alone, Forrestal went to the President, but Truman's mind was elsewhere. He seems to have believed his economic experts' assurances that a defense budget of more than $15 billion would mean "national bankruptcy." Silencing the Joint Chiefs was the only military problem that captured his attention. Forrestal thus returned empty-handed to the Chiefs, reporting, "In the person of Harry Truman, I have seen the most rocklike example of civilian control that the world has ever witnessed." \footnote{31} Forrestal presented the budget to Congress — in terms that appeared "general and vacuous." JCS pleadings sounded to economy-minded Congressmen like evidence of
"separatism" and the need for "reorganization." Not surprisingly, then, fiscal 1950 displays the features of Schilling's "syndrome."52

The Common Defense by Samuel P. Huntington analyzes U.S. defense policies and force structures from the end of the Second World War to 1960 in terms of another variant of a governmental politics model.53 Huntington focuses specifically on one segment of military policy — namely, "decisions on the overall size of the military effort, force levels, and weapons."54 These decisions are explained not as the product of expert planning but rather as the "result of controversy, negotiations, and bargaining among officials and groups with different interests and perspectives."55 His distinction between "executive" and "legislative" processes symbolizes this contrast. A policymaking process is executive to the extent that: "(1) the participating units differ in power (i.e., are hierarchically arranged); (2) fundamental goals and values are not at issue; and (3) the range of possible choice is limited."56 In contrast, a policymaking process is legislative to the extent that: "(1) the units participating in the process are relatively equal in power (and consequently must bargain with each other); (2) important disagreements exist concerning the goals of policy; and (3) there are many possible alternatives."57

According to Huntington during the period he examined, decisions about force levels and weapons were determined by a structured "legislative" process. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Security Council — "the two most important committees in the executive branch of the national government" — served as the forum for balancing interests.58 These committees produced three regular pieces of executive legislation on programs. First, National Security Council (NSC) papers, especially the annual NSC paper, contained "a broad outline of the aims of U.S. national strategy and a more detailed discussion of the military, political, economic, and domestic elements to support the overall national strategy."59 Second, the Joint Chiefs of Staff counterpart to the NSC annual policy paper, the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP), "estimates the military requirements for cold, limited, or general war, and includes a determination of the military forces together with their disposition and employment necessary to implement the military strategy derived from the 'Basic National Security Policy.'"60

The third document, the annual formulation of force requirements, was then drawn up by the military Chiefs on the basis of the NSC and JCS papers. When approved by the administration, this document served as the guidelines for the appropriations and expenditures required by military services in the executive budget. This legislative process exemplified the traditional tactics of congressional legislation: (1) "avoiding controversial issues, delaying decisions on them, referring them to other bodies for resolution";61 (2) "compromise and logrolling, that is, trading off subordinate interests for major interests";62 (3) "expressing policies in vague generalities, representing the 'lowest common denominator' of agreement in which all can acquiesce";63 (4) "basing policies upon assumptions which may or may not be realistic."64

Another example of recent analysis from this perspective is Roger Hilsman's To Move a Nation (published in 1967).65 Before entering the government with the Kennedy administration, Hilsman had formulated a version of the Governmental Politics Model — one heavily influenced by the theoretical works of Almond, Lindblom, and Dahl.66 The framework used in the analysis of the major foreign policy decisions of the Kennedy administration and formulated explicitly at the end of To Move a Nation has been refined both by his experience in the government and by the works of Schilling, Huntington, Neustadt, and Schelling.67

Following Almond, Hilsman conceives of the policymaking process as a series of concentric circles. The innermost circle contains the President and the men in the departments and agencies who must carry out foreign policy decisions. Beyond this core lie other departments of the executive branch, and other layers in the basic departments and agencies. Finally, there is the open arena of "attentive publics," which includes Congress, press, and interest groups. Policy is made primarily in the innermost circle. But whether in the inner sanctum or when involving second-ring and third-ring participants, policymaking is politics.68 Decisionmaking as a political process exhibits three characteristics: (1) "a diversity of goals and values that must be reconciled before a decision can be reached";69 (2) "the presence of competing clusters of people within the main group who are identified with each of the alternative goals and policies"70 (3) "the relative power of these different groups of people included is as relevant to the final decision as the appeal of the goals they seek or the cogency and wisdom of their arguments."71 Policymaking is therefore a process of "conflict and consensus building." The advocate of a particular
example from the Eisenhower administration. In 1957, President Eisenhower appointed the Gaither Committee to study the major strategic issue of the day, American nuclear capability. When it became clear that the committee was going to be critical of the administration’s posture, publication of the report was suppressed. Having lost this battle, the advocates of the committee’s proposals regrouped a second: whether there would be two or two hundred top secret copies of the report. This battle they won. In the same week that the President failed to accept the proposals recommended by the report, Chalmers Roberts of The Washington Post published an account covering two newspaper pages, containing an accurate and complete version both of the top secret report and of its recommendations.

Finally, a growing number of case studies of decisions in foreign policy trace the bureaucratic politics of particular decisions, actions, and policies. Paul Hammond has produced three of the most interesting studies. The first, “Directives for the Occupation of Germany,” centers on the problem of drafting concrete orders for U.S. troops occupying Germany. The chief economic issue for American occupying forces was whether to “de-industrialize” Germany. When Germany surrendered on May 7, 1945, this issue became urgent. On May 11, President Truman signed the major directive on German economic policy, JCS-1067, ordering the U.S. Supreme Commander, General Eisenhower, both to “prevent Germany from ‘ever again’ becoming a threat to the peace of the world” and to prevent “such civil unrest as would endanger the occupying forces.” The former clause was a slightly veiled reference to the Morgenthau Plan; the latter referred to the consequences that State and War Department planners predicted would follow if the Morgenthau Plan were implemented. The balance of politics within the administration prevented any clear guidelines and thus permitted American military commanders to settle the issue.

Hammond traces the sources of this stalemate: the competition and confusion of a small group of players including President Roosevelt, Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau, Secretary of War Stimson, and Secretary of State Hull. The stage for this battle was set by Roosevelt’s operating style—his tendency to guard his options until the end and his willingness to encourage the principal members of his government to get involved in an issue on the assumption that he agreed with their
The forum for the "revolt of the admirals." Emphasizing superior preparation and exploiting dissent within naval ranks, Symington and Vandenberg turned the hearings to the advantage of the Air Force. Congressional appreciation of the merits of strategic bombing was simply reinforced, and the Air Force got its bombers.

Hammond's third case study, "NSC-68," traces the tangled pattern that produced the first comprehensive review of U.S. national security policy. In 1949 Paul Nitze, head of the Policy Planning Staff in the State Department, became convinced the budgetary ceilings were severely limiting U.S. foreign policy. He decided to do something about it. The Policy Planning Staff circulated several studies of the relative economic capacities of the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as of problems of European defense, in an attempt to generate interest in a major reconsideration of national strategy. Sydney Souers, Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, bought the idea and prompted the National Security Council to order a general study. The reconsideration in which Nitze was interested, however, required a stronger mandate. The H-bomb decision provided the occasion to get that mandate. With the aid of Secretary of State Acheson and Chairman Lilienthal of the Atomic Energy Commission, Nitze managed to couple the H-bomb decision a directive authorizing a joint State-Defense overall reassessment of strategic issues. Both were approved on January 30, 1950.

Nitze and the Policy Planning Staff guided the study by their willingness to "do the work." The benevolent presence and occasional intervention of Secretary Acheson on Nitze's behalf also enhanced his position. Secretary of Defense Johnson, leader of the economy drive, stood aloof from the study and hampered Department of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff participation. Nevertheless, before the study was completed in mid-March, General Landon (who had been assigned to the study by the JCS because of his commitment to existing budget levels) supported the recommendations. Landon guided the paper through the Pentagon, acquiring the signatures of all three service Secretaries and the Joint Chiefs. Outmaneuvered, Johnson was forced to join Acheson in recommending the paper to President Truman. On April 12, the President gave his tentative approval to the paper and referred it to the NSC for cost estimates. These estimates were being formulated when the eruption of the
Korean War made NSC-68 a blueprint for tripling the defense budget.

A Governmental (Bureaucratic) Politics Paradigm

Within the ballpark outlined by this rapid tour through the literature, a tentative governmental or bureaucratic politics paradigm can be formulated. The primary source of the paradigm is the model implicit in Neustadt's work, though his concentration on Presidential action has been generalized to a concern with action as a resultant of political bargaining among a number of independent players, the President being only a "superpower" among many lesser but considerable powers. The paradigm takes seriously Schelling's contention that the substantive problems are so inordinately difficult that differences about goals, alternatives, and consequences are inevitable. Thus the process of conflict and consensus building described by Hilsman becomes crucial. Characterization of the techniques employed starts from Huntington's insight that the activity resembles bargaining in legislative assemblies, though his contention that the process is "legislative" overemphasizes participant equality as opposed to the hierarchy that structures the game.

I. Basic Unit of Analysis: Governmental Action as Political Resultant. The decisions and actions of governments are intranational political resultants: resultants in the sense that what happens is not chosen as a solution to a problem but rather results from compromise, conflict, and confusion of officials with diverse interests and unequal influence; political in the sense that the activity from which decisions and actions emerge is best characterized as bargaining along regularized channels among individual members of the government. Following Wittgenstein's employment of the concept of a "game," national behavior in international affairs can be conceived of as something that emerges from intricate and subtle, simultaneous, overlapping games among players located in positions in a government. The hierarchical arrangement of these players constitutes the government.* Games proceed neither at random nor at leisure.

*The theatrical metaphor of stage, roles, and actors is more common than this metaphor of games, positions, and players. Nevertheless, the rigidity conveyed by the concept of "role" both in the theatrical sense of actors reciting fixed lines and in the sociological sense of fixed responses to specified social situations makes the concept of games, positions, and players more useful for this analysis of active participants in the determination of national foreign policy. Objections to the terminology on the grounds that "game" connotes nonsensory play overlook the concept's application of most serious problems both in Wittgenstein's philosophy and in contemporary game theory. Game theory typically treats more precisely structured games, but Wittgenstein's examination of the "language game" wherein men use words to communicate is quite analogous to this analysis of the less specified game of bureaucratic politics. Wittgenstein's employment of this concept forms a central strand in his *Philosophical Investigations*. See also Thomas C. Schelling, "What is Game Theory?" in James Charlesworth, *Contemporary Political Analysis*, New York, 1967.

Regular channels structure the game; deadlines force issues to the attention of incredibly busy players. The moves, sequences of moves, and games of chess are thus to be explained in terms of the bargaining among players with separate and unequal power over particular pieces, and with separable objectives in distinguishable subgames.

In analyzing governmental actions — for example, U.S. government efforts to retard the spread of nuclear weapons — one must examine all official actions of the U.S. government that affect this outcome. U.S. government actions affecting the spread of nuclear weapons include the State Department's efforts to gain adherence to the Nonproliferation Treaty, presidential offers of guarantees to non-nuclear nations against nuclear blackmail; Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) tests of nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes (that consequently provide a convenient shield for non-nuclear powers' development of nuclear devices); withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Far East (which may increase the concern of some Japanese and Indians about their national security); statements by the AEC about the great prospects for peaceful nuclear weapons (designated to influence AEC budgets); an AEC commissioner's argument, in the absence of any higher level decision, to a Brazilian scientist about the great virtues of peaceful nuclear explosives; and U.S. government refusal to confirm or deny the reported presence of nuclear weapons aboard ships calling in foreign ports. As this list suggests, it is important to recognize that governmental actions relevant to some issues are really an agglomeration or collage composed of relatively independent decisions and actions by individuals and groups of players.
in a broader game, as well as formal governmental decisions and actions that represent a combination of the preferences and relative influence of central players or subsets of players in more narrowly defined games. For purposes of analysis, it will often be useful to distinguish among: (1) governmental actions that are really agglomerations of relatively independent decisions and actions by individuals and groups of players, (2) formal governmental decisions or actions that represent a combination of the preferences and relative influence of central players in the game, (3) formal governmental decisions and actions that represent a combination of the preferences and relative influence of a special subset of players in the game.

II. Organizing Concepts. The organizing concepts of this paradigm can be arranged as strands in the answers to four interrelated questions: Who plays? What determines each player’s stand? What determines each player’s relative influence? How does the game combine players’ stands, influence, and moves to yield governmental decisions and actions?

A. Who plays? That is, whose interests and actions have an important effect on the government’s decisions and actions?

1. Players in Positions. The governmental actor is neither a unitary agent nor a conglomerate of organizations, but rather is a number of individual players. Groups of these players constitute the agent for particular government decisions and actions. Players are men in jobs.

Individuals become players in the national security policy game by occupying a position that is hooked on to the major channels for producing action on national security issues. For example, in the U.S. government the players include Chiefs: the President, the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Treasury, the Director of the CIA, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and, since 1961, the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs; Stafters: the immediate staff of each Chief; Indians: the political appointees and permanent government officials within each of the departments and agencies; and Ad Hoc Players: actors in the wider government game (especially “Congressional Influentials”), members of the press, spokesmen for important interest groups (especially the “bipartisan foreign policy establishment” in and out of Congress), and surrogates for each of these groups. Other members of the Congress, press, interest groups, and public form concentric circles around the central arena—circles that demarcate limits within which the game is played.²⁵

Positions define what players both may and must do. The advantages and handicaps with which each player can enter and play in various games stem from his position. So does a cluster of obligations for the performance of certain tasks. The two sides of this coin are illustrated by the position of the modern Secretary of State. First, in form and usually in fact, he is a senior personal adviser to the President on the political-military issues that are the stuff of contemporary foreign policy. Second, he is the colleague of the President’s other senior advisers on problems of foreign policy, the Secretaries of Defense and Treasury, and the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. Third, he is the ranking U.S. diplomat in negotiations with foreign powers. Fourth, he serves as the primary representative of the administration’s foreign policy in Congress. Fifth, he is an educator of the American public about critical issues of foreign affairs and a defender of the actions of the administration. Sixth, he serves as an administration voice to the outside world. Finally, he is Mr. State Department or Mr. Foreign Office, “leader of officials, spokesman for their causes, guardian of their interests, judge of their disputes, superintendent of their work, master of their careers.”²⁶ But he is not first

²⁵For some purposes, organizations and groups can be treated as players. In treating an organization or group as a player, it is important to note the differences among (1) summarizing the official papers that emerge from an organization as coherent calculated moves of a unitary actor; (2) treating the actions of the head of an organization, whose goals are determined largely by that organization, as actions of the organization; and (3) summarizing the various actions of different individual members of an organization as coherent strategies and tactics in a single plan.
one and then the other: all these obligations are his simultaneously. His performance in one affects his credit and power in the others. The perspective he gets from the daily work he must oversee—the cable traffic by which his department maintains relations with other foreign offices—conflicts with the President's requirement that he serve as a generalist and coordinator of contrasting perspectives. The necessity that he be close to the President restricts his ability to represent the interests of his department. When he defers to the Secretary of Defense rather than fighting for his department's position—he often must—he strains the loyalty of his officialdom. In the words of one of his Indians: "Loyalty is hilly, and it has to go down if it is going to go up." Thus he labors under the weight of conflicting responsibilities.

A Secretary of State's resolution of these conflicts depends not only upon the position, but also upon the player who occupies it. For players are also people; men's metabolisms differ. The hard core of the bureaucratic politics mix is personality. How each man manages to stand the heat in his kitchen, each player's basic operating style, and the complementarity or contradiction among personalities and styles in the inner circles are irreducible pieces of the policy blend. Then, too, each person comes to his position with baggage in tow. His bags include sensitivities to certain issues, commitments to various projects, and personal standing with and debts to groups in the society.

B. What determines each player's stand? What determines his perceptions and interests that lead to a stand?

1. Parochial Priorities and Perceptions—Answers to the question "What is the issue?" are colored by the position from which the question is considered. Propensities inherent in positions do not facilitate unanimity in answering the question "What must be done?" The factors that encourage organizational parochialism also exert pressure upon the players who occupy positions on top of (or within) these organizations. To motivate members of his organization, a player must be sensitive to the organization's orientation. The games into which the player can enter and the advantages with which he plays enhance these pressures. Thus propensities and priorities stemming from position are sufficient to allow analysts to make reliable predictions about a player's stand in many cases. But these propensities are filtered through the baggage that players bring to positions. Some knowledge of both the pressures and the baggage is thus required for sound predictions.

2. Goals and Interests. The goals and interests that affect players' desired outcomes include national security interests, organizational interests, domestic interests, and personal interests. Some national security objectives are widely accepted—for example, the interest in U.S. avoidance of foreign domination and the belief that if the United States were to unilaterally disarm other nations would use military force against it and its allies with serious adverse consequences. But, in most cases, reasonable men can disagree about how American national security interests will be affected by a specific issue. Thus other interests as well affect an individual's stand on an issue of national security or foreign policy. Members of an organization, particularly career officials, come to believe that the health of their organization is vital to the national interest. The health of the organization, in turn, is seen to depend on maintaining influence, fulfilling the mission of the organization, and securing the necessary capabilities. While many bureaucrats are unconcerned with domestic affairs and politics and do not ask themselves how a proposed change in policy or behavior would affect domestic political issues, the President and senior players will always be concerned about domestic implications. Finally, a player's stand depends on his personal interests and his conception of his role.

3. Stakes and Stands. Games are played to determine decisions and actions. But decisions and actions advance and impede each player's conception of the national interest, his organization's interests, specific programs to which he is committed, the welfare
of his friends, and his personal interests. These overlapping interests constitute the stakes for which games are played. Stakes are an individual’s interests defined by the issue at hand. In the light of these stakes, a player decides on his stand on the issue.

4. Deadlines and Faces of Issues. "Solutions" to strategic problems are not found by detached analysts focusing coolly on the problem. Instead, deadlines and events raise issues and force busy players to take stands. A number of established processes—fix deadlines that demand action at appointed times. First, in the national security arena, the budget, embassies’ demands for action—cables, requests for instructions from military groups, and scheduled intelligence reports fix recurring deadlines for decision and action. Second, major political speeches, especially Presidential speeches, force decisions. Third, crises necessitate decisions and actions. Because deadlines raise issues in one context rather than in another, they importantly affect the resolution of the issue.

When an issue arises, players typically come to see quite different faces of the issue. For example, a proposal to withdraw American troops from Europe is to the Army a threat to its budget and size, to the Budget Bureau a way to save money, to the Treasury a balance-of-payments gain, to the State Department Office of European Affairs a threat to good relations with NATO, to the President’s congressional adviser an opportunity to remove a major irritant in the President’s relations with the Hill. (Chiefs, especially, tend to see several faces of the issue simultaneously.) But the face of the issue that each player sees is not determined by his goals and interests alone. By raising an issue in one channel rather than in another, deadlines affect the face an issue wears.

C. What determines each player’s impact on results?

1. Power. Power (i.e., effective influence on government decisions and actions) is an elusive blend of at least three elements: bargaining advantages, skill and will in using bargaining advantages, and other players’ perceptions of the first two ingredients. The sources of bargaining advantages include formal authority and responsibility (stemming from positions); actual control over resources necessary to carry out action; expertise and control over information that enables one to define the problem, identify options, and estimate feasibilities; control over information that enables chiefs to determine whether and in what form decisions are being implemented; the ability to affect other players’ objectives in other games, including domestic political games; personal persuasiveness with other players (drawn from personal relations, charisma); and access to and persuasiveness with players who have bargaining advantages drawn from the above (based on interpersonal relations, etc.). Power wisely invested yields an enhanced reputation for effectiveness. Unsuccessful investments deplete both the stock of capital and the reputation. Thus each player must pick the issues on which he can play with high probability of success.

D. What is the game? How are players’ stands, influence, and moves combined to yield governmental decisions and actions?

1. Action-channels. Bargaining games are neither random nor haphazard. The individuals whose stands and moves count are the players whose positions hook them on to the action-channels. An action-channel is a regularized means of taking governmental action on a specific kind of issue. For example, one action-channel for producing U.S. military intervention in another country includes a recommendation by the ambassador to that country, an accessment by the regional military commander, a recommendation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, an evaluation by the intelligence community of the consequences of intervention, a recommendation by the Secretaries of State and Defense, a Presidential decision to intervene, the transmittal of an order through the President to the Secretary of Defense and the JCS to the regional military commander, his determination of what troops to employ, the order from him to the commander of those troops, and orders from that commander to the individuals who actually move in-
to the country. Similarly, the budgetary action-channel includes the series of steps between the Budget Bureau's annual "call for estimates," through departmental, Presidential, and congressional review, to congressional appropriation, Presidential signature, Bureau of Budget apportionment, agency obligation, and ultimately expenditure.

Action-channels structure the game by preselecting the major players, determining their usual points of entrance into the game, and distributing particular advantages and disadvantages for each game. Most critically, channels determine "who's got the action" — that is, which department's Indians actually do whatever is decided upon.

Typically, issues are recognized and determined within an established channel for producing action. In the national security area, weapons procurement decisions are made within the annual budgeting process; embassies' demands for action-cables are answered according to routines of consultation and clearance from State to Defense and White House; requests for instructions from military groups (concerning assistance all the time, concerning operations during war) are composed by the military in consultation with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the White House; crises responses are debated among White House, State, Defense, CIA, Treasury, and ad hoc players.

2. Rules of the Game. The rules of the game stem from the Constitution, statutes, court interpretations, executive orders, conventions, and even culture. Some rules are explicit, others implicit. Some rules are quite clear, others fuzzy. Some are very stable; others are ever changing. But the collection of rules, in effect, defines the game. First, rules establish the positions, the paths by which men gain access to positions, the power of each position, the action-channels. Second, rules constrict the range of governmental decisions and actions that are acceptable. The Constitution declares certain forms of action out of bounds. In attempting to encourage a domestic industry — for example, the computer industry — to take advantage of certain international opportunities, American players are restricted by antitrust laws to a much narrower set of actions than, for example, are players in Japan. Third, rules sanction moves of some kinds — bargaining, coalitions, persuasion, deceit, bluff, and threat — while making other moves illegal, immoral, ungentlemanly, or inappropriate.

3. Action as Political Resultant. Government decisions are made, and government actions are taken, neither as the simple choice of a unified group, nor as a formal summary of leaders' preferences. Rather, the context of shared power but separate judgments about important choices means that politics is the mechanism of choice. Each player pulls and hauls with the power at his discretion for outcomes that will advance his conception of national, organizational, group, and personal interests.*

Note the environment in which the game is played: inordinate uncertainty about what must be done, the necessity that something be done, and the crucial consequences of whatever is done. These features force responsible men to become active players. The pace of the game — hundreds of issues, numerous games, and multiple circuits — compels players to fight to "get others' attention," to make them "see the facts," to assure that they "take the time to think seriously about the broader issue." The structure of the game — power shared by individuals with separate responsibilities — validates each player's feeling that "others don't see my problem," and "others must be persuaded to look at the issue from a less parochial perspective." The law of the game — he who hesitates loses his chance to play at that point and he who is uncertain about his recommendation is overpowered by others who are sure —

*How each player ranks his interests as they are manifest as stakes at particular points in the game is a subtle, complex problem. In one sense, players seem to have gone through a "Model I" analysis. American culture tends to legitimize national interests and to render "political considerations" beyond the pale. This makes it difficult for many players to articulate, even to themselves, the priorities that their behavior suggests.
pressure players to come down on one side of a 51 to 49 issue and play. The reward of the game—effectiveness, i.e., impact on outcomes, as the immediate measure of performance—encourages hard play. Thus, most players come to fight to “make the government do what is right.” The strategies and tactics employed are quite similar to those formalized by theorists of international relations.

Advocates fight for outcomes. But the game of politics does not consist simply of players pulling and hauling, each for his own chosen action, because the terms and conditions of players’ employment are not identical. Chiefs and Indians are often advocates of particular actions. But staffers fight to find issues, state alternatives, and produce arguments for their Chiefs. Presidential staffs—ideally—struggle to catch issues and structure games so as to maximize both the President’s appreciation of advocates’ arguments and the impact of Presidential decision. Chiefs sometimes function as semi-staffs for the President. The President’s costs and benefits often require that he decide as little as possible, keeping his options open (rather than coming down on one side of an uncertain issue and playing hard).

When a governmental or Presidential decision is reached, the larger game is not over. Decisions can be reversed or ignored. As Jonathan Daniels, an aide to Franklin Roosevelt, noted:

Half of a President’s suggestions, which theoretically carry the weight of orders, can be safely forgotten by a Cabinet member. And if the President asks about a suggestion a second time, he can be told that it is being investigated. If he asks a third time, a wise Cabinet officer will give him at least part of what he suggests. But only occasionally, except about the most important matters, do Presidents ever get around to asking three times.89

And even if not reversed or ignored, decisions still have to be implemented. Thus formal governmental decisions are usually only way-stations along the path to action. And the opportunity for slippage between decision and action is much larger than most analysts have recognized. For after a decision, the game expands, bringing in more players with more diverse preferences and more independent power.

Formal decisions may be very general or quite specific. In some cases, the players who reach a formal decision about some action that the government should take will have no choice about who will carry it out. But in other cases, there will be several subchannels leading from decision to action. For example, negotiations with foreign governments are usually the concern of the State Department but can be assigned to a special envoy or to the intelligence services. Where there are several subchannels, players will maneuver to get the action into the channel that they believe offers the best prospect for getting their desired results.

Most decisions leave considerable leeway in implementation. Players who supported the decision will maneuver to see it implemented and may go beyond the spirit if not the letter of the decision. Those who opposed the decision, or opposed the action, will maneuver to delay implementation, to limit implementation to the letter but not the spirit, and even to have the decision disobeyed.

III. Dominant Inference Pattern. If a nation performed an action, that action was the resultant of bargaining among individuals and groups within the government. Model III's explanatory power is achieved by displaying the game—the action-channel, the positions, the players, their preferences, and the pulling and hauling—that yielded, as a resultant, the action in question. Where an outcome was for the most part the triumph of an individual (e.g., the President) or group (e.g., the President's men or a cabal) this model attempts to specify the details of the game that made the victory possible. But with these as with "orphan" actions, Model III tries not to neglect the sharp differences, misunderstandings, and foul-ups that contributed to what was actually done.

IV. General Propositions. The difficulty of formulating Model III propositions about outcomes can be illustrated by con-
Model III: Governmental Politics

considering the much simpler problems of a theorist attempting to specify propositions about outcomes of a card game he has never seen before but which we recognize as poker. As a basis for formulating propositions, the analyst would want information about (1) the rules of the game: are all positions equal in payoffs, information, etc., and if not, what are the differences? (2) the importance of skill, reputation, and other characteristics that players bring to positions: if important, what characteristics does each player have? (3) the distribution of cards, i.e., the advantages and disadvantages for the particular hand; (4) individual players' valuation of alternative payoffs, e.g., whether each simply wants to maximize his winnings or whether some enjoy winning by bluffing more than winning by having the strongest cards. This partial list suggests how difficult the problem is, even in this relatively simple, structured case.* The extraordinary complexity of cases of bureaucratic politics accounts in part for the paucity of general propositions. Nevertheless, as the paradigm has illustrated, it is possible to identify a number of relevant factors, and, in many cases, analysts can acquire enough information about these factors to offer explanations and predictions.

A. Political Resultants. A large number of factors that constitute a governmental game intervene between "issues" and resultants.

1. The peculiar preferences and stands of individual players can have a significant effect on governmental action. Had someone other than Paul Nitze been head of the Policy Planning Staff in 1949, there is no reason to believe that there would have been an NSC-68. Had MacArthur not possessed certain preferences, power, and skills, U.S. troops might never have crossed the narrow neck.

2. The advantages and disadvantages of each player differ substantially from one action-channel to another. For example, the question of economic directives for Germany was considered by the U.S. government in a military context. If the issue had arisen through international monetary channels, players in the Treasury would have had more leverage in pressing their preferences.

3. The mix of players and each player's advantages shift not only between action-channels but also along action-channels. Chiefs dominate the major formal decisions on important foreign policy issues, but Indians, especially those in the organization charged with carrying out a decision, may play a major role thereafter.

B. Action and Intention. Governmental action does not presuppose government intention. The sum of behavior of representatives of a government relevant to an issue is rarely intended by any individual or group. Rather, in the typical case, separate individuals with different intentions contribute pieces to a resultant. The details of the action are therefore not chosen by any individual (and are rarely identical with what any of the players would have chosen if he had confronted the issue as a matter of simple, detached choice). Nevertheless, resultants can be roughly consistent with some group's preference in the context of the political game.

1. Most resultants emerge from games among players who perceive quite different faces of an issue and who differ markedly in the actions they prefer.

2. Actions rarely follow from an agreed doctrine in which all players concur.

3. Actions consisting of a number of pieces that have emerged from a number of games (plus foul-ups) rarely reflect a coordinated government strategy and thus are difficult to read as conscious "signals."

C. Problems and Solutions

1. "Solutions" to strategic problems are not discovered by detached analysts focusing coolly on the problem. The problems for players are both narrower and broader than the strategic problem. Each player focuses not on the total strategic problem but rather on the decision that must be made today or tomorrow. Each decision has important consequences not only for the strategic problem but for each player's stakes. Thus the gap between what the player is focusing on (the problems he is solving) and what a strategic analyst focuses on is often very wide.

*An analogous difficulty is faced by economists trying to formulate propositions in oligopoly theory.
2. Decisions that call for substantial changes in governmental action typically reflect a coincidence of Chiefs in search of a solution and Indians in search of a problem. Confronting a deadline, Chiefs focus on an issue and look for a solution. Having become committed to a solution developed for an earlier, somewhat different and now outmoded issue, Indians seek a problem.16

D. Where you stand depends on where you sit.17 Horizontally, the diverse demands upon each player shape his priorities, perceptions, and issues. For large classes of issues—e.g., budgets and procurement decisions—the stance of a particular player can be predicted with high reliability from information about his seat. For example, though the participants in the notorious B-36 controversy were, as Eisenhower put it, “distinguished Americans who have their country’s good at heart,” no one was surprised when Admiral Radford (rather than Air Force Secretary Symington) testified that “the B-36, under any theory of war, is a bad gamble with national security,” or when Air Force Secretary Symington (rather than Admiral Radford) claimed that “a B-36 with an A-bomb can take off from this continent and destroy distant objectives which might require ground armies years to take and then only at the expense of heavy casualties.”18

E. Chiefs and Indians. The aphorism “Where you stand depends on where you sit” has vertical as well as horizontal application. Vertically, the demands upon the President, Chiefs, Staffers, and Indians are quite distinct, first in the case of policymaking, and second in the case of implementation.

The foreign policy issues with which the President can deal are limited primarily by his crowded schedule. Of necessity, he must deal first with what comes next. His problem is to probe the special face worn by issues that come to his attention, to preserve his leeway until time has clarified the uncertainties, and to assess the relevant risks.

Foreign policy Chiefs deal most often with the hottest issue du jour, though they can catch the attention of the President and other members of the government for most issues they take to be very important. What they cannot guarantee is that “the President will pay the price” or that “the others will get on board.” They must build a coalition of the relevant powers that be. They must “give the President confidence” in the choice of the right course of action.

Most problems are framed, alternatives specified, and proposals pushed, however, by Indians. Indians’ fights with Indians of other departments—for example, struggles between International Security Affairs of the Department of Defense and Political-Military of the State Department—are a microcosm of the action at higher levels. But the Indians’ major problem is how to get the attention of Chiefs, how to get an issue on an action-channel, how to get the government “to do what is right.” The incentives push the Indian to become an active advocate.

In policymaking, then, the issue looking down is options: how to preserve my leeway until time clarifies uncertainties. The issue looking sideways is commitment: how to get others committed to my coalition. The issue looking upward is confidence: how to give the boss confidence to do what must be done. To paraphrase one of Neustadt’s assertions, the essence of any responsible official’s task is to persuade other players that his version of what needs to be done is what their own appraisal of their own responsibilities requires them to do in their own interests.19

For implementation of foreign policy decisions, vertical demands differ. The Chief’s requirements are two, but these two conflict. The necessity to build a consensus behind his preferred policy frequently requires fuzziness: different people must agree with slightly different things for quite different reasons; when a government decision is made, both the character of the choice and the reasons for it must often remain vague. But this requirement is at loggerheads with another: the necessity that the choice be enacted requires that footdragging by the unenthusiastic, and subversion by the opposed, be kept to a minimum. Nudging the
footdraggers and corralling the subversives constitute difficult tasks even when the decision is clear and the watchman is the President. And most oversight, policing, and spurring is done not by the President but by the President's men or the men who agree with the government decision. Men who would move the machine to act on what has been decided demand clarity.

F. The 51–49 Principle. The terms and conditions of the game affect the time that players spend thinking about hard policy choices and the force and assurance with which they argue for their preferred alternative. Because he faces an agenda fixed by hundreds of important deadlines, the reasonable player must make difficult policy choices in much less time and with much less agonizing than an analyst or observer would. Because he must compete with others, the reasonable player is forced to argue much more confidently than he would if he were a detached judge.

G. Inter- and Intra-national Relations. The actions of one nation affect those of another to the degree that they result in advantages and disadvantages for players in the second nation. Thus players in one nation who aim to achieve some international objective must attempt to achieve outcomes in their intra-national game that add to the advantages of players in the second country who advocate an analogous objective.

H. The face of the issue differs from seat to seat. Where you sit influences what you see as well as where you stand (on any issue). Rarely do two sets of eyes see the same issue. President Truman never saw the issue of defense in the military budget of 1950. Arguments about security and the forces required to support our foreign policy appeared purely as military strategies for expanding the budgets of the services concerned.

I. Misperception. The games are not played under conditions of perfect information. Considerable misperception is a standard part of the functioning of each government. Any proposal that is widely accepted is perceived by different men to do quite different things and to meet quite different needs. Misperception is in a sense the grease that allows cooperation among people whose differences otherwise would hardly allow them to co-exist.

J. Misexpectation. The pace at which the multiple games are played allows only limited attention to each game and demands concentration on priority games. Thus players frequently lack information about the details of other players’ games and problems. In the lower priority games, the tendency to expect that someone else will act in such a way that “he helps me with my problem” is unavoidable. In November 1950, each man expected that someone else would go to the President to get MacArthur’s orders changed.

K. Miscommunication. Both the pace and the noise level merge with propensities of perception to make accurate communication difficult. Because communication must be quick, it tends to be elliptic. In a noisy environment, each player thinks he has spoken with a stronger and clearer voice than the others have actually heard. At the Key West meeting of March 1947, the Chiefs understood Forrestal to say that the President had decided to purchase a flush deck carrier. Forrestal heard the Chiefs’ acceptance of the President’s decision as their approval of the merits of a flush deck carrier. These differences came to light only when the issue was reopened.***

L. Reticence. Because each player is engaged in multiple games, the advantages of reticence — i.e., hesitant silence and only partially intended soft-spokenness — seem overwhelming. Reticence in one game reduces leaks that would be harmful in higher priority games. Reticence permits other players to interpret an outcome in the way in which the shoe pinches least. It gives them an ill-focused target of attack. Reticence between Chiefs and Staffers or Indians permits each Indian to offer a charitable interpretation of the outcome — the proposal that simply never moves, for example, or the memo that dies at an interagency meeting of Chiefs. And at least it reduces explicit friction between a Chief and his men. Neustadt’s example of the reticence of various Chiefs in speaking to Truman about leasing MacArthur is classic.

M. Styles of Play. There are important differences in the behavior of (1) bureaucratic careerists, whether civilian or military, (2) lateral-entry types, and (3) political appointees. These differences are a function of longer-range expectations. The bureaucrat must adopt a code of conformity if he is to survive the inevitable changes
of administration and personnel, whereas the lateral-entry type and the political appointee are more frequently temporary employees, interested in policy. The political appointees have a very limited tenure in office and thus impose a high discount rate, that is, a short-time horizon on any issue. Careerists know that presidents come and presidents go, but the Navy...

Style of play is also importantly affected by the terms of reference in which a player conceives of his action. Some players are not able to articulate the bureaucratic politics game because their conception of their job does not legitimate such activity. On the other hand, Acheson maintained that the Secretary of State works “in an environment where some of the methods would have aroused the envy of the Borgias.” The quality he distinguished from all others as the most necessary for an effective American Secretary of State was “the killer instinct.”

V. Specific Propositions
A. Nuclear Crises
1. A decision to use nuclear weapons is less likely to emerge from a game in which a political leader (whose position forces upon him the heat of being a Final Arbiter) has most of the chips than from a game in which the military have most of the chips.
2. The probability of the U.S. government making a decision to use more military force (rather than less) in a crisis increases as the number of individuals who have an initial, general, personal preference for more forceful military action increases in the following positions: President, Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Secretaries of Defense and State, Chairman of the JCS, and Director of the CIA.
3. In a nuclear crisis, the central decisions will be hammered out not in the formal forums, e.g., the National Security Council, but rather by an ad hoc group that includes the President, the heads of the major organizations involved, plus individuals in whom the President has special confidence.
4. These individuals' perception of the issue will differ radically. These differences will be partially predictable from the pressure of their position plus their personality.

B. Military Action
1. For any military action short of nuclear war, decision and implementation will be delayed while proponents try to persuade opponents to get on board.
2. Major decisions about the use of military tend not simply to be Presidential decisions, or majority decisions, but decisions by a large plurality.
3. No military action is chosen without extensive consultation of the military players. No decision for a substantial use of force, short of nuclear war, will be made against their advice, without a delay during which an extensive record of consultation is prepared.

VI. Evidence. Information about the details of differences in perceptions and priorities within a government on a particular issue is rarely available. Accurate accounts of the bargaining that yielded a resolution of the issue are rarer still. Documents do not capture this kind of information. What the documents do preserve tends to obscure, as much as to enlighten. Thus the source of such information must be the participants themselves. But, ex hypothesis, each participant knows one small piece of the story. Memories quickly become colored. Diaries are often misleading. What is required is access, by an analyst attuned to the players and interested in governmental politics, to a large number of the participants in a decision before their memories fade or become too badly discolored. Such access is uncommon. But without this information, how can the analyst proceed? As a master of this style of analysis has stated, “If I were forced to choose between the documents on the one hand, and late, limited, partial interviews with some of the principal participants on the other, I would be forced to discard the documents.” The use of public documents, newspapers, interviews of participants, and discussion with close observers of participants to piece together the bits of information available is an art. Transfer of these skills from the fingerprints of artists to a form that can guide other students of foreign policy is this model's most pressing need.
The Governmental Politics Model Applied

A Model III approach to problems considered in earlier chapters accented new dimensions. The Soviet Union's simultaneous purchase of ABMs and pursuit of detente emerge as separate results of different bargaining games. A full understanding would require specific information about the players, their advantages, and the overlapping games from which relevant decisions and actions resulted. In the absence of this information, however, one can consider more general characteristics of the Soviet national security game.

The dominant feature of bureaucratic politics in the Soviet Union is the continuous “struggle for power.” An occupant's position in the central game is always uncertain and risky. Members of the Politburo and Central Committee are aware of the historical tendency for one man to become preeminent. Thus while a central problem of life for the leader is managing to stay on top, a large part of the problem for Politburo members is how to keep the leadership collective. This fact yields a relevant proposition: policy issues are intricately intertwined with power plays. Reorganizations, or shifts in resources, constitute redistributions of advantages and disadvantages in the central game.

Presidium and Central Committee Secretariat members have typically risen through, and assumed special responsibility for, various departments and subdepartments. These organizational associations color players' perspectives and priorities. Individuals in these organizations constitute each player's power base. Because of personal histories and constituent pressures, a number of central players must have taken visible stands for ABM deployment, and for detente. In the absence of a deadline forcing a decision in the central Soviet game between ABM and detente, it seems likely that advocates of each have been allowed to tend their own gardens. (Indeed, if one assumes that the Soviet government is analogous to the U.S. government, advocates of the two tracks argue that there is really no conflict between the two.) Thus the two courses of action probably emerged, and are likely to be sustained.

A necessity for budgetary cuts or a requirement to respond to a strong American initiative for an agreement limiting ABM deployment might present an opportunity for advocates of detente to interfere with the established programs and procedures of the PVO. Indeed, stopping deployment of ABMs would constitute a major defeat for several central players and a redistribution of the power base of certain ministers and Presidium members. It is important to recognize, however, that this conflict would arise from unavoidable choices on concrete issues rather than by internal disagreement about the consistency of strategic policies.

Nuclear Strategy

In thinking about the problem of deterrence, a Model III analyst begins from the proposition that if a nuclear attack occurs, it will have emerged as a result of bargaining in the attacking government. Rather than Model I's focus on balance and stability, or Model II's focus on organizational routines, a Model III analyst is concerned with the features of the internal politics of a government that might produce this decision.

First, which players can decide to launch an attack? Whether the effective power over this action is controlled by an individual, a minor game, or the central game is critical.

Second, though Model I's confidence in deterrence relies on the assumption that, in the end, nations will not commit suicide, Model III recalls historical precedents. Admiral Yamamoto, who designed the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, told the members of the Japanese government accurately: “In the first six months to a year of war against the U.S. and England I will run wild, and I will show you an uninterrupted succession of victories; I must also tell you that, should the war be prolonged for two or three years, I have no confidence in our ultimate victory.” But Japan attacked. Such a precedent suggests three key questions. One: Could any member of the government solve his problem by attack? What patterns of bargaining could yield attack as a result? The major difference between a stable balance of terror and a questionable one may simply be that most members of the government appreciate fully the consequences of attack in the case of the former and are thus on guard against this decision.

Two: What stream of decisions might lead to an attack? At what point in that stream do the potential attacker’s politics lie? If members of the U.S. government had known more about the succession of decisions from which the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor emerged, they would have been aware of a considerable probability of that attack. Three: How might miscalculation and
confusion generate foul-ups that yield attack as a resultant? For example, in a crisis or after the beginning of conventional war, what happens to the information available to, and the effective power of, members of the central game?

A final element of importance in thinking about nuclear attacks is the probable differences in perceptions and priorities of central leaders. Pressures encourage both the Soviet Chairman and the U.S. President to feel the distance between their own responsibilities and those of other members of their central games. Each lives with the daily responsibility for nuclear holocaust. Neither will be overly impressed by differences between the death of one million and one hundred million of his own citizens when choosing to take, or to refrain from taking, a risk. Each will be more sensitive to the other's problem than is any other member of the central game. Both may well appreciate the extent to which the "kings" are partners in the game against nuclear disaster. Both will be interested in private communication with each other. If channels can be arranged, such communication offers the most promising prospect of resolution of a crisis.

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Cuba II: A Third Cut

"The fourteen people involved [in the ExCom] were very significant—bright, able, dedicated people, all of whom had the greatest affection for the U.S. . . . If six of them had been President of the U.S., I think that the world might have been blown up." This remark of Robert Kennedy's overstates the risks inherent in the course of action advocated by his opponents — the air strike — as compared with those of the blockade, which he favored. But his memoir of the Cuban missile crisis does no disservice to those fourteen men* in recognizing that they differed sharply about what should be done. Given the difficulty of the problem, the differences in their jobs, and the individuality of each man, who would expect otherwise? That each of these men fought hard for the course of action he judged to be right should not be surprising. With the life of the nation in the balance, should anyone expect less?

*The members of the ExCom Kennedy listed in his Thirteen Days were: Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, Director of the CIA John McCone, Special Assistant for National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy, Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon, Special Counsel Theodore Sorensen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Maxwell Taylor, Undersecretary of State George Ball, Deputy Undersecretary of State Alexis Johnson, Assistant Secretary of State (Latin American Affairs) Edwin Martin, State Department Soviet expert Llewellyn Thompson, Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric, Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) Paul Nitze, former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, and former Secretary of Defense Robert Lovett. Actually, this list includes fifteen, in addition to the President and the Attorney General himself.
could not be unrelated to various current domestic campaigns being pursued by Khrushchev and others: a new round in the battle between anti-Stalinists and Stalinists, a doctrinal dispute about the predominance of economics over politics, and a struggle between party apparatchiki and industrial and agricultural managers that led to a proposal for dramatic organizational restructuring. No Presidium member, and few high-level members of the government, could keep foreign and domestic problems entirely separated. Of necessity, each was involved in many issues, both foreign and domestic, and each man's influence on any particular issue derived not only from his advantages in that game, but from his performance in the spectrum of issues with which he was involved. Indeed, each official's tenure in office depended on this performance. But because of the lack of information, we are forced simply to note these additional dimensions of the game, without speculating about their consequences for the decision to send missiles to Cuba.

How the separate players' various perceptions of quite different problems such as these finally converged in a single solution to these assorted problems is unknown. A number of plausible paths can be imagined by which an initial proposal, made as a solution to one problem, appealed to other individuals and groups for different reasons as solutions to their problems. For example, some Presidium members who were not impressed with the Soviets' obligations to Cuba, and who were suspicious of Khrushchev's ambitions in Berlin, nonetheless may have seen in the proposal a way of increasing strategic capabilities without significantly increasing the military budget. Given Khrushchev's known penchant for gambling, it seems likely that at some point he picked up the proposal and made it his own. There were many reasons why someone could support the proposal. There seems, nonetheless, to have been significant opposition to the move by some Presidium members who feared U.S. reaction as well as by the military and intelligence circles over the danger of exposing Soviet nuclear capabilities and troops less than ninety miles from the American mainland. By some such succession of complex and probably confused steps, the Soviet government reached the decision to send missiles to Cuba.

Conclusion

In the preceding chapters, we have taken a "walk around" the Cuban missile crisis, with pauses at three vantage points. This allowed us to explore the central puzzles of the crisis. While the chapters do not settle the matter of what happened and why, they do uncover many previously underemphasized features, and they afford a rich source of hypotheses about the causes of various outcomes. At the same time, these three case studies offer evidence about the nature of explanations produced by different analysts. None of the three analysts simply described events. In attempting to explain what happened, each distinguished certain features as the relevant determinants. Each combed out the numerous details and factors in a limited number of causal strands that were woven into the "reasons" for a particular occurrence. Moreover, the three accounts emphasized quite different factors in explaining the central puzzles of the crisis. The sources of the difference are the conceptual models each analyst employed.

These conceptual models are much more than simple angles of vision or approaches. Each conceptual framework consists of a cluster of assumptions and categories that influence what the analyst finds puzzling, how he formulates his question, where he looks for evidence, and what he produces as an answer. The three cuts at the missile crisis demonstrate both the complexity of the models and the differences in analysis that they make.
Summing Up: Differences in Interpretation

In generating hypotheses about the missile crisis from alternative conceptual angles, these chapters present a number of differences in emphasis and interpretation. Such incongruities could be the starting point for a full-length historical study of the crisis. Friends have persuaded me that so many participants in the event have given so graciously of their time and information that I have incurred an obligation to try my hand at this task as a further work. Here, however, a few preliminary observations seem in order.

There is an apparent incompatibility between the level of discourse in the Model I account and that of the Model II and Model III accounts. The Model I analyst approached the Soviet installation of missiles in Cuba, the American naval blockade, and the Soviet withdrawal of missiles as strategic choices. By analyzing the strategic problem that the Soviet Union faced, and the characteristics of the Soviet missile deployment, he produced an argument for one goal (rectifying the nuclear balance) that made the Soviet emplacement plausible. The American blockade was explained simply as the U.S. value-maximizing choice. Withdrawal of the missiles was understood as the only option left for the Soviets after the United States signaled the firmness of its intentions. While these explanations were offered without detailed attention to the internal mechanisms of the governments, the Model I analyst's appropriation of statements by officials of the government as "the government view" and his use of fine detail about the Soviet missile deployment as a criterion for distinguishing among Soviet objectives would seem to imply coincidence of perceptions, control of choice, and coordination of movement within the government-as-unitary-actor.

As the Model II and Model III accounts of bureaucratic machinations demonstrate, this was not in fact the case. Many crucial details of implementation followed from organizational routines rather than from central choice. The principal government leaders differed markedly in their perceptions of the problem, their estimates of the consequences of various courses of action, and their preferred solutions. These facts force one to wonder about the Model I account. The explanation proceeds as if it were simply describing the process of governmental reasoning, choice, and implementation. But since, as we have seen, this account does not accurately describe the process, what does it describe? To whose objectives and reasons does the Model I analysis refer? In contrast with the Model II and Model III accounts, the Model I version seems somewhat disembodied.*

The Model I analyst fastened on particular characteristics of the Soviet installation of missiles, and of the blockade, as signals of central calculations and choices. The Soviet installation of more expensive and more visible IRBMs as well as MRBMs was taken by the Model I analyst as a major piece of evidence against which to test the competing hypotheses about Soviet intentions. He used this fact to disqualify the "Cuban defense" hypothesis on the grounds that MRBMs alone would have sufficed to guarantee the defense of Cuba. But the Model II analyst challenged the presumption that evidence of this sort can be used to identify governmental intentions. He explained the simultaneous installation of IRBMs and MRBMs as a consequence of organizational goals and routines. Similarly, the construction of MRBMs before completion of the SAM network, the positioning of Soviet missiles in the standard four-slice pattern, and the failure to camouflage the sites were explained by the Model II analyst as normal, organizational performance—rather than as occasions for extraordinary puzzlement.

The most glaring conflict between Model I's strategic summary of the event and Model II and Model III's examination of details of the process—organizational or political—reflects the incentives that each model produces for probing the facts. The Model I analyst's explanatory power derives primarily from his construction of a calculation that makes plausible the character of the action chosen, given the problem the nation faced. This construction requires a factual base. But the available, conventional facts usually suffice, since the essential element in the analyst's work is his reasoning, his thinking through the nation's problem.

For example, most previous Model I analyses have accepted the blockade as a satisfactory base for building an explanation of the Soviet withdrawal. As our Model I account argued, this interpretation is incorrect. Ours is the first published account to emphasize the U.S. ultimatum to the Soviet Union as the central factor in the Soviet withdrawal. This interpretation

*This issue is considered further, beginning on page 259.
emerged from hard Model I reasoning plus a serious respect for the facts. Similarly, as the footnotes to Chapter 3 demonstrate, our account avoids a large number of specific errors that have been accepted in various previous accounts. Nevertheless, our Model I account accepts certain points that the Model II and Model III accounts find to be inaccurate, and it overlooks certain pieces of information that the Model II and Model III accounts notice.

The argument for permitting this is threefold. First, the present chapters mirror the author's experience with the models. The inaccuracies discovered in the Model I version and the new insights recorded in the Model II and Model III versions were found when probing data with the concepts of these models. Second, since the purpose of the Model I account is to present a strong, typical explanation, it seems fair to let the account reflect only conventional evidence plus additional facts that the model itself would naturally uncover. Third, most of the additional facts are not simple facts. Rather, they are points that emerge when one mixes traces of evidence with judgments; one is inclined to accept or reject the judgments depending on the logic of the model within which he is working.

The alternative interpretations of the Soviet missile withdrawal provide the most suggestive instance of these differences among the models over evidence and interpretation. Our Model I analyst explained the withdrawal as a consequence of the American ultimatum. Most analysts will find this interpretation preferable to explanations that focus on the blockade. This explanation is certainly satisfactory in Model I terms. But the Model II and Model III analysts carry the argument a step further. They are naturally inclined to dig deeper into the evidence about organizations and internal politics. Though the information is incomplete, the Model II analyst uncovered and emphasized the importance of U.S. missiles in Turkey and a Presidential order that they be defused. This led him to hypothesize with respect to the final Saturday that either (1) an American ultimatum forced Soviet capitulation, or (2) while Kennedy was beginning to wobble, Khrushchev folded. From a Model III perspective, a further hypothesis emerged. The argument against a "deal" (i.e., withdrawal of Soviet missiles in Cuba for withdrawal of American missiles in Turkey) has — in Model I terms — been heretofore entirely compelling. In spite of the fact that the Soviets proposed precisely this arrangement in their Saturday letter, the United States simply could not accept such terms: it would shake the alliance; it would signal weakness; it would confuse the issue. No published analysis of the missile crisis has been able to escape this reasoning. But from a Model III perspective, it is hard to believe that John F. Kennedy should have been so insensitive to Khrushchev's problem as to refuse, in private, what he in fact planned — and had previously meant — to do. Robert Kennedy's last account of the crisis, published after our Model III analyst generated this hypothesis, suggests strongly that the Model III analysis is correct.

Between the Model II and Model III versions there are a number of additional differences in emphasis and interpretation. For example, the Model II explanation credited Kennedy's consultation of General Sweeney, the head of Tactical Air Command, on Sunday, October 20, as a bona fide last minute reconsideration. But the Model III understanding of this occurrence as "preparation of the record" seems closer to the mark.

More revealing is the divergence between Model II and Model III interpretations of the Air Force estimate of U.S. capabilities for a surgical air strike. From a Model II perspective, that inaccurate estimate — which in its error eliminated the Air Force's preferred course of action — emerged according to the established routines of the Air Force. In contrast, the Model III interpretation of this event highlighted both the overconfidence of the Air Force Chief of Staff, which reduced his suspicion of the estimate, and the willingness of other government leaders not to probe an estimate that served their purposes. The available evidence is insufficient to permit confident judgment between these hypotheses.

A large number of puzzles about this most important event are yet unresolved — leaving a real need for a thorough historical study of this crisis.

**Summing Up: Different Answers or Different Questions?**

Such variance among interpretations demonstrates each model's tendency to produce different answers to the same question. But as we observe the models at work, what is equally striking are the differences in the ways the analysts conceive of the problem, shape the puzzle, unpack the summary questions, and pick up pieces of the world in search of an answer. Why did the
United States blockade Cuba? For Model I analysts, this "why" asks for reasons that account for the American choice of the blockade as a solution to the strategic problem posed by the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba. For a Model II analyst, the puzzle is rather: What outputs of which organizations led to this blockade? A Model III analyst understands the basic "why" as a question about the various problems perceived by relevant players and their pulling and hauling from which the blockade emerged.

Typically, the thing to be explained is designated by a rather vague, summary clause, accompanied by an implicit appendix that specifies the relevant aspects of the occurrence. For a Model I analyst, "blockade" is an aggregate act. The perceived context, formal decision, and implementation are all aspects of one coordinated, rational choice. The Model II and Model III analysts insist on splitting up the blockade into a number of pieces. The Model II analyst focuses on slices like when the missiles were discovered, how the options were defined, and the details of the blockade's execution. The Model III analyst focuses both on the emergence of the blockade decision in the ExCom and on various aspects of implementation.

To explain the blockade, the Model I analyst examines the U.S. strategic calculus: the problem posed by the Soviet missiles, relevant American values, and U.S. capabilities. Explanation means placing the blockade in a pattern of purposive response to the strategic problem. For a Model II man, this "solution" emerges as the by-product of basic organizational processes. The analyst emphasizes organizational constraint in choice and organizational routines in implementation. Organizational processes produced awareness of the problem on October 14 (rather than two weeks earlier or later); organizational routines defined the alternatives; organizational procedures implemented the blockade. These features overshadow the "decisions" of the unified group of leaders within these constraints. Explanation starts with existing organizations and their routines at t = 1 and attempts to account for what is going on at time t. The Model III analyst acccents the action of players in the relevant games that produced pieces of the collage that is the blockade. Bargaining among players who shared power but saw separate problems yielded discovery of the missiles on a certain date in a special context, a definition of the problem which demanded strong action, a coalition of Presidential intimates set on averting holo-

caust, failure to probe the the military estimate, and consequently a blockade. In the absence of a number of particular characteristics of players and games, the action would not have been the same.

The information required by Model II and Model III analysts dwarfs that needed by a Model I analyst. An armchair strategist (in Washington or even Cambridge) can produce accounts of U.S. (or Soviet) national costs and benefits. Understanding the value-maximizing choices of nations demands chiefly an analytic ability at vicarious problem solving. But analyses that concentrate on processes and procedures of organizations, or on pulling and hauling among individuals, demand much more information. Some observers (particularly players in the game) rely on a version of Model III for their own government's behavior, while retreating to a Model I analysis of other nations. Thus information costs account for some differences among explanations. The difficulty of acquiring information, however, is no more important than the differential capacity of different models to recognize the relevance and importance of additional pieces of information. For a Model I analyst, information about a split between McNamara and the Joint Chiefs over the proper response to Soviet missiles constitutes gossip or anecdote but not evidence about an important factor. Only Model II analysts are willing to gather information about existing organizational routines. Model III's delineation of positions, and its attention to the advantages and disadvantages of various players, strikes other analysts as an undue concern with subtlety.

Thus while at one level three models produce different explanations of the same happening, at a second level the models produce different explanations of quite different occurrences. And indeed, this is my argument. Spectacles magnify one set of factors rather than another and thus not only lead analysts to produce different explanations of problems that appear, in their summary questions, to be the same, but also influence the character of the analyst's puzzle, the evidence he assumes to be relevant, the concepts he uses in examining the evidence, and what he takes to be an explanation. None of our three analysts would deny that during the Cuban missile crisis several million people were performing actions relevant to the event. But in offering his explanation, each analyst attempts to emphasize what is relevant and important, and different conceptual lenses lead analysts to different judgments about what is relevant and important.
Where Do We Go from Here?

In the last several years it has been remarked with increasing frequency that American academic and professional thought about foreign affairs seems to have reached a hiatus. Strategic thought has made little progress since Schelling’s *Strategy of Conflict*. Sovietology is just “more of the same.” The arms control literature has been coasting on ideas generated by the time of the summer study of 1960. The new wave of revisionist studies of American foreign policy turns traditional interpretations on their head without really increasing our understanding. Diplomatic history shows little life.

Why should this be the case? My colleagues in Harvard’s Research Seminar on Bureaucracy, Politics, and Policy have convinced me that my argument really backs into consideration of these larger issues: namely, where does our thinking about foreign affairs now stand? Where should we go from here? The answer provided by this study is half-baked and rather haphazard, since these are not questions with which it began. Still, the tentative answer it implies should be made explicit.

That most thinking about foreign affairs is dominated by one basic set of categories is hardly accidental. Confronted by a puzzling occurrence in international affairs, we naturally ask why, and try to understand how the nation involved could have chosen the action in question. Without thinking, we immediately begin talking about “Hanoi” or “Peking.” We try to “see the problem from the North Vietnamese point of view”—that is, from the point of view of a reasonable leader sitting in Hanoi—and to reason why “he” chose the action in question. The analogy between nations in international politics and a coordinated, intelligent human being is so powerful that we rarely remember we are reasoning by analogy.

The contribution of the classical model (Model I) to our explanations, predictions, and analyses of foreign affairs is considerable. This lens reduces the organizational and political complications of a government to the simplification of a single actor. The array of details about a happening can be seen to cluster around the major features of an action. Through this lens the confused and even contradictory factors that influence an occurrence become a single dynamic: choice of the alternative that achieved a certain goal. Thus the Rational Actor Model permits us to translate the basic question, “Why did X happen?” into the question “Why did this nation do X?” The question then becomes: “What problem was the nation solving, or what goal was the nation achieving in choosing, X?” The classical model allows us to deal with the last question in the same way that we would answer a question about an individual’s action.

Recall once more the Model I analyst’s explanation of Soviet installation of missiles in Cuba. Confronted with the fact, he formulated the puzzle as a question about why the government chose this aggregate action. Explanation then consisted in constructing a calculation according to which the Soviet government reasonably chose to make the move. In producing the explanation, the Model I analyst proceeded as if his assignment had been: make a powerful argument for one objective that permits the reader to see how, given the strategic problem, if he had been playing the Soviet hand, he would have chosen that action. In more technical terms, the game is one of maximization under some set of constraints.

The model employed in this explanation is not only the basic framework used by ordinary men and professional analysts in explaining occurrences in foreign affairs. It is even more essential. Perhaps the most fundamental method employed by human beings in their attempt to come to grips with the puzzling occurrences around them is to conceive of these occurrences not as simple phenomena or events (i.e., things that just happen) but rather as action (i.e., behavior expressing some intention or choice). This is the way we explain our behavior to ourselves and to others: “I wanted X.” “I chose Y.” This is the way we understand the behavior of our fellow men.

For explaining and predicting the behavior of individual men, this general orientation toward purpose and rational choice seems to be the best available. The rationality of man’s choices is, of course, “bounded” by things such as the availability of information and the difficulty of calculation. But as a baseline, if one knows how an individual has defined his problem and what resources he has available, his objectives provide a good clue to his behavior.

Difficulties arise when the thing to be explained is not the behavior of an individual but rather the behavior of a large organization or even a government. Nations can be reified, but at considerable cost in understanding. By personifying nations, one glides over critical characteristics of behavior where an organi-
zation is the main mover—for example, the fact that organizational action requires the coordination of large numbers of individuals, thus necessitating programs and SOPs. Thinking about a nation as if it were a person neglects considerable differences among individual leaders of a government whose positions and power lead them to quite different perceptions and preferences. Thus where the actor is a national government, a conception of action for objectives must be modified. (Perhaps the organizational and political factors could be formulated as "constraints" within which the government actually chooses, though this would require an analysis quite distinct from Simon’s concern with "bounded rationality").

As we have noted earlier, the Model II and Model III accounts of questions treated ordinarily in standard Model I fashion highlight this difficulty. No longer is it possible to maintain that the Model I explanation is simply describing the processes within the national government. We are forced to recognize that in treating happenings as actions, and national governments as unitary purposive actors, we are "modeling." The fact that the assumptions and categories of this model neglect important factors such as organizational processes and bureaucratic politics suggests that the model is inadequate. Careful examination of the model’s performance confirms this suspicion. For example, the U.S. intelligence estimate of September 19, 1962, contained a plausible strategic analysis showing that the Soviets would not place missiles in Cuba. If no missiles had been placed in Cuba, a Model I analyst would have explained this fact by reference to these reasons. Given that the Soviets did emplace missiles, the Model I analyst attempts to explain this event by constructing the strategic analysis that makes plausible their choice to do so. But the occurrence or nonoccurrence of the Soviet missile deployment in Cuba must have been determined by something more than these strategic reasons.

The present hiatus in thinking about problems of foreign affairs derives in large part from attempts to pursue Model I reasoning, without much self-consciousness, as the single form of analysis. Model I analysis can be valuable. It does permit a quick, imaginative sorting out of a problem of explanation or analysis. It serves as a productive shorthand, requiring a minimum of information. It can yield an informative summary of tendencies, for example, by identifying the weight of strategic

Where Do We Go from Here?

costs and benefits. But it is not itself a full analysis or explanation of an event, and it cannot stand alone. We must understand much more clearly what a Model I analysis refers to, what part of the problem it captures, how we should modify its rules for the use of evidence, etc. Part of "where we should go from here" is to develop Model I as one of several conscious and explicit styles of analysis.

The burden of this study’s argument, however, is that larger payoffs in the future will come from an intellectual shift of gears. We should ask not what goals account for a nation’s choice of an action, but rather what factors determine an outcome. The shift from Model I to the Model II and Model III forms of analysis really involves a fundamental change in intellectual style. From the basic conception of happenings as choices to be explained by reference to objectives (on analogy with the actions of individual human beings), we must move to a conception of happenings as events whose determinants are to be investigated according to the canons that have been developed by modern science.

Model II and Model III summarize two bundles of categories and assumptions, and two distinctive logical patterns that provide useful, emphatic shorthands in which governmental action can be explained and predicted. The separation of these two models as alternative pairs of spectacles facilitates the generation of hypotheses and highlights features that might otherwise be overlooked. The focus on separable clusters of factors with distinguishable logical thrusts makes persuasive the importance of certain factors that might not otherwise be so. But this argument should not be misinterpreted as an assertion that Model II and Model III are the only alternative conceptual models.

One of my colleagues in the Bureaucracy Research Seminar, John Steinbruner, has stated a fourth conceptual model. A number of others are clearly possible. Nor should the fact that several are stated, and additional models contemplated, be misunderstood as a denial of the possibility of a grand model that would incorporate the features of all. The basic orientation toward outcomes and their determinants invokes an image of an ideal model in which all determinants and their relations could be specified (at least probabilistically). The only issue here is one of the relative merits of alternative paradigms versus a grand model at the present stage of understanding.
The outline of a tentative, *ad hoc* working synthesis of the models begins to emerge if one considers the general questions that each model leads one to ask of a problem of explanation, analysis, or prediction.

Among the questions posed by Model I are:

1. What is the problem?
2. What are the alternatives?
3. What are the strategic costs and benefits associated with each alternative?
4. What is the observed pattern of national (governmental) values and shared axioms?
5. What are the pressures in the "international strategic marketplace"?

Model II leads one to ask:

1. Of what organizations (and organizational components) does the government consist?
2. Which organizations traditionally act on a problem of this sort and with what relative influence?
3. What repertoires, programs, and SOPs do these organizations have for making *information* about the problem available at various decision points in the government?
4. What repertoires, programs, and SOPs do these organizations have for generating *alternatives* about a problem of this sort?
5. What repertoires, programs, and SOPs do these organizations have for *implementing* alternative courses of action?

The central questions posed by Model III include:

1. What are the existing action channels for producing actions on this kind of problem?
2. Which players in what positions are centrally involved?
3. How do pressures of job, past stances, and personality affect the central players on this issue?
4. What deadlines will force the issue to resolution?
5. Where are foul-ups likely?

Thus we can see how Model I emphasizes, on the one hand, the problem and context that create incentives and pressures
for a government to choose a particular course of action, and, on the other, the national (or governmental) values and axioms that create propensities to respond in certain ways. Overarching problems and axioms summarize important differences between behavioral tendencies of nations. Were one ignorant, for example, of the differences between American national attitudes in the mid-1960s and those in the mid-1930s, he would miss fundamental factors in the foreign policy of the United States. The shared objectives of national leaders, and the pressures created by strategic problems influence the trend line of any nation's action. Indeed, it is not difficult to see how the factors summarized by Model I affect assumptions of players in the Model III game, the kinds of arguments that these men can make, and even the range of outputs that organizations examined by Model II are prepared to produce. For some purposes, then, Model I may provide a satisfactory summary of the longer-run patterns of a nation's foreign policy.8

Model II and Model III analysts, however, assume the influence of Model I factors, focusing within this environment—this set of market pressures—on the mechanism that produced a particular outcome. The problem, according to these analysts, is to explain, for example, why the United States had 500,000 men in Viet Nam in the mid-1960s, rather than in the mid-1930s. The problem is, given the national values and leaders' objectives in the United States in the 1960s, why did the United States have 500,000 men in Viet Nam? Overarching ideas or the climate of opinion constitute a large part of the explanation of the differences between the 1930s (when the probability that any U.S. leader or governmental organization could have inserted 500,000 men in Viet Nam approached zero) and the 1960s (when the probability of this outcome was closer to 0.2). But the Organizational Process and Governmental Politics Models assume the context, and focus on the problem of explaining the occurrence of an event that values and objectives made 20 percent probable.

Thus the models can be seen to complement each other. Model I fixes the broader context, the larger national patterns, and the shared images. Within this context, Model II illuminates the organizational routines that produce the information, alternatives, and action. Within the Model II context, Model III focuses in greater detail on the individual leaders of a government and the politics among them that determine major governmental choices. The best analysts of foreign policy manage to weave strands of each of the three conceptual models into their explanations. A number of scholars whom our analytic chapters have squeezed into a single box display considerable intuitive powers in blending insights from all three models. By drawing complementary pieces from each of these styles of analysis, explanations can be significantly strengthened. But we must pay more careful attention to the points at which the explanations are complementary and the junctures at which implications may be incompatible.10

As a final reminder of the importance of the differences in emphasis among the three models, consider the lessons that each model draws from the crisis. The most widely believed and frequently cited lessons of the crisis have emerged from Model I analysis. These include: (1) since nuclear war between the United States and Soviet Union would be mutual national suicide, neither nation would choose nuclear war, and nuclear war is therefore not a serious possibility; (2) in a world of rough nuclear parity, the United States can choose low-level military actions with no fear that they will escalate to nuclear war; (3) nuclear crises are manageable—that is, in situations involving the vital interests of the superpowers, the leaders of both nations will have little difficulty in thinking through the problem and its alternatives, finding limited actions (the blockade) that communicate resolve, and thus settling the issue (withdrawal of the missiles). According to these analyses, the missile crisis was one of the Kennedy administration's "finest hours," though the "flap in the White House"—the White House tendency to view the problem in apocalyptic terms—was not only unnecessary but positively dangerous. As we noted earlier, the major departmental postmortem on the crisis concluded that "this exaggerated concern [about the possibility of nuclear war] prompted consideration of improvident actions and counseled hesitation where none was due."11

Model II and Model III analysts caution against confidence in the "impossibility of nations stumbling—"irrationally"—into a nuclear exchange, in the manageability of nuclear crises, or in our understanding of the ingredients of successful crisis management. According to Model II's account of the crisis, our success included crucial organizational rigidities and even mistakes. Except for the routines and procedures that produced an inaccurate estimate of our capability for a surgical air strike, the probability of war would have been much higher. Only barely
did government leaders manage to control organizational programs that might have dragged us over the cliff. In several instances, we were just plain lucky. The lesson: nuclear crises between machines as large as the United States and Soviet governments are inherently chancy. The information and estimates available to leaders about the situation will reflect organizational goals and routines as well as the facts. The alternatives presented to the leaders will be much narrower than the menu of options that would be desirable. The execution of choices will exhibit unavoidable rigidities of programs and SOPs. Coordination among organizations will be much less finely tuned than leaders demand or expect. The prescription: considerable thought must be given to the routines established in the principal organizations before a crisis so that during the crisis organizations will be capable of performing adequately the needed functions. In the crisis, the overwhelming problem will be that of control and coordination of large organizations.

The lessons that emerge from Model III give one even less reason to be sanguine about our understanding of nuclear crises or about the impossibility of nuclear war. The actions advocated by leaders of the U.S. government covered a spectrum from doing nothing to an air strike. The process by which the blockade emerged included many uncertain factors. Had Cuba II been President Kennedy’s first crisis, Robert Kennedy and Sorensen would not have been members of the group, and the air strike would probably have emerged. Had Kennedy proved his mettle domestically in a previous confrontation, the diplomatic track could have prevailed. The lessons in Model III terms, then, are that: (1) the process of crisis management is obscure and terribly risky; (2) the leaders of the U.S. government can choose actions that entail (in their judgment) real possibilities of escalation to nuclear war; (3) the interaction of internal games, each as ill-understood as those in the White House and the Kremlin, could indeed yield nuclear war as an outcome. From this perspective, the “flap in the White House” was quite justified — especially for men aware that the internal politics of the government whose behavior they were trying to influence must have been no less confusing and complex than their own. If a President and his associates have to try to manage a nuclear crisis, the informal machinery, free-wheeling discussions, and devil’s advocacy exemplified by the ExCom have many advantages. But the mix of personality, expertise, influence, and temperament that allows such a group to clarify alternatives even while it pulls and haws for separate preferences should be better understood before we start down the path to nuclear confrontation again. On the evidence of the Cuban missile crisis, clarification is scarcely assured.

Both these differences in emphasis among the models and a partial, working synthesis of the three can be illustrated by using the models to generate predictions. Strategic surrender is an important problem of international relations and diplomatic history. War termination is a new, developing area of the strategic literature. Both of these interests lead scholars to address a central question: Why do nations surrender when? Whether implicit in explanations or more explicit in analysis, diplomatic historians and strategists rely upon propositions that can be turned forward to produce predictions. Thus surrender offers an interesting issue for illustrative predictions. In spite of the risks of seeming dated, and being in error, a number of readers have persuaded me to reproduce some predictions presented in an earlier essay. The question addressed there was: Why will North Viet Nam surrender when? What follows is quoted verbatim from a paper delivered in September 1968 to the American Political Science Association.

In a nutshell, analysis according to Model I asserts: nations quit when costs outweigh the benefits. North Viet Nam will surrender when it realizes “that continued fighting can only generate additional costs without hope of compensating gains, this expectation being largely the consequence of the previous application of force by the dominant side.” U.S. actions can increase or decrease Hanoi’s strategic costs. Bombing North Viet Nam increases the pain and thus increases the probability of surrender. This proposition and prediction are not without meaning. That — “other things being equal” — nations are more likely to surrender when the strategic cost-benefit balance is negative is true. But nations rarely surrender when they are winning. The proposition specifies a range within which nations surrender. But over this broad range, the relevant question is: Why do nations surrender?

Model II and Model III analysts focus upon the government machine through which this fact about the international strategic marketplace must be filtered to produce a surrender. These analysts are considerably less sanguine about the possibility of surrender at the point that the cost-benefit calculus turns.
negative. Never in history (i.e., in none of the five cases I have examined) have nations surrendered at that point. Surrender occurs sometime thereafter. When depends on the processes of organizations and the politics of players within these governments—as they are affected by the opposing government. Moreover, the effects of the victorious power's action upon the surrendering nation cannot be adequately summarized as increasing or decreasing strategic costs. Imposing additional costs by bombing a nation may increase the probability of surrender. But it also may reduce it. An appreciation of the impact of the acts of one nation upon another thus requires some understanding of the machine that is being influenced. For more precise prediction, Model II and Model III require considerably more information about the organizations and politics of North Viet Nam than is publicly available. On the basis of the limited public information, however, these models can be suggestive.

Model II examines two subproblems. First, to have lost is not sufficient. The government must know that the strategic cost-benefit calculus is negative. But neither the categories nor the indicators of strategic costs and benefits are clear. And the sources of information about both are organizations whose parochial priorities and perceptions do not facilitate accurate information or estimation. Military evaluation of military performance, military estimates of factors like “enemy morale,” and military predictions about when “the tide will turn” or “the corner will have been turned” are typically distorted. In cases of highly decentralized guerrilla operations, like Viet Nam, these problems are exacerbated. Thus strategic costs will be underestimated. Only highly visible costs can have direct impact on leaders without being filtered through organizational channels.

Second, since organizations define the details of options and execute actions, surrender (and negotiation) is likely to entail considerable bungling in the early stages. No organization can define options or prepare programs for this treacherous act. Thus, early overtures will be uncoordinated with the acts of other organizations—e.g., the fighting forces—creating contradictory “signals” to the victor.

Model III suggests that surrender will not come at the point that strategic costs outweigh benefits, but that it will not wait until the leadership group concludes that the war is lost. Rather the problem is better understood in terms of four additional propositions. First, strong advocates of the war effort, whose careers are closely identified with the war, rarely come to the conclusion that costs outweigh benefits. Second, quite often from the outset of a war, a number of members of the government (particularly those whose responsibilities sensitize them to problems other than war, e.g., economic planners or intelligence experts) are convinced that the war effort is futile. Third, surrender is likely to come as the result of a political shift that enhances the effective power of the latter group (and adds swing members to it). Fourth, the course of the war, particularly actions of the victor, can influence the advantages and disadvantages of players in the loser's government. Thus, North Viet Nam will surrender not when its leaders have a change of heart, but when Hanoi has a change of leaders (or a change of effective power within the central circle). How U.S. bombing (or pause), threats, promises, or action in South Viet Nam affect the game in Hanoi is subtle but nonetheless crucial.

That these three models could be applied to the surrender of governments other than North Viet Nam should be obvious. But that exercise is left for the reader.
AFTERWORD

Implications and Issues for Further Research, 1971

This study has obviously bitten off more than it has chewed. The arguments started and lines of inquiry begun must extend beyond the covers of this book. It may be useful, however, to spell out several implications of the argument and to identify a number of unsettled issues that require further research. What follows are a dozen implications and issues, the first six of general and practical character, the last six of narrower, more theoretical interest.

1. MODEL II AND MODEL III CUTS AT OTHER PROBLEMS OF FOREIGN POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. Though preliminary and partial, the paradigms presented here do provide a basis for serious reexamination of many problems of foreign policy and international relations. Model II and Model III cuts at problems typically treated in Model I terms should permit significant improvements. Various areas of literature, for example, Sinology or diplomatic history, should be treated systematically from the perspectives of organizational processes and bureaucratic politics. In areas where Model I thinking is so entrenched that it discourages serious consideration of alternative hypotheses, it might be appropriate to ask analysts, after they have produced a Model I study, to then write further Model II and Model III cuts at the same issues. At a minimum, analysts should be encouraged to put on Model II and Model III spectacles in searching for hypotheses about any issue.

Full Model II and Model III analyses require large amounts of information. But even in cases where information is severely limited, improvements are possible. Consider the problem of predicting Soviet strategic forces. In the mid-1950s Model I-style calculations led to predictions that the Soviets would rapidly deploy large numbers of long-range bombers. From a Model II perspective, both the frailty of the Air Force within the Soviet military establishment and the budgetary implications of such a build-up would have led analysts to hedge this prediction. Moreover, Model III would have pointed to a sure, visible indicator of such a build-up: noisy struggles among the service chiefs and Politburo members over major budgetary shifts. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Model I calculations led to the prediction of an immediate, massive, Soviet deployment of ICBMs. Again, a Model II cut would have reduced this number because in the earlier period strategic rockets were controlled by the Soviet ground forces rather than an independent service, and in the latter period this would have necessitated major shifts in budgetary splits.

2. THE "BUREAUCRACY" PROBLEM. The factors highlighted by our Organizational Process and Governmental Politics Models provide a base from which to begin to formulate the bureaucracy problem.

Few issues about the American government are more critical today than the matter of whether the federal government is capable of governing. Specifically, the issue is whether the U.S. government is capable of translating intentions into outcomes. Any careful review of the outcomes produced by the American government over the past decade will make the point of this question painfully obvious. Some radical critics focus on the seeming inability of the government to deliver even available, well-understood solutions to problems that most Americans recognize and want solved—for example, hunger in the United States—and conclude that the "system" should be destroyed. This radical despair is not unlike the frustration of many governmental analysts and operators as they reflect on the fate of their best-laid plans and solutions.

But what is the problem? The classical frame of reference finds it difficult to formulate, since the assumptions and categories of Model I seem to require an analyst to choose between phrasing bad outcomes on bad intentions (villains or conspirators) and explaining the outcomes as aberrations from the normal processes of government. Even when Model I analysts reach
make for many unhappy outcomes in the present system and that will have to be changed, with meticulous care, on the basis of considerable understanding, if changes in this system are to increase the probability of happy results.

3. ANALYSIS, GOVERNMENTAL ACTIONS, AND OUTCOMES. Improvement in the capabilities of analysts and operators to achieve desired actions and outcomes will require (1) narrowing the "analysis gap," (2) upgrading current policy analysis, and (3) finding new ways of thinking about the "system" for selecting and implementing actions.

As presently practiced, most analysis of public policy issues consists in solving analytic problems, that is, identifying preferred proposals for attacking a defined policy problem. For example, analyses of the problems of NATO defense attempt to distinguish the preferred package of troops and weapons for meeting the range of plausible contingencies. Good analysis clarifies objectives, explores alternatives, ranks alternatives in terms of relevant objectives, and selects the preferred option. The development of techniques like systems analysis and cost-benefit analysis permit highly refined Model I-style analysis.

According to prevailing practice, analysis stops when a preferred analytic solution to the problem has been identified. Analysts seem to assume either that the preferred solution will command agreement and thus be adopted and implemented or that in any case their job ends and someone else's (perhaps the politician's) begins at that point.

If one is primarily interested in what the government actually does, the unavoidable question is: What percentage of the work of achieving a desired governmental action is done when the preferred analytic alternative has been identified? My estimate is about 10 percent in the normal case, ranging as high as 50 percent for some problems. What remains — namely, the gap between preferred solutions and the actual behavior of the government — we label the "analysis gap" or "missing chapter" in conventional analysis.

If analysts and operators are to increase their ability to achieve desired policy outcomes, they will have to develop ways of thinking analytically about a larger chunk of the problem. It is not that we have too many good analytic solutions to problems. It is, rather, that we have more good solutions than we have appropriate actions. Thus we shall have to find ways of thinking...
harder about the problem of "implementation," that is, the path between preferred solution and actual performance of the government.

This perspective suggests that the central questions of policy analysis are quite different from the kinds of questions analysts have traditionally asked. Indeed, the crucial questions seem to be matters of planning for management: How does an analyst or operator think about moving from the preferred solution to the actual governmental action? Among the questions that an analyst concerned with this gap must consider are: Is the desired action on the agenda of issues that will arise in the current climate? If not, can it be forced onto the agenda? What are the various bundles of action-channels and sequences of action-channels for producing the desired action? Can new action-channels be devised? How will the key players along those action-channels regard this proposal? Which players will have to agree and which to acquiesce? What means are available to them for persuading these players? Is the desired action consistent with existing programs and SOPs of the organizations that will deliver the behavior? If not, how can these organizational procedures be changed?

More systematic and rigorous ways of asking and answering these questions should increase analysts' and operators' effectiveness not only in achieving actions but also in judging the administrative feasibility of preferred solutions. For the argument is not simply that analysis needs to be extended beyond the identification of preferred solutions to implementation. It is also that ways must be found of inserting organizational and political factors into the initial analysis, into the selection of the preferred alternative.

For solving problems, a Model I-style analysis provides the best first cut. Indeed, for analyzing alternatives and distinguishing the preferred proposal, there is no clear alternative to this basic framework. In order to make a Model I-style analysis manageable, analysts simplify the problem by abstracting from the real-world situation. For example, analyses of the purchase of a major piece of hardware, e.g., a fighter for the military services or computer facilities for the health services, attempt to distinguish the most cost-effective alternative. By examining the benefits derived from the marginal dollars in each of the alternative investments, the analyst is able to distinguish one of the alternatives as the most beneficial. But such analyses omit factors like the existing configuration of organizations that will employ the hardware, the norms and procedures of these organizations, the extent of support for these norms and programs, the political configuration on top of and outside of the relevant organizations, etc. In order to distinguish the alternative that will produce the most cost-effective action, these factors would have to be built into the problem being solved. Formally, many of these factors can be posed as additional "constraints." How such factors can be built into analysis in practice is a most difficult issue for further research.

Moreover, a serious concern with using analysis to improve policy outcomes must not be limited to improving analysis of particular problems. Rather, we must find new ways of thinking about improving the capabilities of the "system" to select and implement actions. The central questions concern the impact of the structure of political games, and the character of organizations, on policy outcomes. For example, what information do existing organizational procedures make available at what points and how can this information be improved? How can organizations be encouraged to produce a longer list of alternatives? Can means be devised for checking the programs that organizations are prepared to implement and making the repertoire of programs more relevant? What structure of a bureaucratic political game facilitates the identification of issues and production of a good map of alternatives and arguments? How does structure affect the representation of interests and provision of a forum for relevant participants? The arguments developed in this study should facilitate formulation of a long list of questions of this sort about the impact of structural arrangements on policy analysis and policy outcomes. These questions present a promising area for further research.

4. NORMATIVE CONSIDERATIONS. This study has suggested that when analysts focus on an outcome in international affairs, the name of the game is explanation. But this is not entirely fair. The haphazard state of the literature of foreign affairs derives in part from the fact that analysts are engaged in a number of other activities as well. Sometimes in asking "why" of an outcome, they seek an evaluation or justification rather than an explanation. For example, in examining the U.S. blockade, an analyst may be interested not only in an explanation of that ac-
tion but also in the question of whether the President and his associates were justified in choosing a course of action that entailed such a high probability of nuclear war.

An analogue of the conceptual model that we have specified as Model I serves as the basis for most evaluation of actions in international politics. A rational analysis of the problem, alternatives, and consequences provides the benchmark against which the behavior of the governments is tested.

But if one accepts a Model II or Model III explanation of a governmental action, does this not require him to modify the norms he uses in evaluating that behavior? For example, the Organizational Process Model leads an analyst to expect routine behavior in implementation, rather than complete flexibility in tailoring action to the specific situation. A Model II analyst might ask whether established routines were appropriate. But should he not tend to accept—and justify—behavior that would appear, from a Model I perspective, in error? Model III leads the analyst to expect much pulling and hauling, and consequently large errors as a result of innumerable, small slips. Perhaps his touchstone for failure could be labeled “for want of a nail a shoe is lost…” Since he recognizes many reasons for losing nails, should this not limit his willingness to allocate large slices of blame—especially for “failures” to make grand departures?

5. PREDICTION'S AND WARNING SIGNS. The utility of the models in activities other than explanation derives in large part from their effect on analysts' expectations about future outcomes. While most analysts' predictions tend to be generated in terms of some variant of Model I, the attempt to make predictions based on Model II and Model III should permit improvements. But the issue of prediction raises a number of questions that have not been addressed in this study and that provide a fascinating agenda for further work.

Predictions are important, inevitable elements in the structure of our opinions about policy issues, and in any policy analysis or recommendation. These predictions are most often implicit. Most analysts formulate predictions in an intuitive fashion, without much explicit thought. But in making predictions, analysts are forced to relate and weight hundreds of factors known to be relevant to the outcome. Would making explicit predictions about outcomes, and assessing other analysts' implicit predictions, be a useful way of clarifying thought about policy problems and improving analysis and advice? Specifically, should we accept the precept: a good, simple-minded test of someone's expertise in a particular area is whether he can win money (on average) in a series of bets with other reasonable men about outcomes in that area?

For what classes of outcomes do propositions that emerge from Model II and Model III have the most power, that is, permit the greatest improvement in prediction?

Should the objective of studies of internal mechanisms of governments be an explicit statement of factors and relations—a series of simultaneous equations—or rather simply a map of factors to which an analyst should be sensitive, but which he must weigh and relate in his own gut?

What are the major drawbacks to the simple-minded demand for predictions about outcomes, and what does the literature on the logic of prediction and forecasting suggest about ways of overcoming them?

This cluster of issues forms a major problem for further steps in the analysis of foreign policy, and indeed of all public policy.

Model II and Model III cuts should not only improve analysts' specific predictions; they should also sensitize analysts to certain warning signs about the behavior of nations that they might otherwise overlook. A Model II perspective should encourage analysts to worry about the mechanisms by which partial commitments become overcommitments. For example, any organizational process analyst would have bet that in allowing MacArthur to provide air cover for the South Koreans on June 26, 1950, Truman had virtually decided for American intervention with a significant force. No Model II analyst could have expected that President Johnson's decision to bomb North Viet Nam in February 1965 (and thus of necessity to provide bases for bombers, storage sites for bombs, and security for both) would be separate from the introduction of American troops. Only by neglecting the questions posed by Model II could an analyst assume that organizational options, e.g., significant capabilities for fighting limited war, can be created without also raising the probability that these options will be exercised. In the words of Senator Richard Russell, a seasoned observer of military organizations, "If Americans have the capability to go anywhere and do anything, we will always be going somewhere and doing something."
Model III should lead an analyst to post cautions about the necessity for complementarity among personalities and operating styles in the highest circles. Some ingredients and certain combinations tend to spoil the soup — or at least to make it less savory. For example, each new American administration goes through a transition period in which large errors are likely to occur: Truman's cancellation of Lend-Lease, Kennedy's Bay of Pigs, and Johnson's Viet Nam. These "transition phenomena" resulted in large part from the newness of players both to one another and to the machines on top of which they were placed.

6. APPLICATIONS OF THE MODELS TO OTHER AREAS OF PUBLIC POLICY. That analogies of the three models can be used to analyze outcomes in areas of public policy outside foreign and military affairs should be obvious. Several such analyses have been published, for example, Theodore Marmor's excellent study, The Politics of Medicare. Others are in progress. Further specification of the analogies, and application of them to various additional areas, constitutes a significant "target of opportunity."

7. THEORIES OF FOREIGN POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. The argument of this book implies a position on the problem of "the state of the art" of theorizing about foreign policy and international relations.

That the best explanations of foreign affairs are insightful, personalistic, and noncumulative has often been noted. The field is so unstructured that each scholar is encouraged to make a personal contribution by expressing his understanding in a vocabulary that captures what is unique about his insight. Such insights, however, are not easily applied by less brilliant students of foreign policy to new cases. Consequently, perceptive analyses of particular happenings tend simply to illuminate those occurrences rather than to contribute to an accumulating body of systematic knowledge.

Some analysts justify this condition as a consequence of the character of the enterprise. The complexities of the reality with which the analyst of foreign affairs is concerned create a conflict between insight and cumulation. Juxtaposition of the necessity for insight and the requirement of communication poses a paradox: well-defined concepts shackle the analyst's ability to grasp insights that require well-defined concepts to communicate. In explaining occurrences, then, the foreign policy analyst is a historian, and Clio is a muse. As one major proponent of this position has declared, "Understanding is the enemy of prediction."

While accepting the characterization of the present condition of foreign policy analysis, most international relations theorists draw quite different conclusions. These symptoms constitute evidence of the lack of theory in international relations and the bankruptcy of analysis without theory. Under the banner "There is no theory in international relations" international relations theorists march off to explore new frontiers.

The fact that almost as much time has been spent lamenting the lack of theory, and theorizing about theory in international relations, as has been invested in producing substantive work suggests that the "discipline" is retarded. But this study adopts a third posture toward the problem — one quite distinct from the first two. A concern for systematic foreign policy analysis does not entail a demand for a priori theorizing on new frontiers or ad hoc appropriation of "new techniques." The present condition of foreign policy explanations can be taken as an indicator that the "state of the art" is stunted rather than bankrupt. What is required, at least as the first step, is an examination of the work: inspection of existing explanations, articulation of the conceptual models employed in producing them, formulation of the propositions relied upon, analysis of the logic of the various intellectual enterprises, and reflection on the questions being asked. These preliminary matters — formulating questions with clarity and self-consciousness about categories and assumptions so that fruitful acquisition of large quantities of data is possible — are still a major hurdle in considering most important problems. As a second step, foreign policy and international relations theorists must begin systematic acquisition and processing of data. Most theorists have little respect for "case studies" — in large part because of the atheoretical character of case studies of the past. But the only substitute for detailed examination of particular events and problems is construction of theory in the absence of specific information. What we need is a new kind of "case study" done with theoretical alertness to the range of factors identified by Models I, II, and III (and others) on the basis of which to begin refining models and procedures.

8. CLARIFICATION AND REFINEMENT OF MODELS I, II, AND III. The present formulation of Models I, II, and III is a first step. These models must be refined, their applicability clarified, and variants identified. Given any action, an imaginative analyst should always be able to construct some rationale for the government's choice. (Indeed, in a democratic system, it is necessary
that reasons be produced for whatever is done.) By imposing, and relaxing, constraints on the parameters of rational choice (as in variants of Model I), analysts can construct a large number of accounts of any act as the rational choice. But what does such an account imply? What are the rules of evidence and inference by which one distinguishes among various accounts of a particular action as a rational choice? What evidence counts for or against an assertion about, for example, Soviet intentions? Analysts who rely on Model I in explaining occurrences by reference to national goals and Intentions summarize a large number of specific factors. But if we are to be clearer about specific determinants of occurrences, it will be necessary to decompose these summary statements.

As suggested in Chapter 1, I have begun a further study of the Rational Actor Model in which I attempt to distinguish between Model I statements about (1) pressures created by the international environment, that is, pressures that would be felt by any national government; (2) the logic of a situation or problem; (3) shared national values and assumptions; and (4) values or assumptions shared by a group of national leaders. But considerably more refinement is necessary before Model I analysis can make more systematic contributions to the question of determinants of governmental actions.

Model II's explanation of action at \( t \) in terms of activity at \( t - 1 \) is explanation. The world is contiguous. But governments sometimes make sharp departures. Can an Organizational Process model be modified to suggest where change is likely? Attention to organizational change should afford greater understanding of why particular programs and SOPs are maintained by identifiable types of organizations and also how a manager can improve organizational performance. Model II concentrates on the aggregate behavior of organizations rather than on individuals within organizations. What kinds of individuals, personnel systems, and norms are consistent with the kind of organizational behavior identified by Model II? In the present formulation of Model II, a unified group of leaders makes decisions within organizational constraints. Other accounts of these central decisions could be meshed with the organizing concepts of Model II.

Model III tells a fascinating story, but it is enormously complex. The information requirements are often overwhelming, and many of the details of the bargaining may be superfluous. How can such a model be made parsimonious? The use of this model requires more satisfactory accounts of each player's position, more careful specification of various action-channels, etc. The current statement of the model concentrates on the governmental machine, but external groups could be included by broadening the model. Model III permits a number of low-level propositions about the behavior of players or their likely stand on various issues. How these propositions can be combined to yield propositions about more aggregate governmental actions is a central difficulty.

9. RELATIONS AMONG THE MODELS: PARTIAL V. GENERAL ANALYSIS. The three models are obviously not exclusive alternatives. Indeed, the paradigms highlight the partial emphasis of each framework — what each magnifies and what it leaves out. Each concentrates on one class of variables, in effect, relegating other important factors to a ceteris paribus clause. The models can therefore be understood as building blocks in a larger model of the determinants of outcomes.

The developed sciences have little hesitation about partial models. The fact that additional factors are known to be relevant to a class of outcomes does not necessarily mean that it is always helpful to try to incorporate these factors into an analytic model. In contrast, the aspiring sciences tend to demand general theory. In satisfying this demand, they often force generalization at the expense of understanding. Refining partial paradigms, and specifying the classes of actions for which they are relevant, may be a more fruitful path to limited theory and propositions than the route of instant generalization.

It is not difficult to sketch the outline of a general model. The concepts of each conceptual model could be represented as factors relevant to governmental action in foreign affairs. And the collection of factors in each of the models could then be combined into a full function — or a set of simultaneous equations — that represent the determinants of these actions. Given our present understanding of the factors involved, and our lack of understanding of the relations among them, however, this "grand model" is really a metaphor.

10. THE TYPOLOGY PROBLEM. The three models are not equally applicable to any governmental action or outcome. A typology of actions and outcomes, some of which are more amenable to treatment in terms of one model and some to another, should be developed.
The highest of high-level crises, the events of October 1962, do not constitute a typical occurrence. Prima facie, the missile crisis would seem to be an ideal Model I case. The strategic competition, the obvious threat to shared values, the awareness of central leaders about the details of governmental actions, and the overwhelming importance of the President and the Chairman do make Model I analysis powerful. Even in this case, Model II and Model III add a lot. But the shape of this study is biased by focusing on this high-level crisis rather than on the more routine behavior of governments.

For explaining actions where national security interests dominate, shared values lead to a consensus on what national security requires, and actions flow rather directly from decisions, Model I is useful. Thus to predict that if the Soviet Union doubles its defense expenditures, the U.S. defense budget will rise, Model I is sufficient. For explaining the specific characteristics of a governmental action performed by a large organization, Model II is most powerful. Decisions that emerge from intra-governmental debate at the highest levels are the stuff of Model III. But these three clues are no typology. For a refined typology, we do not even have a satisfactory list of the relevant dimensions. Among the dimensions that should be considered are: crisis to noncrisis contexts, decisions to actions, short-term to long-term, more presidential involvement to presidential unawareness, potential political saliency to no political saliency; as well as the substance of the issue: military force, budget, diplomacy, etc. But can the typology neglect specific characteristics of the structure of the government and the individuals in it? A typology of decisions and actions that would serve as a guide to the analyst about predominant reliance for a first cut constitutes an important next step in research.

11. ADDITIONAL PARADIGMS. These three models of the determinants of governmental action do not exhaust the dimensions on which they are arranged. Along one dimension, they represent different levels of aggregation: nations (or national governments), organizations, and individuals. Along a second dimension, they represent different patterns of activity: purposive action toward strategic objectives, routine behavior toward different organizational goals, and political activity toward competing goals. It is not accidental that explanations offered in the literature of foreign policy cluster around these three patterns. But models that mix characteristics of the three are clearly possible. One of the more interesting and promising is a cross between Model I and Model III, focusing in the case of the United States, on the President as the rational actor whose purposes nevertheless include more than mere strategic values and whose activities require sneakers as well as boots. Similarly, by treating organizations as political players, Model II and Model III can be blended.

But these three paradigms neglect or underplay a number of further aspects of governmental behavior. Additional paradigms focusing, for example, on individual cognitive processes, or the psychology of central players, or the role of external groups, must be considered.

12. FACTORS BEYOND GOVERNMENTAL ACTION. Governmental action forms but one cluster of factors relevant to outcomes in foreign affairs. Most students of foreign policy adopt this focus. Most explanations of occurrences center on government action. Nevertheless, the dimensions of the chessboard, the character of the pieces, and the rules of the game — factors considered by international systems theorists — constitute the context in which the chess pieces are moved. This context includes diverse factors such as gross topography, frontiers, climate, religion, national character—insitutions—style, natural resources, demography, capital resources, skill and training, technology, CNP, and morale. How these factors affect the models of governmental behavior is yet another important issue for further research.